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This research answers the question of what shaped the US support for Turkish 
membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and early 
the 2000s in order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as a candidate country. 
Studies do exist in the literature, which strive to reveal the importance of US influence 
in world politics or its support in bilateral relations between the European Union and 
Turkey. However, this thesis furthers previous studies by (1) providing a credible path 
within the multi-dimensional framework of neorealism and (2) benefitting from the APP 
data to elaborate on shifting American support in EU-Turkey bilateral relations across 
time.  
With the above-mentioned aim, this thesis first introduces neorealism as the overarching 
theory of this study. Then it reviews Turkey-EU and Turkey-US bilateral relations to 
emphasize the emerging shift between European and American perspectives on Turkey 
after the Cold War while underscoring the essence of this study; American support in 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. In detail, this work discusses how the shifted 
international system and changing relations of the US, heralded as the hegemon of the 
international system, affected American attempts to support Turkey in European circles 
and examines the reasons behind the American support during the 1990s and the early 
2000s. With the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical framework, this thesis aims to 
focus on the significance of Turkey’s relations with the EU for the US security interests. 
Additionally, this thesis constitutes the first quantitative study, which intends to 
evaluate the primary form of US support to Turkey in official and non-official European 
circles during the 1990s and the early 2000s.    
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ABD, AB, VE TÜRKİYE ÜÇGENİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN AB’NE KABUL 
GÖRÜŞMELERİNDE AMERİKAN DESTEĞİ   
Yasin Bostanci 
Avrupa Çalışmaları, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014. 
Tez Danışmanı: Meltem Müftüler Baç 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği Genişlemesi, Amerikan Desteği, Amerikan Algısı, 
AB-Türkiye İlişkileri, ABD-Türkiye İlişkileri, Üçlü İlişkiler 
Bu araştırma, 1990’lar ve 2000’lerin başlarında Türkiye’nin AB üyeliği için ABD’nin 
verdiği desteğin nasıl oluştuğu ve bu desteğin arkasında yatan sebepler nelerdir 
sorularına, Türkiye’nin aday bir ülke olarak geleceğini yorumlayabilmek amacıyla 
cevap vermektedir. Literatürde ABD’nin dünya politikasında etkisini göstermeyi 
amaçlayan veya ABD’nin Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ikili ilişkilerine olan desteğini 
göstermeyi hedefleyen çalışmalar bulunmaktadır. Lakin, bu çalışma daha önce 
gerçekleştirilmiş çalışmaları (1) neorealizm’in çok yönlü temeli ile güvenilir bir yordam 
sağlayarak ve (2) APP verilerinden faydalanarak zaman içerisinde değişiklik gösteren 
ABD’nin Türkiye-AB ikili ilişkilerinde desteğini yorumlayarak ilerletmektedir.  
Yukarıda bahsedilen amaçlarla, bu tez öncelikle neorealizmi bu çalışmanın kapsayıcı 
teorisi olarak sunmaktadır. Daha sonra, Soğuk Savaş dönemi sonrasında Türkiye ile 
ilgili Amerikan ve Avrupa algılarında oluşan değişimi açıklamak amacıyla Türkiye-AB 
ve Türkiye-ABD ikili ilişkilerini gözden geçirmekte ve bu çalışmanın özü 
vurgulanmaktadır: Türkiye’nin AB’ye kabulünde Amerikan desteği. Son olarak, bu 
çalışma, değişen uluslararası sistemin ve uluslararası sistemin egemeni olan ABD’nin 
ilişkilerinin, 1990’lar ve 2000’lerin başlarında Türkiye’nin Avrupa’da desteklenmesine 
yönelik Amerikan çabalarını nasıl etkilediğini detaylı şekilde tartışmaktadır. 
Neorealizm’in bu tezin teorik temeli olarak benimsenmesi ile birlikte, bu tez ABD’nin 
güvenliğe yönelik çıkarları için Türkiye’nin AB ile olan ilişkilerinin önemine 
odaklanmaktadır. Bu araştırmanın aynı zamanda ABD’nin Türkiye’yi resmi ve gayri-
resmi Avrupa ilişkilerinde desteklemek için 1990’lar ve 2000 başlarında kullandığı 
öncelikli yaklaşımı değerlendirme niyeti olan ilk sayısal çalışma olduğu da 
belirtilmelidir.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION  
This research answers the question of what shaped US support for Turkish membership 
in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and the early 2000s in 
order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as a candidate country.  American 
support in the Turkey-EU relations following the end of the Cold War, offers a unique 
analysis to those researchers who are keen on multi-faceted inquiries since the process 
contains various levels. Since the end of World War II, Turkey saliently has constituted 
a major role in bilateral/transatlantic relations between the US and the EU. The US has 
always been very determined in supporting Turkish integration with the Western 
institutions since the initiation of the Cold War. The Turkish issue and the Turkish 
inclusion in the West portrayed a positive stance until the end of the 1980s. 
Accordingly, this seemed to be supported by both a domestic and international 
audience. On the contrary, this support became a challenge for Turkey, especially after 
the end of the Cold War. While the US continued to further support Turkey in its 
official and non-official relations with the West due to its increasing geo-strategic 
importance following the end of the Cold War, the Western alliance which was born out 
of the threat of Communism started to become problematic once the common concerns 
regarding security started to dissolve. As a consequence, Turkey’s position in the 
European Union has since been readjusted with the degrading alliance in the 
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international system. Contrasting with the fact that the everlasting alliance between 
Western European countries and the US started to worsen after the end of the Cold War, 
American support to anchor Turkey to the West appeared as successful efforts during 
the 1990s, once the 1995 Customs Union Agreement and the 1999 Helsinki Summit 
decision which made Turkey a candidate country for EU membership considered. The 
US’s support was also influential in Turkey’s membership to North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as well as the European Community (EC). While neither the 
international structure nor the capabilities of the US encountered a radical change, 
American attempts to support the European Union to assist Turkey as a candidate 
country dramatically became a burden for Turkey by the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 
and the European Council decision regarding the start of accession negotiations in 2004. 
Considering that Turkey is now a member of Western based political and security 
mechanisms such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), and the Council of Europe, Turkey’s full-membership to the EU still seems to 
lag behind.   
During the Cold War, US motivation in supporting Turkish integration with the Western 
institutions was mainly based on strategic concerns. Turkey’s unique geostrategic 
location made it possible for the US to contain Soviet expansionism in areas 
surrounding Turkey. As a consequence, this necessitated Turkey’s inclusion in the 
Western group. According to the US, Turkey’s membership to the non-military 
institutions such as the EC would accelerate the adoption of Western democracy, norms 
and values, and free market economy. Turkey’s integration with the West, in turn, 
would help the US in creating a stronger Western ‘buffer’ against the communist threat. 
In other words, the US’s support for Turkish inclusion in the West was a significant and 
complementary part of its global security policy. On the other hand, the US had no 
doubts about Turkey’s foreign policy orientation or Turkey’s potential search ability for 
an ‘alternative.’ The fact that Turkey was already following a Western-oriented foreign 
policy and was weak against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the 
issues regarding its East border were two of the driving factors for Turkey’s 
membership to NATO and the Western group. Due to Turkey’s strategic importance, 
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the EC also appreciated Turkey’s application in 1963. In this regard, it can be argued 
that the strategic imperatives of the Cold War period combined American and European 
approaches towards Turkey. As a result, these approaches of the two sides fastened 
Turkey’s inclusion in the Western institutions and this balance could survive until the 
end of the Cold War. 
When the Cold War came to an end, divergence about Turkey and global security 
expectations emerged between the US and European states. The rogue states, the newly 
emerging European security and defence framework as well as missile defence system 
were only some of the matters that caused divergence between the US and European 
states. It should be noted here that nearly all of the studies in literature express the level 
of divergence emerged during the post-Cold War with their titles such as: ‘transatlantic 
strains,’ ‘the divergence of transatlantic policies,’ ‘allies divided,’ ‘fraying ties,’ and 
‘continental adrift.’  
However, Turkey’s geostrategic location kept its prominence as the driving force in US-
Turkey bilateral relations. Even when a divergence about Turkey emerged in the EU 
due to a number of factors such as Kurdish issue, Cyprus issue, and democratic and 
human rights deficits, the US’s policy to anchor Turkey to the West remained strong 
because of the continuation of Turkey’s strategic importance for American interests. As 
reflected in the US’s National Security Strategy in 1998, 
…Turkey’s relationship with Europe has serious consequences for regional 
stability and the evolution of the European political and security structures. 
A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey has supported 
the US efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, NIS, and the Middle East as 
well as to contain Iran and Iraq. Its continued ties to the West and its 
support for our overall strategic objectives in one of the world’s most 
critical regions are critical. We continue to support Turkey’s active 
constructive role within NATO and the Europe (The White House, 1997, p. 
16). 
As can be understood from the US security strategy during the post-Cold War, Turkey 
emerged as a critical actor for the US’s security policy to be implemented in the 
surrounding regions. In other words, Turkey now had a multiregional role for the US.  
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Accordingly, this study considers the abovementioned context in order to understand 
the American support in bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU. This thesis aims 
to reveal the motivations for the US in supporting Turkey’s membership to the EU 
during the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, this study seeks to understand the American 
perspective on the EU variable in Turkey-US bilateral relations as well as the affecting 
US security policy.  
This thesis first elaborates on the dimensional change in relations between the European 
Union and the US after the Cold War. Then, the work focuses on the American efforts 
to support Turkey’s potential membership in the European Union. Finally, this thesis 
examines the reasons behind the American support during the 1990s and the early 
2000s. 
The primary concern of this thesis is to understand the American perspective in 
Turkey’s accession to the EU and the reasons behind this support. This work will 
discuss how the shifted international system and changing relations of the US, heralded 
as the hegemon of the international system, affected American attempts to support 
Turkey in European circles. Exploring such an effect will create minor questions for this 
thesis. Some of the questions which will be posed in the next chapters are as follows: 
How did the European Union deal with the Turkish issue? How did the US deal with the 
Turkish issue? How could the US support relations between the European Union and 
Turkey? To what extent did the US support relations between the European Union and 
Turkey? What were the motivations of the US behind its aggressive support policy? 
What were the limits for American support? How were the relations between the US 
and the EU during the 1990s and the early 2000s?  
To provide a theoretical framework for the main research question of this thesis, I will 
review the related conceptual literature in the forth chapter. The very detailed review of 
neorealism as the overarching theory of this study will help better explaining the 
underlying reasons of continued and furthered American support. However, this thesis 
will mainly focus on a series of secondary sources to elaborate on the shift by adding 
different variables into the equation such as the different stages of American support 
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and structural impetus. To further elaborate on American support, this study will also 
quantitatively evaluate the stance of US Presidents within the framework presented in 
Chapter 2. 
This research covers the period from the end of the Cold War until the early 2000s, in 
other words, from the time when Turkey submitted its first formal application for 
membership in the European Union until the time the European Union declared that it 
would start the accession talks with Turkey. This time period provides the researcher 
the opportunity to evaluate in detail the gradually decreasing effectiveness of American 
support in bilateral relations between the European Union and Turkey. Additionally, 
this period witnessed the most problematic EU-Turkey relations in history. The 
unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as well as the Iraq 
War in the 2000s are some of the key factors that this work evaluates at the global level.  
Additionally, this period witnessed how the atmosphere of the international system both 
during the Cold War and the post-Cold War had an impact on foreign policy of the 
European Union. As a result, US efforts were much welcomed in official and non-
official European circles. However, following the start of accession talks with Turkey in 
2005, bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey underwent a significant 
transformation. It was during this time when it became apparent that the EU would not 
be under the influence of a third party in its decisions such as the start of the Customs 
Union negotiations with Turkey and Helsinki Summit decision for Turkey. On the 
contrary, EU-Turkey relations and the Turkey issue in a general sense would now be 
based on a number of domestic factors such as domestic reforms that would be adopted 
by Turkey. Following the Helsinki Summit in 1999 and the start of accession 
negotiations in 2005, the relations of the EU with Turkey was understood as being 
conditional according to the progress of Turkey’s reform process. As a result, the US 
and Turkey realized that without adopting necessary reforms requested by the EU, 
American efforts to involve Turkey in the EU would be ineffective. In this regard, it can 
be concluded that the strategic interests of the US have no longer affected the outcome 
for Turkey and the EU started to have its own strategic interests at some level. On the 
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other hand, as this thesis evaluates, the US always continued to further support Turkey 
regardless of the EU’s stance in a very determined manner. 
The chapters in this thesis follow a sequential order. With an intention to go into the 
details of the divergence emerged towards Turkey, the first half of the second chapter 
adopts neorealism as this study’s theoretical framework. The second chapter presents 
the analytic features of this approach as well as its suitability for other frameworks. 
First, it starts with the development of realism as a major stream international theory 
and then elaborates on the different schools of neorealism. Furthermore, it touches upon 
the details of neorealism’s development as an international relations theory during the 
post-Cold War. This chapter presents a provisional road map to understand American 
support and the reasons behind it by examining neorealism in detail. With its 
comparatively flexible methodology, this theoretical framework helps the researcher 
adopt mainly structural motivators (variables) and paves the way for understanding 
foreign policy outcomes of the US within the time frame of this thesis.  
With the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical framework for this study, this thesis 
gains the ability to explain policy outcomes with sensitivity through the act of balancing 
between external structural variables, as well as domestic accelerators and barriers. 
However, it should be noted that this thesis neither attempts to test the validity of 
neorealism nor to evaluate its sufficiency to explain the foreign policy outcomes. On the 
contrary, the framework that this thesis adopted only helps in answering the main 
question of this study in a systemic manner while strengthening the arguments 
presented throughout the chapters. 
The second half of the second chapter additionally presents a quantitative content 
analysis technique named Wordscores. This thesis has benefitted from Woolley and 
Gerhard Peter’s The American Presidency Project at the University of California Santa 
Barbara, which contains "most of the US President’s public messages, statements, 
speeches, and news conference remarks" (Peters, 2014). This study evaluates 757 
automatically extracted documents related to Turkey from the 1990s until 2006 to 
quantitatively analyze the efforts of American Presidents in supporting Turkey in 
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European circles, since public speeches to the European leaders were the primary form 
of US efforts to support Turkey in official and non-official European circles (Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2005). This section first introduces the details of the document collection 
process and hand coding rules. Then, it presents the details of Wordscores as well as its 
mathematical foundation and software components. Third, this chapter discusses 
problematic aspects of the method along with its advantages.  
With this aspect, this study demonstrates the level of US support across time. As a 
consequence, this approach provides the opportunity for researcher to compare US 
support quantitatively along with structural variables which neorealism suggests, and 
increases the explanatory power of this research. 
The third chapter provides a historical framework to comprehensively understand the 
bilateral relations between the US and Turkey and between Turkey and the EU after the 
Cold War. This chapter also provides insight regarding the divergences that arose 
towards Turkey after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Throughout this work, 
special emphasis has been placed on American approach, interests, and motivations 
towards Turkey; as opposed to focusing solely on Turkish policies.  
To understand the American support on bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey, 
the fourth chapter elaborates on the attempts of the US to assist Turkey in European 
circles from the 1990s until the 2000s with a special emphasis on the US scope of 
Turkish membership after the end of the Cold War. Similar to the approach adopted in 
Chapter 3, this chapter stems from the assumption that Turkey constituted for a bulwark 
for the US’s interests. This chapter evaluates American national interests as well as its 
motives in supporting the Turkish membership in the Union by treating the international 
climate as an independent variable. Additionally, the fourth chapter touches upon the 
international climate as a factor which shapes the US foreign policy at all levels. Then, 
to show American support and efforts to support Turkey in European circles, this 
chapter sequentially orders ‘what happened’ in the relations of the European Union with 
Turkey from the 1980s until the early 2000s, with their causal mechanisms. The efforts 
of American leaders as well as the approaches of the US administrations, specifically 
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their public speeches, which have been available in the APP dataset, have been treated 
as the primary form of American support in accordance with the literature and the 
renewed neorealist assumptions. However, this study mainly focuses on the aggressive 
American foreign policy and its interventions by the end of the Cold War, after the 
events on September 11, and the Iraq crisis that followed as a result of the changing 
structure of the international system. This chapter examines American interventions in 
the EU-Turkey relations in two sections: during the 1990s and during the early 2000s. 
As a consequence, the first section of this chapter focuses on two major events; the 
Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the Customs Union agreement in 1995. With an aim to 
understand the changing perspective of the EU regarding the US interventions, the 
second section of this chapter mostly touches upon the American efforts to support 
Turkey during the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 as well as the initiation of accession 
negotiations in 2004. By evaluating the shifting responses of the European Union during 
the Clinton and Bush administrations, this study presents empirical data to demonstrate 
the significant decrease of the legitimacy of the US in bilateral relations of the European 
Union and Turkey during Clinton and Bush presidencies.  
All of the above-mentioned chapters help the researcher to explain the American 
perspective on Turkey’s accession to the EU and the reasons behind this support as well 
as how complicated the rational and continued support of the US in Turkey’s accession 
process to the EU gradually lost its legitimacy. In turn, this thesis demonstrates that 
American efforts in supporting Turkey in both non-official and official European circles 
were due to the US’s security policy which aims to protect and increase American 
economic, political, and military interests at all levels. Furthermore, this study indicates 
the essential importance of changing geo-political hierarchies and the changing balance 
in the international system for understanding the policy outcomes of related actors. 
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CHAPTER 2  
METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Setting Theoretical Framework: Realism and Neorealism 
As one of the major stream international relations theories, the use of realism is 
"unavoidable" (Norris, 2002, p. 15). According to some scholars, whether it is 
incomplete or not, realism, as Frankel puts it: 
…as an intellectual construct as dominated the study of international 
relations from the beginnings [for the reason that] Realism has consistently 
provided the most reliable guidance for statecraft, and it has consistently 
offered the most compelling explanations of state behaviour (Frankel, 1996, 
p. ix). 
As a consequence, realism as one of the major international relations theories has been 
pervasive through both political science and international relations literature. Due to its 
prevalence, most paradigms and theories could only oppose realism partially. 
Furthermore, Baldwin indicates that "commercial liberalism" or interdependency; 
"republican liberalism" or democratic peace theory; "sociological liberalism" or 
constructivism; and neoliberal institutionalism are some of the approaches that have 
emerged as a critique of realism (Baldwin, 1993). On the other hand, as Keohane puts 
it: 
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Periodic attacks on Realism have taken place; yet the very focus of these 
critiques seems only to reconfirm the centralist of Realist thinking in the 
international political thought of the West (as cited in Smith, 1986, p. 20). 
The controversial debate between the neorealists and neo-liberalists dominated the last 
two decades of political science and international relations literature (Powell, 1994). 
However, I approach these debates as the efforts which improve neorealism with 
alternative causal mechanisms. 
2.1.1. The Concepts of Neorealism 
According to the approach that Waltz adopts in his masterpiece, Theory of International 
Politics, the systemic structure is defined through: (1) order, (2) the variance in units’ 
functions, and (3) capabilities of the units (as cited in Vasquez, 1996, p. 310).   
 
Figure 1: Waltzian (1979) Components of the System Structure 
 
In his work, Waltz preferred to evaluate the interactions of states, particularly the 
pathway of warfare. According to Waltz, the system in which states are members is an 
The Order (i.e. 
Hierarchy or 
Anarchy) 
The Functional 
Specifications of 
the System Units 
The Distribution 
of the Units' 
Capabilities 
 27 
 
anarchic one. Under the circumstances of the international system, the states cannot 
trust each other and rely on each other only for their own interests, even if interaction 
between two states continues for a long time. Without an authority in charge of the 
international system, i.e. a world government, there is no way to prevent hostility 
among states. As Waltz argues, each state of the international system is forced to 
develop an ability called "self help" since each and every member of the international 
system can only survive by relying on only itself. As a consequence, Waltz thinks that 
"wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them" (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 
1999, p. 140). 
In an anarchical international system, being dependent is much more beneficial for a 
state in the long-term. Under hierarchical conditions, specialization of state in a specific 
area might lead to a better cooperation in the economy; on the contrary, under 
anarchical circumstances a state’s dependence on each other would bring nothing but 
vulnerability in the long run. As Waltz defines the international system as a mechanical 
structure by stating: "A mechanical society rests on the similarity of the units that 
compose it; an organic society is based on their differences" (Waltz, 1986, p. 324). 
Accordingly, Waltz expects the states to be functionally similar under the circumstances 
of the international system. While the states do their best to protect themselves and their 
interests, obviously what they arrange is determined by their capabilities. This 
automatically creates an advantage for those states with more capabilities under the 
circumstance of the anarchic international system, while fewer capabilities become 
vulnerability for some of the states. As Waltz asserts, the functions of the states become 
alike, but the efforts they can put into their plans differ due to their capabilities. From 
this point of view, Waltz builds his theory upon what Thucydides calls cruel reality, 
"…the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to 
accept" (as cited in the translation of Warner, 1972, p. 402).   
As a consequence, if the states with more capabilities are able to build their hegemony 
in the system, those will fewer capabilities may prefer to build a coalition to enhance 
their abilities and attempt to unseat the hegemon. Since the hegemon may start to 
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exploit the rest at anytime by benefitting from its position, the incentive of the rest to act 
together to reset their positions gains significance. As Weber puts it: 
…peace is nothing more than a chance in the character of the conflict… As 
every big political community is a potential aspirant to prestige, it is also a 
potential threat to all its neighbours. Finally, by virtue of an unavoidable 
‘dynamic of power,’ wherever claims to prestige flare up… They challenge 
and call forth the competition of all other possible bearers of prestige (as 
cited in Smith, 1986, p. 26). 
Due to the anarchic environment of the international system, small powers are expected 
to coordinate and stand against the hegemon. Since the states are rational actors, a state 
is more likely to act against and challenge the hegemon, particularly right after its 
adversary gains hegemon status in the international system. Whether the same state or 
states obtain the hegemon status in the international system, it is always advantageous 
for the other states to initiate another challenge against the hegemon. Additionally, there 
is nothing to hinder them in the anarchic structure of the international system.  
The “balance of power” concept of neorealism, according to Waltz, is the most 
important addition that neorealism has made to the political theory. As he puts it: 
If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance 
of power is it (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, pp. 161-162). 
Waltz adopts the international system as his primary causal variable. According to him, 
the insecurity of the system and its anarchic nature leads to the restructuring of its units. 
For the neorealists, this transformation or the balance of power process would repeat 
itself forever until another ordering is arranged. As Gilpin adds: 
Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new 
round of hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be, 
until men either destroy themselves or learn to develop an effective 
mechanism of peaceful change (as cited in Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, p. 166).  
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Figure 2: A Neorealist Review 
2.1.2. Neorealism during the Post Cold War 
If the process of balance of power is endless and timeless, as Morgenthau and Waltz 
claim: "…the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact 
of experience" (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1985, pp. 38-39) then the US should have 
been the new and only hegemon after the collapse of the Soviet Union as neorealists 
expected. As Waltz asserts: "Never since the Roman Empire has power been so 
concentrated in one state" (Waltz, 2000). However, for the US to be the only hegemon 
in the system would falsify the balance of power assumption of neorealism. Due to the 
continuity found in the balance of power process, the US should have been challenged 
by a number of states who are simply not ‘happy’ with the status quo. In 1993, Waltz 
claimed that the balance about to be reached as the following: 
Hegemony leads to balance… That is now happening, but haltingly so 
because the United States still has benefits to offer and many other countries 
have become accustomed to their easy lives with the United States bearing 
many of their burdens (Waltz, 1993, p. 77). 
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During the 2000s, when Waltz stated that "the balance is emerging slowly" (Waltz, 
2000), most scholars who work with realist theories started to re-evaluate the Waltzian 
formulation of neorealism. As a consequence, neorealism divided into two branches: (1) 
offensive neorealism and (2) defensive neorealism. 
On the contrary, defensive realists think that classifying states according to their 
capabilities is not sufficient. A hegemon in the international system may be the most 
powerful state; however, the rest may be powerful enough to initiate a challenge while 
the capabilities of each constitute a weakness. As a consequence, defensive realists refer 
to realism during World War II and focus on the intentions of states. Rather than solely 
focusing on a state’s need for self-help, they claim that this situation in the international 
system creates distrust and leads to competition among states. As a further note, 
defensive realists also touch upon the costs of competition among states and incentives 
for cooperation. 
According to defensive realists, a state does not follow a pre-determined path in the 
international system nor does it has any pre-determined behaviour. A state, as a rational 
actor calculates the risks and benefits of an action and acts accordingly. As Schweller 
puts it: 
...if all states seek the minimum of power needed for security, threats 
sufficient to provoke balancing behaviour will not arise in the first place. 
...anarchy among units wishing to survive does not mean that war is always 
possible, and states that do not pursue security will not be punished by the 
system (Schweller, 1996, pp. 115-119).  
Thus, Schweller takes the position that a state does not follow an automated path in a 
conflict, if its ultimate motivation is for its own security. Furthermore, if a state’s 
ultimate goal is to reach security, then the possibility of a war in the international 
system should be less likely. However, if a state cannot prevent domestic crime, no 
matter how much it is determined to do so or not, it is impossible to prevent conflict in 
the international system if a member is highly committed. As a result, a member’s 
aggressiveness may be the trigger of a conflict and not only the anarchic structure of the 
international system. As in the case of revisionist states, the ones who look for security 
 31 
 
may also be classified according to their motivations. Contrasting with the assumptions 
of a more pessimistic balance of power approach, conflicts are seen as the only results 
within this framework. As rational actors, states are “to build and deploy forces and 
develop doctrines that emphasize their benign intentions and that create no incentives to 
strike first” (Schweller, 1996, p. 118). 
With a similar approach, Glaser also argues that a state’s intentions are important to 
understand its intentions. Since the states are assumed to be rational actors, Glaser 
through this assumption suggests that a state who seeks security should look for 
cooperation first rather than increasing capabilities. As he puts it: 
Structural realism properly understood predicts that, under a wide range of 
conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through 
cooperative policies, not competitive ones, and should, therefore, cooperate 
when these conditions prevail (Glaser, 1996, p. 123).  
According to Glaser, states as rational actors with ‘selfish’ goals are already motivated 
and encouraged to cooperate and they are able to present their intentions to each other 
through what Glaser defines ‘costly signals.’ For example, a security-seeking state may 
adopt military policies and strategies such as limiting military power only for defense, a 
policy that a non-security-seeking state would find too costly. In this context, a security-
seeking state, as Glaser puts it: “can communicate information about which type of state 
it is, that is, about its motives” (Glaser, 1996, p. 141). Glaser’s contingent realism, a 
renewed version of Waltz’s structural realism, corrects for the Waltzian neorealism’s 
misjudgment of “the propensity of states to succumb to systemic pressures towards 
conflictual patterns of behaviour” (Norris, 2002, p. 27). As Glaser offers additional 
paths: 
Considerations of power do influence the answers to these questions, but 
they only begin to tell the story... (Glaser, 1996, p. 134). In short, states 
motivated primarily by security should not as a general rule try to maximise 
their relative power (Glaser, 1996, p. 145). 
Kydd also argues for the importance of a state’s motives by emphasizing:  
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...anarchy is not so bad in and of itself, it only leads to problems if there are 
states with aggressive motivations, a desire for more land or power, for 
instance (Kydd, 1997, p. 115). 
As rational actors, security-seeking states are expected to attempt to understand the 
motives of another state. If both parties are looking for security, then this situation 
should lead to cooperation. If this is not the case, then states are expected to switch to 
the ‘self-help’ mode and take precaution for their securities. Then a question emerges: is 
it possible to know a state’s intentions in an anarchic environment? 
As Glaser previously suggested, an actor can send each other a ‘costly signal.’ 
According to Kydd, costly signals may become problematic for aggressive actors by 
simply increasing the cost while it may not for those who seek security. Additionally, 
by touching upon neoliberalism and furthering Glaser’s arguments, Kydd thinks that 
due to the policy process of a democratic state, it’s intentions are expected to be pretty 
clear. As Kydd adds: 
If a democracy is really a security seeker, the openness of its policy 
processes will  reveal this to the world (Kydd, 1997, p. 119). 
With a different evaluation other than structural realists, Kydd rejects the idea of 
whether or not states share the same or ‘good’ intentions are forced into a conflict due 
to the anarchic structure of the international system. According to Kydd, structural 
realists, 
...strongly overestimate the difficulty in assessing state motivations. 
Information on the motivations of security seeking states is so easy to come 
by that mistaken fears about motivations cannot plausibly explain any 
significant war, arms race or crisis this [20th] century (Kydd, 1997, p. 128). 
Walt by agreeing with Kydd, argues that the type of state is also important in 
understanding the behaviour of the state and the traditional approach would be 
misguiding. According to Walt, the capabilities of a state does not determine the 
balance status. A very powerful hegemon may or may not choose to harm. On the 
contrary, a less powerful, revisionist state may motivate itself through its revisionist 
goals and challenge the balance of power system. As a consequence, the revisionist state 
 33 
 
or states emerge as the ones to create a counter-balance. So, Walt replaces the balance 
of power concept with the balance of threat dynamic as the following, 
Balance of power theory predicts that states will ally against the strongest 
state in the system, but the balance of threat theory predicts they will tend to 
ally against the most threatening (Walt, 1997, p. 933). 
While offensive realists backed up the fundamental basis of realism by claiming, 
Of the gods we know and of men we believe, that it is a necessary law of 
their nature that they rule wherever they can (as cited in Morgenthau & 
Thompson, 1985, p. 40). 
Defensive realists attempted to form combined theories by changing their level of 
analysis and even adopting non-realist explanations. As Legro and Moravcsik started 
the debate, modern realist scholars appear to be adopting a number of explanations both 
from outside realism and contradictory to the assumptions of realism. Legro and 
Moravcsik criticize modern realist scholars for risking the fundamental paradigm(s) for 
the sake and credibility of alternatives. According to modern realists, especially 
defensive realists, harm neorealism: 
Realism’s central analytical leverage, parsimony, and distinctiveness derive 
from its ability to explain social life simply through variation in the 
distribution of objective material power capabilities, rather than preferences, 
perceptions, or norms (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999, p. 34). 
At this point, Spirtas contributes to the debate with a very similar approach. He defines 
two different schools of realism. According to the first school, ‘Evil School’, as also 
discussed by Morgenthau and Niebuhr, the actor is intrinsically evil and conflict 
emerges due to the actions of a human or state. Since an actor cannot be ‘fixed’ for its 
evilness, whether mediatory tools such as diplomacy attached to conflict or not, a 
conflict cannot be completely solved. On the contrary, the second school, ‘Tragedy 
School’ does not see any relation between an actor’s nature and evil developments. 
Rather, it prefers to indicate the importance of the environment. According to this 
approach, actors are likely to commit evil behaviour since the environment they live in, 
as Waltz puts, is simply insecure. Under these circumstances, they are likely to act as 
‘evil entities’ whether their intentions are purely good or not. 
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According to Spirtas, ‘Evil’ and ‘Tragedy’ schools of realism was a significant part of 
realism until Waltz published his work in 1975, Theory of International Relations. 
Then, defensive realists attempted to revive a pre-Waltzian approach to cover 
deficiencies emerged especially after the end of the Cold War, which are indicated by 
both defensive realists and the other scholars. As Schweller furthers the realist theories 
after the end of the Cold War by rejecting Legro and Moravcsik’s approach regarding 
defensive realists’ ‘betrayal,’ 
...has been faithful to the paradigm’s core principles precisely because it has 
not advanced unicausal explanations of complex phenomena. In so doing, it 
has restored the theoretical richness of realism that was abandoned by 
structural realism (R. Schweller, 2000, p. 174). 
Additionally, as Spirtas puts it, 
Now the major challange to Waltz comes from those who seek to include 
unit-level factors in a theory of state behaviour. Realists are increasingly 
turning to evil to explain international politics (Spirtas, 1996, p. 398). 
However, adding unit-level variables into the frame is consistent with Waltz’s previous 
explanations regarding the vague nature of neorealism and again and again need for 
non-systemic variables. 
Waltz first pointed out “his theory of the significance of the system structure” (Norris, 
2002, p. 32) or “third image” in 1954, which is itself insufficient, 
The third image describes the framework of world politics, but without the 
first and second images, there can be no knowledge of the forces that 
determine policy (Waltz, 1965, pp. 237-238). 
In 1979, Waltz furthered his arguments by relating the first and second images with the 
third image and admitting that relying on a systematic level of analysis would provide a 
limited perspective only, as anarchy suggests, 
Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they 
may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be 
left alone (Waltz, 1999, p. 309). 
As Waltz clearly clearly further expresses, 
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Far from thinking of unit-level processes as ‘all product...and...not at all 
productive’ I, like Durkheim, think of unit-level processes as a source of 
both changes in systems and of possible changes of systems, hard though it 
is to imagine the latter. Neither structure nor units determine outcomes. 
Each affects the other... Changes in, and transformations of, systems 
originate not in the structure of system, but in its parts (Waltz, 1986, p. 328 
and 343). 
Following the end of Cold War, Waltz remained him in his stance on the “duality of 
causation” (Frankel, 1996, p. 79) approach: 
Structural change begins in a system’s unit, and then unit-level and 
structural causes interact (Waltz, 1993, p. 49).  
During the 2000s, Waltz reformed his theory and concluded that knowledge from the 
units of the system is required: 
Structures shape and shove; they do not determine the actions of states... 
One example is enough to show this... [In Yugoslavia] American policy was 
generated not by external security interests, but by internal political pressure 
and national ambition (Waltz, 2000, p. 24 and 29). 
With Waltz’s attempts to contain unit-level variables in his theory, defensive realists 
can be seen in the same track with neorealism. As previously mentioned, Waltz himself 
made it clear that containing unit-level variables is not only consistent but also 
important for neorealism’s applications in practice. Obviously, this expression contrasts 
with and corrupts Spirtas’s argument: 
The advantages of Waltz’s neorealism is that it discourages the proliferation 
of variables by making the distribution of capabilities among states the only 
dependent variable (Spirtas, 1996, p. 391). 
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Figure 3: Defensive Realists' Contributions to Waltz's Theory 
 
Defensive realists added the motivations of an actor along with its capabilities and its 
strategies for the transparency of an actor’s motivations into the equation. As a 
consequence, balancing appears as a non-automated process which relies on a number 
of different variables. As Vasquez expresses the general posture of post-Cold War 
realism: 
that the balancing of power was never the law Waltz thought it was. In 
effect, he offered an explanation of a behaviour regularity that never existed, 
except within the logic of the theory (Vasquez, 1997, p. 908). 
As a furthering point, defensive realists think that anarchy solely itself does not affect 
the behaviour of the actors. According to them, an actor’s behaviour is affected by 
“structural modifiers” (Taliaferro, 2000, pp. 136-138). So, what modern realists need to 
do is to reveal these modifiers. As Schweller puts it: 
...is not whether states balance or bandwagon – history clearly shows that 
they do both – but rather under what conditions states choose one strategy or 
the other (R. Schweller, 1997, p. 927). 
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One of the top questions that scholars of international relations and political science 
ponder is that under what conditions an actor is more likely to follow a specific strategy. 
According to Norris, “Neorealism today is less content to formulate theoretical 
abstractions” (Norris, 2002, p. 35). The comparative stability arose right after the end of 
the Cold War made it clear for theorists that international relations is quite complex and 
beyond an automated balancing process. According to Powell, during the attempts of 
scholars to explain the effects of different variables, the gap between neorealism and its 
one of the alternatives, neoliberalism started to narrow. In both neorealism and 
neoliberalism scholars attempt to move from the effects of structure to its provisional –
related– relationship with the system units. As Powell claims, 
...both neorealism and neoliberalism see the effects of anarchy and the 
degree of concern about relative gains to be conditional. The task ahead is to 
specify these conditions more precisely (Powell, 1994, p. 344). 
2.1.3. An Introduction to the European Union: the Neorealist Perspective 
Once the analyses of the European Union are evaluated, the very problematic structural 
approach to neorealism is more likely to be seen compared to the dual-causality theory. 
The previous works gather around two broad avenues. According to the first approach, 
European integration was a state-centric answer to bi-polarity. This state-centric answer 
was a US led attempt to create a balance against the Soviet Union and threat, and also 
an attempt for those former powers to significantly be a part of the international system 
once again. As a consequence, European integration was not aiming to form a common 
power, but it was aiming to strengthen the member states individually through common 
points. So, European integration was about the states, but not completely about Europe. 
This is why “modern realists have been sceptical of the EC” (Grieco, 1993, p. 329). 
According to Gilpin, the EC is an 
interstate alliance whose primary purpose is to strengthen the position of 
individual states in an interdependent and highly competitive global 
economy (Gilpin, 1996, p. 19). 
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As this argument suggests, the members of European integration expected to leave the 
integrationist behaviour after the end of the Cold War, and follow an alternative 
pathway in accordance with their national interest against the superpower and 
constraints which affect them. Furthermore, Mearsheimer with the help of neorealism 
and political history, argued that following the end of the Cold War, Europe would 
return to multipolarity. According to him “the European state system has been plagued 
with war since its inception” and a balancing process would eventually come and 
Europe would be “back to the future,” because “the keys to war and peace lie more in 
the structure of the international system than in the nature of the individual states” 
(Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 11-12). As Griffiths puts it with a very similar approach: 
States are condemned to reproduce the logic of anarchy and any cooperation 
that takes place between them is subordinated to the distribution of power 
(Griffiths, 1999, p. 49). 
On the other hand, the second approach to European integration argues that another 
super European power would emerge as a result of European integration, while agreeing 
with most assumptions of the assumptions in the first approach. According to this view, 
European states will merge and form a new superpower to balance against the rest. As 
Rosecrance puts it: "Five great bases of power again control the organization of the 
world order: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China" (as 
cited in Norris, 2002, p. 37). 
During the 1990s, the significance of Mearsheimer’s prediction, “Back to the Future”  
(Mearsheimer, 1990, pp. 11-12) started to decline and European integration was 
furthered with the support provided by the US. Obviously, it was meaningful that 
European states were now able to save themselves from the anarchic order. 
Surprisingly, it was this development that convinced neorealists to add unit-level 
variables to their analyses. Additionally, while European integration furthers, the 
Western states have been able to communicate with the hegemon internally and 
externally. As a result, structural theory started to be criticized for not being able to 
explain ongoing developments in Europe. As Lake stated, “whether or not realists got 
the Cold War right, they have most certainly got the warm peace wrong” (Lake, 1999, 
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pp. 44-45), while Schweller and Wolhfort’s conclusion  was that “the end of the Cold 
War undermines realism” (Schweller & Wohlforth, 2000, p. 60). 
Contrasting with the progressive balancing that neorealism expects, the members of the 
EU appear to find a way to institutionalize their interests to act together, while not being 
affected as much by the structure of the international system and attempts for self-help. 
The EU is a sui-generis entity that emerged not only against an adversary but between 
adversaries. This fact is an answer to why “the chances of enduring peace among Union 
members” increase (Weitsman, 1997, p. 191). Furthermore, Jervis also goes beyond a 
distinction between Gould’s “time’s cycle” and “time’s arrow” to reject the idea that the 
members of the international system would go back to the previous patterns they 
followed before the Cold War, following the end of the Cold War. According to this 
view, a higher level of cooperation on the international stage is possible (Jervis, 1991-
1992, pp. 39-73). If the assumptions of neorealism are problematic because of the 
structural approach, then the ‘time’s cycle’ argument would be inappropriate as a 
conclusion. Keohane argues that the structural theory is “particularly weak in 
accounting for changes” (Keohane, 1999, p. 154). However, it is not completely static. 
While offensive realists adopt the ‘time cycle’ approach in their analyses and expect a 
tragic ending in the European integration while states go back to their previous national 
strategies; defensive realists adopt the ‘time arrow’ approach, which appears to be 
advantageous since this approach considers the changes as well as persistence of unit 
factors. 
Since European integration furthered and deepened following the end of the Cold War, 
sustaining neorealism in this context could be a hard task. On the contrary, once Waltz’s 
dual causality theory is considered, such expressions would become irrelevant. Because, 
according to Waltz, his theory, additional unit variables, and further neo-structural 
theories are able to work fine both in ‘time’s arrow’ and ‘time’s cycle’ approaches. On 
the other hand, an analysis of units was not a part of Mearsheimer’s analysis. From this 
point of view, Mearsheimer’s explanations overlook Waltz’s consideration of changes 
at the unit level. According to Waltz, members of the European Union were not 
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destined to switch back to multipolarity as well as pre-Cold War conflicts, which would 
confirm the previous formats of the balance of power theory. The furthering European 
integration does not necessarily mean that neorealism “has got it wrong,” because the 
other pathway is still possible.  
The ‘time’s arrow’ approach, an approach in which defensive realists adopted, considers 
Waltz’s theory powerful and plausible. This is due to the fact that while the structure 
has an effect, changes at the unit level and cross-relation between these changes and 
structure still affect international politics. Following the end of the Cold War, it can be 
argued that European politics started to shift according to changes at the unit level, 
while it continued to operate under the anarchic conditions of the international system. 
Inside the integration, European states might have decreased the effects of anarchy, but 
outside the integration, the anarchic systemic structure constituted a constraint for all. 
With the deepening and furthering European integration, offensive realism has appeared 
to be more flawed than ever. On the other hand, defensive realism arguments and 
Waltz’s theory still remain plausible, valid, and strong. If the balancing process does not 
apply to the states who are involved in the European integration project, then they 
together may act as a balancer against the rest of system actors. As the ‘time’s arrow’ 
approach expects, the states who involve in the European integration project may 
constitute a one and only single unit, but they will still be restrained to what the uni-
polar world offers and limits. 
As a consequence, the balance of power concept of neorealism for Europe relies on the 
provisional fact that European states will form a superpower soon enough to challenge 
the state in the international system, who holds the status of hegemon. Additionally, 
once the list of countries involved in the EU and the EU itself considered, it appears less 
likely that any of them will become a challenger in the international system. At this 
point, one of the first divisions of neorealism, ‘time’s cycle’ and its assumptions, which 
foresee a shift back to a European multi-polarity, does not seem likely. On the contrary, 
‘time’s arrow’ emerges as a strong and valid alternative that foresees that the 
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rebalancing of the international system would be through the EU, which would 
eventually become a global actor. 
The variables issue and the fact that European states may be replaced with a new 
European actor have been on the agenda of neorealists for a long time. Gilpin by 
furthering one of the fundamental assumptions of all-types-of realism, which is that the 
only actor in world politics is the nation state claimed that the only actor in the world 
politics is the “conflict group” (Gilpin, 1996, p. 7). Furthermore, according to Gilpin, 
the EU, a supranational sui-generis entity could be covered by realism. As he puts it: 
…just as the modern nation-state is a product of particular historical forces, 
changes in those forces could bring about the demise of the nation-state 
(Gilpin, 1984, pp. 267-296). 
Moreover, Waltz points out that 
International structures are defined in terms of the primary political units of 
an era, be they city-states, empire, or nations (Waltz, 1996, p. 309). 
As Gilpin and Waltz, Morgenthau in his masterpiece, Politics Among Nations in 1948, 
also touched upon the transformability of the actor. For European integration, 
Morgenthau listed three different aspects, two of which relate to the variance in 
neorealism, such as offensive and defensive realism, and one, that is between the former 
two. The “political creativity” prediction expects a very intense political, economic, and 
military integration among European states, while “political impotence” refers to 
European neutrality and the EU’s pulling itself back from foreign relations and 
“political desperation” refers to a distancing from integration and cooperation and a 
switch back to national interests.  
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Figure 4: Morgenthau's Predictions regarding European Integration 
 
‘Political desperation’ has been adopted by offensive realism supporters especially after 
the end of the Cold War since the pressure that was born out of the international system 
forced European states to be able to self-help once again. However, the EU (or then the 
EC)  gave a different response by facilitating a number of agreements starting from the 
early 1990s that eventually led to better integration and cooperation among the member 
states. As a consequence, the EU’s efforts to become an ‘ever closer union’ supported 
Morgenthau’s predictions for European integration. 
It should be noted here that Morgenthau’s contributions to explain European integration 
does not solve the question of whether the European Union is an actor in the 
international system or not. While Morgenthau’s approach contrasts with the traditional 
realist view that a supranational organization may only reflect the interests of its major 
members, it forms a trajectory for European integration and concludes in an approach 
that the European Union is a comparatively small conflict group. However, 
Mearsheimer’s analysis already started to lose its attractiveness. While in agreement 
with the transformation of a supranational actor into a global actor over time, Waltz 
argues, 
Political 
Creativity 
Political Impotence 
Political 
Desperation 
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Supranational agents able to act effectively, however, either themselves 
acquire some of the attributes and capabilities of states… or they soon 
reveal their inability to act in important ways… (Waltz, 1996, p. 307). 
During the early 1990s, the EU was fairly in the shape of a state. Until now, as a single 
unit which resulted in a new balancing process in the international system, the European 
Union could be evaluated through the lens of defensive realism as one of the major 
candidates or the only candidate that would become an actor in the international system. 
In the last decade, the European Union intensely attempted to expand its area of 
influence, territory and economic ability. Especially, the formation of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 has been a noticeable 
effort of the Union. From this perspective, a Gilpinian view would be that the European 
Union is an actor, a state which attempts to change the international system (Gilpin, 
1999, p. 149). As Nye Jr. narrates from one of the observers of European integration: 
A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to 
see itself as a challenge to America (Pryce-Jones & Nye, 2000, pp. 51-52).  
As a consequence, scholars of international relations and political science have started 
to approach the EU as an actor capable of balancing world politics. Waltz, in 1993, 
added the EU to his list of balancers. Additionally, Wolhfort stated that “if the EU were 
a state, the world would be bipolar” (Wohlfort, 1999, p. 31). In summary, the EU’s 
ability to challenge the US emerges as an essential and valid fact in the context of 
neorealism, and the once considered that offensive realism and ‘time’s cycle’ approach 
have lost credibility.  
2.1.4. American Support and Neorealist Approach 
The ‘time’s arrow’ approach, an approach in which defensive realists adopted, considers 
Waltz’s theory powerful and plausible. This is due to the fact that while the structure 
has an effect, changes at the unit level and cross-relation between these changes and 
structure still affect international politics. Following the end of the Cold War, it can be 
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argued that European politics started to shift according to changes at the unit level, 
while it continued to operate under the anarchic conditions of the international system. 
Inside the integration, European states might have decreased the effects of anarchy, but 
outside the integration, the anarchic systemic structure constituted a constraint for all. 
With the deepening and furthering European integration, offensive realism has appeared 
to be more flawed than ever. On the other hand, defensive realism arguments and 
Waltz’s theory still remain plausible, valid, and strong. If the balancing process does not 
apply to the states who are involved in the European integration project, then they 
together may act as a balancer against the rest of system actors. As the ‘time’s arrow’ 
approach expects, the states who involve in the European integration project may 
constitute a one and only single unit, but they will still be restrained to what the uni-
polar world offers and limits. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, this thesis will examine US-Turkey relations, the 
US approach towards Turkey, the efforts and support of the US in bilateral relations 
between Turkey and the EU, and the underlying motivations. As a consequence, in 
accordance with neorealist assumptions, this study will rely mostly on structural 
variables. 
In this thesis, I treat the alliance and co-operation among European states, including 
Turkey as a realist consensus to balance the Soviet Union during the Cold War. My 
point here is that, following the end of the Cold War, European integration continued to 
further under the circumstances of an anarchic systemic order. While the European 
Union accelerated its progress to become a political union with its supranational body, 
the anarchic structure of the international system constituted a barrier for the Union’s 
foreign policy and relations with the transatlantic actors.  
In the approach I adopt in this study, as mentioned above, the EU will be treated as a 
single actor in the international context. The EU emerges as a global actor, which frees 
itself from US hegemony following the end of the Cold War. Contrasting with the 
expectations of classical realists, the EU did not disappear from the international arena 
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following the end of the Cold War (Norris, 2002). As Nye Jr. narrates from one of the 
observers of European integration: 
A political bloc is emerging in the form of the European Union that likes to 
see itself as a challenge to America (Pryce-Jones & Nye, 2000, pp. 51-52).  
The EC was formed under US hegemony during the Cold War period. However, the EU 
preferred a transformation to increase its political power in world politics following the 
end of the Cold War. With institutional changes and further integration steps regarding 
the political and economic aspects of the Union, the EU obtained the ability to play as a 
single actor in the international system (Norris, 2002). Above all, the political 
integration of the Union does not comply with the structural assumptions of realists. 
However, conflict groups determined by the realists, who can dominate the international 
system could be: 
politically united actors who are bound by a common interest, though 
realists are interested mostly in the ‘primary’ groups, which since the 
seventeenth century has meant nation-states (Norris, 2002, p. 41). 
As a consequence, realists adopt two different approaches while examining the case of 
the EU. While the first one strictly relies on structural variables and benefits from the 
so-called potential unit-level variables to examine the EU at the global level, the second 
one evaluates the European integration by mainly relying on unit-level variables. In the 
end, the both explanations perceive the EU as a state, an actor capable of balancing in 
the international system. At this point, since this study focuses on the American 
perception on Turkey’s accession to the EU and the motives behind this support, but 
does not place a special emphasis on the European perception towards Turkey, this 
study benefits from the realist explanation, the one, which suggests that the EU and the 
US will act to protect their interests, in other words, interests which constitute their 
sources of power (e.g. political, economic or military power) at the global level, 
obviously according to what the international system suggests.    
Strengthening this study’s approach preference, as briefly mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the EU’s enlargement as well as its internal politics between member and 
candidate countries started to become affected by a number of unit-level variables when 
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the security risks that were born out of the structure of the international system started 
to dissolve. On the contrary, the US continued to further support Turkey in the 
framework of its security policy. Furthering this view as the main frame of this thesis, I 
argue that the US’s foreign policy behaviour between the post-Cold War period and the 
post-September 11 attacks can be best explained by considering systemic variables such 
as the US’s attempts to secure its interests in accordance with the events at the global 
level (i.e. the US’s security oriented policy). 
As a furthering note, it should be noted that the EU is an undivided entity such as the 
US since it is being shaped by the interests of member states. In a parallel manner, I 
assume that the individual interests of member states of the EU have an impact on the 
formation of the Union’s foreign policy, as well as the Union’s perception regarding US 
efforts and support for Turkey. As Ratti puts it: 
the realist perspective… share the view that supra-national institutions are 
above all a tool of national governments and that states use them in ways 
that suit their national interests (Ratti, 2006, p. 98). 
As a consequence, concurrently I expect the EU to act according to its member states’ 
interests, which are assumed to have a significant effect on the Union and its decisions 
regarding Turkey for a better understanding of the effectiveness of the US support in 
bilateral relations between the European Union and Turkey, particularly when the views 
of the EU and the US started to change. 
Throughout this thesis, the analysis will apply the neorealist approach and adopt a 
standing closer to defensive realists, which effectively evaluate the shift in the 
international system as a critical independent variable that is responsible for the shift in 
the effectiveness of US efforts and support in bilateral relations between the EU and 
Turkey. Subsequently, this study will treat the standing of American leaders regarding 
the strategic importance of Turkey and security as the primary form of American 
support, since public speeches to the leaders of European states were the primary form 
of US efforts to support Turkey in official and non-official European circles (Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2005). Furthering this point, the leader of state must have adopted moral values 
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and behaviour, which are in favour of the interests of the state (Machiavelli as cited in 
Arı, 2012) in foreign policy making. 
As can be understood from the perspective above, this thesis presents a multi-level 
analysis, which benefits from a number of factors (Figure 5), for a better understanding 
of US attempts to support Turkey in both official and non-official European circles.  
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Figure 5: Variables defined in accordance with the neorealist approach  
Independent Variables (The Structure of the International 
System):  
All shift in the international structure during the 1990s and 
the early 2000s such as the increased stability (political 
changes) in Southeast Europe, incidents  (i.e. Iraq War, the 
Gulf War) occurred in the Middle East, Turkey-Israel 
Relations as well as the developments in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
Dependent Variable (Foreign Policy Outcome):  
The US attempts to support Turkey (The stance of 
American leaders). 
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2.2. Consolidating the US Support: A Quantitative Aspect of Content Analysis 
As mentioned in the first half of the second chapter, US-Turkey relations during the 
post-Cold War era were expected to improve on the basis of security convergences, in 
accordance with realist assumptions. By adopting the speeches of US leaders as the 
primary form of American perception and support, this part of the thesis introduces the 
quantitative aspect of this study to demonstrate the changing US support to Turkey in 
European circles across time. First, this section introduces the details of the document 
collection process and hand coding rules. Then, it presents the details of Wordscores 
method as well as its mathematical foundation and software components. Third, this 
chapter discusses problematic aspects of the method along with its advantages. The 
results of the analysis have been presented and discussed throughout Chapter 4, in 
accordance with the historical framework given in Chapter 3 and theoretical framework 
given in Chapter 2. 
2.2.1. Document Collection for Content Analysis 
Firstly, all presidential documents have been extracted from Woolley and Gerhard 
Peter’s The American Presidency Project at the University of California Santa Barbara 
(Peters, 2014). The types of documents as well as their time frame contained in the 
database are as follows: 
Document Period Document Type 
Washington 1789 through Taft 1913 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 
Hoover 1929-1933; Truman through G.W. 
Bush 1945-2007; & Obama 2009-2010 
Public Papers of the Presidents 
F. Roosevelt 1933-1945 Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin 
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D. Roosevelt 
Carter 1977 through G.W. Bush 2009 Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents 
Obama 2009-2014 Daily Compilation of Presidential 
Documents 
Washington 1790 – Obama 2014 Annual Messages to Congress on the State 
of the Union 
Washington 1789 – Obama 2013 Inaugural Addresses 
Reagan 1982 – Obama 2014 Saturday Addresses (Radio from Reagan 
through G.W. Bush) 
F. Roosevelt Fireside Chats 
Hoover 1929 – Obama 2014 News Conferences 
J.Q. Adams 1826 – Obama 2014 Executive Orders 
Washington 1789 – Obama 2014 Proclamations 
Hoover 1929 – Obama 2014 Presidential Signing Statements 
Truman 1947 – Obama 2014 The Economic Report of the President 
(Clinton 1997 – Obama 2014) – (105th – 
113rd Congress)  
Statements of Administration Policy 
1928-2012 Presidential Nomination Acceptance 
Addresses 
1960-2012 Presidential Candidates Debates 
1960, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012 Elections Documents Related to Presidential 
Elections 
The 2000s Documents Related to the 2000 Election 
Dispute 
2009 Presidential Transition (G.W. Bush – 
Obama) 
2001 Presidential Transition (Clinton – 
G.W. Bush) 
Documents Related to Presidential 
Transitions 
Between 1840-2012, of parties receiving National Political Party Platforms 
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electoral votes 
 
Table 1: Documents in the Database 
 
Since the American Presidency Project database benefits from a SQL coded storing 
system, an additional .php script has been used to download the entire dataset consisting 
of 105.245 documents as .txt files. Following the extraction of the above-mentioned 
documents, the algorithm given in Appendix A has been used to classify .txt documents, 
which are somehow related to Turkey between the years, 1990-2006 (n=753). Each 
document has then been re-classified according to its owner (i.e. President Name) and 
date under the different folders. Upon the completion of this task, re-classified files 
have been renamed in accordance with the file creation date. For instance, a document 
from President George W. Bush’s folder with the date 20.01.2007 has been renamed as 
‘1.txt’, while a document with the date 24.04.2008 has been renamed ‘2.txt.’ 
2.2.2. Hand Coding 
Hand coding is one of the most widespread approaches used in content analysis 
(Klüver, 2013). Content analysis with hand coding involves four steps. First, a 
researcher develops a categorization scheme. Then, the texts are divided into sub units 
such as paragraphs or sentences depending on the adopted research design. Third, units 
of analysis are assigned categories based on human judgement. Finally, this analysis 
ends up in a dataset consisting of the units of analysis and their assigned categories. In 
this study, we adopt paragraphs, full-sentences, and quasi-sentences as our units of 
analysis, defined as “an argument or phrase which is the verbal expression of one idea 
or meaning” (Klingemann, Volkens, Budge, Bara, & McDonald, 2006, p. xxiii).  
Following the creation of sub-datasets, a random document selection process has been 
applied. For every sub-sample of each US president, which consists of nearly 25% 
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(184/757) of all documents have been randomly duplicated for the hand coding process. 
To prevent a potential rater bias regarding the identity of the US president, each 
sentence and word in the sub-folder which might reveal the identity of the document 
owner has been automatically deleted. In accordance with the algorithm rules, full-
sentences and quasi sentences related to our keywords, ‘Turkey’ or ‘Turkish’ have been 
marked with red. Furthermore, two different coding scales have been prepared and then 
two different raters were asked to read the information and consent form given in 
Appendix B. According to Scale A, each rater was asked to assign a point ranging from 
-10 to +10 to each document or report it as ‘Not suitable for research.’  
 
 
Figure 6: Hand Coding Rules for Scale A 
 
Then, each rater was asked again to re-rate the document, which they already assigned a 
point of 10 in accordance with the rules given below; in other words, according to Scale 
If document is 
NOT related to 
Turkey’s 
membership 
in the 
European 
Union or 
Turkey AT ALL. 
If document 
appears to be 
AGAINST 
Turkey’s 
membership 
in the 
European 
Union.  
If document 
appears to be 
neither 
AGAINST nor 
IN FAVOUR 
OF Turkey’s 
membership 
in the 
European 
Union. 
If document 
appears to 
be IN 
FAVOUR OF 
Turkey’s 
membership 
in the 
European 
Union. 
Assign 10 
 Assign 0 
 
Assign -10 
 Do not assign 
and report the 
file. 
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B. Additionally, the coding rules as well as the information and consent form are given 
in Appendix B. 
                    
Figure 7: Hand Coding Rules for Scale B 
 
 
Scale A Scale B 
Overall category 
Do not 
assign -10 0 10 1 2 3 
…this Turkey recipe… X -   -  - -  -  - 
…maybe Turkey should 
consider becoming a privileged 
partner in the EU.  - X -   -  - -  -  
Turkey is an important 
contributor to the peace projects 
in the Caucasus.  - -  X -   - -  - 
Turkey is a neighbour of the EU.  -  -  - X X -  -  
The European Union should start 
accession negotiations with 
Turkey as soon as possible.  -  -  - X  - X  - 
Turkey as a democratic, liberal, 
and European country provides 
security for the EU and must be 
anchored to EU institutions.       X     X 
 
Table 2: Sample Hand Coding Classification Scheme 
 
Assign 1 
•If the document 
appears to be 
SLIGHTLY IN 
FAVOUR OF 
Turkey’s 
membership in 
the European 
Union. 
Assign 2 
•If the document 
appears to be 
SOMEHOW IN 
FAVOUR OF 
Turkey’s 
membership in 
the European 
Union. 
Assign 3 
•If the document 
appears to be 
VERY STRONGLY 
IN FAVOUR OF 
Turkey’s 
membership in 
the European 
Union. 
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By itself, hand coding for content analysis has the comparative advantage of, central 
validity when compared with computerized content analysis methods. However, the 
hand coding process in this study is taking a requirement from Wordscores into 
consideration known as ‘a priori’ position, which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section. 
The reliability of hand coding may be very problematic when collecting results from at 
least two document raters. Cohen’s Kappa and Krippendorff’s Alpha; in other words, 
inter-rater agreement tests have been conducted to make sure that the researcher’s 
coding scheme could be used to obtain ‘a priori’ positions in the automated content 
analysis ahead. These tests have been conducted at least twice for both Scale A and 
Scale B. According to Landis and Koch (1977), an agreement rate above 0.41 
constitutes a plausible agreement beyond chance. Since the agreement rates for both 
tests were higher than 41%, the researcher’s own coding results were adopted as ‘a 
priori’ scores required for Wordscores (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
Percent 
Agreement Scott’s Pi 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Krippendorf’s 
Alpha 
56.70% 0.421 0.466 0.423 
 
Table 3: Cohen's Kappa, Scott’s Pi and Krippendorf’s Alpha Results for Scale A 
 
Percent 
Agreement Scott’s Pi 
Cohen’s 
Kappa 
Krippendorf’s 
Alpha 
58.3% 0.442 0.482 0.447 
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Table 4: Cohen's Kappa, Scott’s Pi and Krippendorf’s Alpha Results for Scale B 
2.2.3. Wordscores 
Due to the lack of reliability in the content analysis through hand coding, a number of 
automated, computerized content analysis technique have been developed. In their 
paper, Laver et al. and Benoit and Laver presented a new method for automated content 
analysis, which assigns scores or positions to the documents by assigning scores or 
positions to the words used in virgin texts (Laver & Benoit, 2002; Laver, Benoit, & 
Garry, 2003, p. 311).  
For the content analysis, the Wordscores method has four steps. Obtaining reference 
data with the a priori scores or positions to set reference values (setref) is the first 
requirement. Once these data are imported, Wordscores assigns scores or positions to 
the reference data (wordscores). Thirdly, it assigns scores or positions to virgin texts or 
data (textscore) and optionally it ''transforms virgin text scores to original metric'' 
(Laver et al., 2003, p. 314).  
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Figure 8: Laver et al.'s Procedure for Wordscores 
 
To comprehensively understand the functioning of Wordscores, let Φ denote the text 
population, where ε denotes the text sample available, γ denotes virgin data, δ denotes 
the unavailable data, and ς denotes the reference data, which a score or position has 
already been assigned. 
 
Figure 9: Wordscores Components 
 
Gathering 
reference data 
(texts) with 
known (a priori) 
positions 
Obtaining word 
scores from the 
reference data 
Scoring virgin 
data (texts) 
with word 
scores 
Transforming 
virgin data 
(text) scores to 
original metric 
Text Population Φ 
The Unavailable Data δ 
Text Sample ε 
Virgin Data 
       γ 
Reference Data 
          ς 
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Then, the relative frequency or the proportion of each word θ in the reference data can 
be formulized as the following, where ώ denotes the number of words in each text file: 
                  
Let us assume that we have twenty-five (25) same words in the reference text R1 and 
fifty (50) words in the reference text R2, both of which consists of one thousand (1000) 
words. Then the probability of reading a specific word in one of the text files is as the 
following: 
      
  
    
       
      
  
    
       
If it is known that a reader reads one of these text files from a set of textual data, the 
probability of reading the text file one and text file two is as the following: 
      
  
     
      
      
  
     
      
If a document has a priori position ע and given that a reader reads a specific set of 
textual data, which contains ώ, then the total score a specific document ש equals: 
ש    
ώ
θ ע     
ώ
 
ώ
Φ   δ  γ 
  ע    
In other words, ש is an average of ע, which is weighted by    If a word occurs in a single 
text file, then the probability of reading that specific text file, which contains that 
specific word,   is equal to 1. Then, ש equals 
ש     ע   ש  ע  
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Visiting back the above-mentioned text file one and text file two examples, let us 
assume that 
                    ע          θ        
                    ע          θ       
Then ש value for each, same word 
ש                                  
Obviously, this value will change upon the addition of several words as part of the 
reference data. But, calculating scores for virgin data is relatively simple once this step 
is completed. Now let    denote the word frequencies of virgin data and ש  denote the 
document scores of virgin data. Then document score for a virgin text ׆ would be equal 
to 
׆    
ώ
θ  ש   
As a consequence, ׆ represents the virgin data score based on a priori score of the 
reference data. This inference is based on the fact that the word frequencies of word 
usage in reference data should be linked to the word frequencies of word usage in virgin 
data. As Laver et al. argue, the scores of virgin data will be calculated with the help of 
same word universe. Because of this, the scores of virgin texts will be quite clustered 
and hard to compare with reference texts. To overcome this issue, we need to transform 
the scores of virgin texts for them to have the same dispersion metric as the scores of 
reference texts. This is done as the following, where ׆ denotes the average of virgin text 
scores, SD denotes the standard deviation of reference texts ש and virgin texts ׆. 
׆   ׆
 
 ׆
 
  
  ש
  ׆
 ׆
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Additionally, Wordscores calculates the confidence intervals through the variance of the 
individual word scores around the document’s mean score. The method for further 
investigation and work can be found in Laver et al.’s article, as well as the Wordscores 
website
1
. 
The Wordscores method relies on a number of different assumptions. First, it assumes 
that positions or scores are reflected in the relative frequency of words used within and 
across the text documents. Second, it assumes that a word’s meaning remains stable 
over time. Third, Wordscores treats the same words as they have the same weight in the 
estimation process. However, Laver et al. eliminate this problem by standardizing the 
raw scores by expanding the variance of virgin text scores to equal the variance of 
reference document positions or scores (Laver et al., 2003). Finally, Wordscores 
requires all related words to the research question be contained in a text document. In 
practical terms, to use Wordscores, one should follow the steps stated in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: Wordscores in Practical Terms 
                                               
1
 Wordscores Project Website, http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/wordscores/ 
(Accessed on 20.07.2014). 
Choosing reference 
documents. 
(Things to consider: 
Language, 
vocabulary, the 
number of words 
contained) 
Obtaining a priori 
scores or positions 
Calculating scores 
or positions for the 
virgin data 
Transforming the 
results 
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Here, for automated content analysis, I assigned a priori scores to my reference 
documents according to the hand coding results. Furthermore, I combined at least two 
different documents, that received a point of 10 on Scale A, and a point of 3 on Scale B, 
since the reference data should contain as many words as possible for a better 
estimation of virgin data scores. 
2.2.4. Problematic Aspects of Method 
Hand coding in general is very time consuming and labour intensive, which makes the 
content analysis for the large number of texts very difficult. Additionally, the lack of 
reliability is a serious issue in manual hand coding once compared to the computerized 
content analysis methods (Bakker, Edwards, & De Vries, 2006; Mikhaylov, Laver, & 
Benoit, 2012). Last, but not least, coding political issues sometimes can be very 
technical, and as a consequence, this situation may constitute a difficulty for both coders 
and researchers to develop an understanding of content. Forming a classification 
scheme and allocating units of analysis into sub-groups also emerge as additional 
obstacles. However, this study, by preferring the hand coding only to obtain a priori 
scores requested by the nature of Wordscores greatly benefitted from the central validity 
claim of manual hand coding. On the other hand, the results of the inter-rater agreement 
tests demonstrate that the researcher’s coding scheme overcomes the problem of 
reliability at a significant level.  
The automated, computerized content analysis method adopted in this study, 
Wordscores, is 100% replicable. As a result, reliability is not an issue for this method. 
Furthermore, analyzing the large amount of data with Wordscores is much easier and 
not time consuming. On the contrary, the requirement of a priori scores or positions is 
one of the disadvantages of Wordscores. However, this problem only occurs when there 
is no available empirical data. From the mathematical point of view, a researcher is able 
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to assign independent scores to virgin texts. In this study, the probability of this problem 
was eliminated through hand coding. It should be noted here that additional automated 
content analysis methods might also have been applied for cross-validation. 
2.2.5. Analysis 
The researcher’s coding scale has been recorded with the setref function of Wordscores 
in accordance with files located under US Presidents’ folders (e.g. Richard Cheney, Al 
Gore). Following the randomization of files for scaling, documents belonging to John F. 
Kerry have been removed from the sample since these files (n=2) have been reported by 
both raters as ‘not suitable for research.’ Furthermore, transformed scores could not be 
determined for Richard Cheney’s documents (n=24) on Scale B since Wordscores 
requires mathematically at least two different values (a priori scores or positions) to be 
assigned to documents in the sample. According to rating reports, it was not possible to 
assign an additional score to the randomized Richard Cheney documents, since the 
randomization process did not result in a document belonging to Cheney that could be 
rated on both Scale A and B. However, this does not constitute a problem for this 
analysis, as transformed scores do not necessarily need to be assigned (Laver & Benoit, 
2002). After obtaining Wordscores for the documents on Scale A (dimension1) and B 
(dimension2), the following variables have been created: 
 
Variable Name Storage Type Display Format Variable Label 
clintona Float %8.0g Clinton Values (Scale A) 
clintonb Float %8.0g Clinton Values (Scale B) 
gbusha Float %8.0g G. Bush Values (Scale A) 
gbushb Float %8.0g G. Bush Values (Scale B) 
gwbusha Float %8.0g G.W. Bush Values (Scale A) 
gwbushb Float %8.0g G.W. Bush Values (Scale B) 
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rcheneya Float %8.0g R. Cheney Values (Scale A) 
Rcheneyb Float %8.0g R. Cheney Values (Scale B) 
gwbushrcheneya Float %8.0g G.W. Bush and R. Cheney 
Values (Scale A) 
gwbushrcheneyb Float %8.0g G. W. Bush and R. Cheney 
(Scale B) 
Year Float %8.0g Years of documents 
Allyeara Float %8.0g Values on Scale A (All 
years) 
Allyearb Float %8.0g Values on Scale B (All 
years) 
 
Table 5: Variable Properties 
 
Accordingly, descriptive statistics have been obtained for these variables to increase the 
explanatory power of this study
2
. With this straightforward analysis, this study gained 
the ability to evaluate American support across time. Accordingly, it becomes now 
possible to differentiate between and elaborate on different US presidencies (e.g. 
Clinton and G.W. Bush) in their support to Turkey in European circles. It should be 
further noted here that the results for both Clinton and G.W. Bush presidencies have 
been within my expectations and the details of which have been explained in the next 
chapters.  
 
 
                                               
2
 Please refer to Appendix C for detailed results. 
 63 
 
 
 
 
This page intentionally left blank. 
 
 
 
 64 
 
 
CHAPTER 3  
THE TRIANGLE: TURKEY, THE US AND THE EU  
From the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the US and Western 
European states have become role models for the modernization and advancement of 
the nation. At the same time, Turkey has also gained significance for both the US and 
Western European countries since the end of World War II. Increased security concerns 
of the US and Western European countries during the Cold War led to the consideration 
of Turkey as an integral part of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union. 
Especially during the Cold War period, Turkey was regarded as an important ally 
against the Soviet expansionism. As can be expected, not only the dynamic relations of 
the US and Western European countries with Turkey but also US foreign policy have 
undergone a remarkable transformation following the end of the Cold War. During this 
period, the US saw Turkey as increasingly important as the focus of US foreign policy 
was placed upon a very critical geography ranging from Central Asia to the Balkans 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Four decades later, George W. Bush's 
declaration of the US's war on terrorism immediately after the September 11 attacks 
particularly boosted the regional importance of Turkey. With this further development, 
bilateral relations between the US and Turkey have deepened on the basis of 
geopolitical-security concerns. On the contrary, however, the significance of Turkey for 
Western European countries has declined following the dissolution of the Soviet Union; 
the common goals born out of security concerns more or less dissolved. Furthermore, 
Western European countries chose to further economic integration through the 
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transformation of the European Economic Community (Leech, 2002). Although Turkey 
has appeared as an ally with an important geo-location for the US, new, but a negative 
perception of Turkey has also emerged in continental Europe, which we will briefly 
discuss in detail in the following chapters. At this point, this division arises as an answer 
to the question of why Turkey-EU and US-Turkey relations are not on the same track. 
This chapter will provide a historical background to properly address the research goals 
of this thesis. First, it will focus on Turkey-EU and US-Turkey bilateral relations after 
the Cold War from different perspectives, most of which occurred after the West 
division during the 1980s. While presenting the historical background of US-Turkey 
relations, a specific approach to those events such as the Iraq War, the Gulf War, Israel-
Turkey relations, energy policies of the US, and Kosovo and Bosnia crises, will be 
demonstrated, since these events mainly shaped the American support as well as 
emerged as the underlying motivations of the US. Concurrently, Turkey-EU relations 
will be briefly evaluated to further elaborate on the historical divergence that emerged 
between the US and the EU. 
3.1. An Overview of Turkish – American Relations after the Cold War 
According to Lesser, the US has seen Turkey as part of Europe from the very beginning 
of its bilateral relations with Turkey (Lesser, 2008). Following the Soviet Union's 
expansionist policy towards the Caucasus, the Middle East and especially countries rich 
in oil in the region, Turkey emerged as an important player along with its geostrategic 
location as a country that, be used in the US's fight against the Soviet Union.  
In 1947, US President Harry Truman prepared a plan, later to be known as the Truman 
Doctrine, to further the US's fight against the Soviet threat. This plan granted Turkey 
and Greece economic and military aid and was aiming to protect these countries from 
the threat of communism (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 232). From 1948-1952, the 
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similarly titled Marshall Plan also aimed to economically help a number of countries 
including Turkey to protect them from the Soviet expansionism.  
These plans were the primary economic form of American support to a number of 
countries including Turkey, during the Cold War. Along with foreign aid, prospects of 
membership in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) paved the way for the 1946 
multi-party elections and accelerated Turkey’s democratic transition. With Turkey's 
contribution to the Korean War in 1950, on the other hand, Turkey attempted to ensure 
its security through the West (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 212). 
Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War also challenged the US’s global role in the 
international system; one major question emerged due to the unexpected collapse of 
communism: what will be the US’s actions in the future? After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the Soviet threat, the US in its foreign policy specifically started to 
focus on the Caucasus and the Middle East, which constitutes of huge oil sources. As a 
result, Turkey’s unique geo-strategic location kept its prominence for the US in 
providing stability in the region for the implementation of its policies. In addition, right 
after the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s location appeared as the most important bridge 
between the regions from the Balkans to Central Asia. Three major reasons that paved 
the way for Turkey to emerge as a major partner in the region for the US were Turkey’s 
ongoing relations with Israel, its borders with oil-rich countries such as Iraq and Syria, 
and the significant effect of air bases located in Turkey. Additionally, the US was able 
to present Turkey as a secular role model to the countries in the Middle East as a 
promotion of Western values and democracy. According to the Clinton administration, 
Turkey also constituted a good role model for those countries emerging right after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, who might accelerate their democratic and economic 
transition (Tocci, 2011). Confirming this approach, the Clinton administration declared 
that the US’s alliance with Turkey was a strategic partnership; and this newly-defined 
alliance relied both on multi-faceted and multi-dimensional relations (Kayhan & 
Lindley, 2006, p. 216). In summary, the post-Cold War Turkish-American relations 
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were essentially based on a geopolitical and strategic understanding, and this 
understanding resulted in much critical cooperation in the decades to follow. 
During this period, with an intention to meet the challenges in the Middle East, as part 
of its dual containment policy, the US started to further its military presence in the Gulf 
(Çankaya, 2003, p. 62). The US’s vital interests in the Middle East were, 
the survival of Israel and the completion of the Middle East peace process, 
access to oil, forestalling the emergence of a hostile regional hegemon, 
preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, promoting peace and 
reform and through it, the internal stability and holding terrorism in check 
(Rubin, 1999).  
The new partnership of Turkey with the US in the Middle East began with their 
participation in the Gulf War. Obviously, the US’s economic support acted as the most 
important catalyst for Turkey’s involvement in the conflict (Oğuzlu, 2008). Due to 
Turkey’s significance in the Gulf War, in 1991, the US increased and accelerated the 
security assistance available to Turkey while additionally doubling the prices of textile 
products being paid, and granting Turkey $282 million for further economic and 
military assistance (Sayarı, 1992, p. 19). On the other hand, according to Oğuzlu, 
following the increase in PKK’s3 mobility and regional threats, Turkey did not see 
available options other than supporting the US (Oğuzlu, 2008). On January 17th, 1991, 
the US published an offensive act and the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
immediately issued a bill making it possible for the Turkish Army to join a coalition 
with the American forces against Iraq. Furthering this bill, Turkey did let the US army 
use its grounds with Operation Northern Watch, despite domestic criticisms (Barkey, 
2007, p. 450). As Çankaya states, 
                                               
3
 "The Kurdistan Workers' Party, commonly referred to by its Kurdish acronym, PKK, 
is a Kurdish political and military organization which from 1984 to 2013 fought an 
armed struggle against the Turkish state for cultural and political rights and self-
determination for the Kurds in Turkey, who comprise between 10% and 25% of the 
population and have been subjected to official repression for decades" (Wikipedia, 
2014d).  
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…During the War, Turkey opened İncirlik air base for the use of the US, 
closed Yumurtalık pipeline, deployed soldiers and implemented embargo on 
Iraq in accordance with the UN resolutions (Çankaya, 2003, p. 63).   
Along with these developments, the Operation Northern Watch further brought the 
Kurdish issue to the international arena (Kirişci & Winrow, 1997) and the developments 
regarding a Kurdish state in northern Iraq started to become problematic in US-Turkey 
relations. In 1992, the foundation of an autonomous Kurdish state created anxiety for 
Turkey. As Turkey expected, in 1994, this development resulted in the increase of 
terrorist attacks near the Turkish border and paved the way for cross-border operations. 
From the very beginning, Turkey, even while supporting the territorial integrity of Iraq, 
was afraid of the emergence of a federal Kurdish state in the region. On the other hand, 
this Turkish concern did not pose a serious problem for the US (Çankaya, 2003). Upon 
this Turkish political concern, the US encouraged Egypt to initiate trade to compensate 
the loss of the Turkish economy due to the closure of Yumurtalık pipeline (Sayarı, 
1992), as a ‘sedative,’ so-to-speak.  
After the end of the Gulf War, an international commercial embargo was imposed on 
the Iraqi government according to the UN decisions. However, a divergence on the Iraqi 
embargo emerged between the US and Turkey. While Turkey suggested lifting the 
embargo since 1992, the US advocated the implementation of it until the collapse of the 
Saddam regime, the elimination of mass destruction weapons, and the end of domestic 
violence in Iraq (Sever, 2000). One of the reasons behind the Turkish request was 
Turkey’s deteriorated economic relations with Iraq. As a border country, Iraq was one 
of the most important trade partners of Turkey. Despite the American foreign aid and 
efforts, Turkey’s economic loss was incomparable. Yumurtalık pipeline, which has been 
carrying oil from northern Iraq to Mediterranean, earned Turkey $1.2 billion per annum. 
Furthermore, Iraq was the second largest importer of Turkish products (Marr, 1996).  
However, despite the economic losses that the Gulf War caused, Turkey cooperated 
with the US as a security provider and stabilizer in the region. Additionally, the war 
emerged as an opportunity for Turkey to prove to the West that Turkey is still vital in 
providing security and stability in the region while protecting the interests of European 
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countries. As expected, this cooperation further exemplified Turkey’s continuing 
importance to the West. 
Meanwhile, Turkey was attempting to improve its relations with Israel while claiming 
its place in the West. During the post-Cold War era, Turkey was isolated in the Middle 
East region mostly due to its history. As Müftüler-Baç indicates, "the legacy of the 
Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s perceived break with Islam, the secular form of government 
in Turkey since 1924" have been some of the reasons behind the Arab Middle East’s 
perception (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 2). As a consequence, Turkey was aware that it was 
not welcome in the Arab Middle East, while it was not also fully accepted to the 
Western group at the end of the Cold War. Thus, Israel, as a Middle Eastern country has 
emerged as an important ally for Turkey for several reasons. As Müftüler-Baç asserts, 
In the post-Cold War era, Turkey finds itself in a turbulent security 
environment marked by volatility and instability. Such regional de-
stabilizers as Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Iran have alerted Turkey to the dangers 
of isolation and marginality within the global and regional security order 
leading it to find new allies, with Israel the most likely candidate (Müftüler-
Baç, 1998, p. 2).  
On the other hand, the above-mentioned Gulf War also emerged as one of the 
motivators of Turkey in its relations with Israel. This war demonstrated that the Middle 
East was still able to constitute a security threat at both global and regional levels. 
Furthermore, the Gulf War resulted in a Turkish-Israeli perception that these two 
countries were pretty similar. Both of these countries were not Arab and still existed in 
the Middle East, and they were vulnerable to similar threats. Former Iraq leader, 
Saddam Hussein’s understanding of the Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974 as well 
as his approach to the Palestinian problem between Israel and the Palestinian authority 
underscored the same enemy in Iraq for the two countries. However, Israel and Turkey 
did not only share concerns related to their regional security. Both being economically 
integrated to European system, having free-market economies, and being the only 
secular democracies in the surrounding region also helped bilateral relations between 
these two countries to positively correlate (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 5). As realist 
approach foresees, these two countries started to cooperate for the sake of their interests 
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(Nachmani, 1999; Yılmaz, 2001). As former president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel 
summarizes Israeli-Turkish relations: "Turkey and Israel have decided on regional 
cooperation for increasing the economic welfare of the region and curbing terrorism" 
(as cited in Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 1).  
One of the steps that furthered Turkey-Israel alliance was the Oslo process. In 1992, the 
Oslo process, "a peace process that is aimed at achieving a peace-treaty based on the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and 338, and to fulfill the "right of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination"" (Erdemir, 2007, p. 120; Wikipedia, 2014e) 
was launched between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Following this diplomatic 
development, Turkey immediately increased the level of its official representation in 
Israel, as the Palestinian Authority had. After the initiation of more diplomatic contact, 
Turkey and Israel signed a number of bilateral agreements on trade, military 
collaboration, and tourism. Obviously, Turkey’s efforts as well as Israel’s efforts were 
welcomed, supported and promoted by the American administration. As previously 
mentioned, the Middle East has been perceived vital for American interests with its 
economic and strategic importance. Additionally, as Müftüler-Baç furthers, 
…the demise of the Soviet Union has increased the strategic importance of 
the Middle East by shifting American attention to the well-armed rogue 
states that represent the new threats to Western security. These rogue states 
defy internationally accepted rules of conduct, support terrorism, possess 
substantial military capabilities, are engaged in massive arms build-ups, and 
carry the potential to destabilize regional and global security. The American 
administration has labelled Iran, Iraq, and Libya as rogue regimes and Syria 
as having the potential to be one. Thus, a Turkish-Israeli alliance might act 
to counterbalance these rogue states as part of the American "dual 
containment policy" towards Iran and Iraq (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 3).  
Following the end of the Cold War, the US also aimed to revise and improve the 
American role in the New World Order. Accordingly, it appeared more rational for the 
US to transfer authority and the attached responsibilities to regional actors. As a 
consequence, the US would need regional allies, who might respond in events such as 
peace-keeping and crisis management. In the end, such a strategy would decrease 
immediate US participation and serve American interests in a more pragmatic fashion. 
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So, an Israeli-Turkish alliance would be the best one in serving American interests by 
keeping the US presence unharmed in the Middle East, while decreasing the chances of 
a direct American participation that would not be rational (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 3).  
As mentioned in the paragraph above, the US supported Turkey-Israel alliance in a very 
determined manner. When Turkey was anxious about the potential negative Arab 
perception of an Israeli-Turkish alliance, President Clinton’s special envoy to Cyprus, 
Richard Hoolbroke (Independent, 1997) expressed the importance of Israel to Turkey, 
in other words, the alliance by saying: "If you would like us to help you regarding the 
Cyprus issue, then you need to cooperate with Israel" (translated from Varol, 2014). The 
military investments of the rogue states along with the US’s desire for "uninterrupted 
flow of oil" help understanding the US manner towards the Israeli-Turkish alliance, 
which might create a-long-awaited protection for the US interests in the region with its 
stabilizing and balancing abilities (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 9). In the end, the Israeli-
Turkish alliance was mostly against security threats in the region, but was not aiming at 
a particular actor, as former president Süleyman Demirel expressed in 1997: "Turkey 
and Israel should stand together to fight terrorism" and former advisor to the Israeli 
Defence Minister, David Ivri furthered: "the security pact signed is not aimed at any 
state, but it seeks to build confidence in the Middle East and to contribute peace and 
stability in the region" (as cited in Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 8).  
Meanwhile, the emergence of the ethnic and national conflicts following the dissolution 
of Yugoslavia changed the American security strategy from central Europe to east 
Europe. It should be noted here that the problems in the Balkans did not constitute a 
direct threat to American security. However, former US Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson stated that problems occurring in the Balkans were important because of the 
‘rotten apple theory’ or the ‘domino theory.’ In other words, these conflicts had the 
potential to spread to the mainland Europe with a spill-over effect. As a consequence, 
this was the main motive behind the US policy and interventions in the region (Albright, 
1998). The Balkans constituted the second major area that the US mostly intervened 
after the Gulf War in the post-Cold War period (Schulzinger, 2007). It can be argued 
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that the US’s motivations in intervening in the Balkans were: (1) the geography of the 
region, as the Balkans was a strategic link to the regions of greater importance (i.e. the 
Gulf, the Mediterranean), (2) the Balkans had the potential to host conflicts which might 
threaten the newly constructing European security structure, since it had the ‘centers of 
conflict’ such as Kosovo and Serbia, (3) potential US interventions would prevent 
powers such as Germany and Russia to actively intervene in the region, (4) the Balkans 
constituted a test for the US presidency as well as the containment capacity and 
effectiveness of the NATO in the new world order (Schulzinger, 2007). As Çankaya 
further expresses the US attempt to create a balance in the region: "The US tried to 
balance the influence of England, Russia, and France which supported Serbs and 
Germany backing Slovenia and Croatia" (Çankaya, 2003, p. 61). 
Here the difference in approaches of the Bush administration and Clinton administration 
should be emphasized. According to President Bush, Yugoslavia was not strategically 
important for the US (Glitman, 1996-1997). On the contrary, President Clinton 
advocated for a more active and deep intervention in his election campaign in 1992 
(Neville-Jones, 1996-1997). Accordingly, Turkey and the US played an important role 
in resolving the conflict in Bosnia and in providing security and stability in the region. 
As Çankaya asserts, 
Among the new areas of cooperation between the US and Turkey, the 
Balkans could be regarded as a region where the Turkish and the US foreign 
policies nearly totally converge and a significant degree of continuity in 
Turkish-American cooperation could be observed… …it was observed that 
both countries had similar objectives, implemented similar policies, and 
acted together in 1990s. The US made use of cooperating with Turkey in the 
region since it comparatively had little knowledge about the region and 
Turkey exploited the opportunity to cooperate with a superpower (Çankaya, 
2003, p. 59). 
The US existence in Kosovo through the mobilization of NATO forces against the 
Former Republic of Yugoslavia along with the economic support provided by the US 
constituted two important aspects of the efforts in the region to secure peace and 
stability (Tocci, 2011). In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy was fairly similar to 
American foreign policy in the Balkans. Turkey, with the encouragement of the US, 
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attempted to use its Muslim identity to relate to Muslims living in Bosnia and Croatia, 
and reconciled attempts to reach a constitutional agreement in Bosnia (Tocci, 2011). In 
wanting to prove its worth to the West, Turkey became part of the "UN Protection Force 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR) in 1993-1995, Implementation Force (IFOR) and 
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-present), Combined Police 
Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia 
(1995-present), International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1997-present), 
Operation ‘Alba’ in Albania (1997), Kosovo Verification Force (1998-1999), and 
Kosovo Force (2001-present)" (Tarik Oğuzlu & Güngör, 2006). The US involvement in 
Bosnia and Kosovo under NATO and its success in ending the conflicts created a 
perception that the US security strategy enlarged. As President Clinton expressed, 
Europe’s security, when it was threatened, as it was in Bosnia and Kosovo, 
we too, will respond. When it is being built we too always take a part 
(Lesser, 1998). 
Contributing to this approach, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, President 
Clinton launched the South European Cooperation Initiative along with his Action Plan 
for the Southeast Europe in order to assist the countries in the region, solve their 
economic and regional problems, which might prevent the stability and security 
required for US interests (Rubin, 1999). Following the military intervention in Kosovo, 
the US also signed a Stability Pact by urging the EU and the south-eastern European 
countries in the region to promote stability and security. Since this pact did not contain 
OSCE or NATO involvement, it brought a new aspect to the transatlantic relations.   
Turkey-US relations continued to improve during the 1990s with US attempts to 
implement a new energy policy in the Caspian region. US president, Bill Clinton’s visit 
to Turkey after the earthquake in Gölcük in 1999 also strengthened relations between 
the two countries (Flanagan & Brannen, 2008). Additionally, the US played a 
significant role between Turkey and Greece in the 1999 crisis and supported crisis 
resolution to prevent a war between these two countries. Apart from that, the US’s 
support in delivering the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 was another aspect that 
demonstrates Turkey’s importance in security-oriented policies of the US (Kirişci, 
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2001). In summary, the cooperation between the US and Turkey in the Gulf War and 
the Balkan crisis, the collective action to deliver Azeri gas to the Mediterranean region 
through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (Barkey, 2008, p. 32), and the US’s support 
for Turkish accession to the EU also represented convalescent relations between Turkey 
and the US during the 1990s. 
Following al-Qaeda, "a global militant Islamist and takfiri organization" (Wikipedia, 
2014a) attacks on American soil on September 11, 2001, transatlantic relations gained a 
new dimension. The US declared war against anti-Western Islamism and accordingly its 
foreign policy underwent a transformation, which later required the US to follow a 
much more interventionist and aggressive foreign policy. Upon these unfortunate 
events, Turkey declared its alliance with the US against terrorism since many of its 
citizens have been lost due to PKK terrorism. Confirming this declaration, Turkey’s role 
in the US intervention in Afghanistan further demonstrated Turkey’s willingness and 
closeness to the US in the war against terrorism. As part of this support, Turkey sent its 
special forces to Afghanistan and let the US benefit from military bases located in 
Turkey in the war against the Taliban. After the collapse of the Taliban regime, Turkey 
also participated in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and took 
command between June 2002-February 2003, and February 2005-July 2005 (Kayhan & 
Lindley, 2006, p. 216). 
As previously mentioned, a controversial debate about the support to be given to the US 
regarding the Iraq War arose during the meetings in the Turkish Parliament, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly (TBMM). One of the reasons behind this debate was 
Turkey’s economic concerns regarding the war. First, it was not satisfied with the 
financial support that it received from the US after the Gulf War and secondly, an 
economic struggle that might have arisen in the case of participation in the war next to 
the US (Güney, 2005). Apart from these economic concerns, Turkey was worried about 
the potential emergence of a Kurdish state in the Northern Iraq, and its potential effects 
on the Kurdish population living in Turkey considering the PKK’s terrorist activities, 
particularly in the southern region of Turkey. In other words, the Turkish state was 
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afraid of a Kurdish uprising on its borders due to the emergence of a new Kurdish state 
in Northern Iraq. At this point, the probability of fleeing refugees from the militarily 
affected zones was also another driving force for the Turkish state (Güney, 2005; 
Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). The US started to put pressure on the newly-elected the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 2002, and since the party had 
Muslim grassroots and Islam as its religious orientation, it was not easy for the Turkish 
government to decide (Güney, 2005). The US, on the contrary, never expected 
hesitation from its strategic partner; furthermore, Turkey’s participation appeared as 
essential to the US and to the Western European states. According to Barkey, without 
the full support of the Turkish government, the US would have had "a terrible time 
keeping Saddam Hussein in a box" (Barkey, 2008, p. 32). 
Also considering the fact that the global economic crisis in 2002 also hit Turkey, the US 
promised the nation a number of economic aid packages so as to accelerate the Turkish 
government’s decision making process, which would lead to the deployment of its 
forces on Turkish soil. On the other hand, it is possible to talk about the Turkish 
government’s suspicion in supporting the war, since Turkey did not get the 
compensation promised since the Gulf War (Güney, 2005). In other words, the First 
Gulf Crisis, in which Turkey preferred cooperation with the US, was still negatively 
impacting the Turkish economy that was performing poorly and this was perceived 
intensely by the Turkish elite and mass public (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010).  During that 
period, Turkey attempted to gain the trust of the countries located in the Middle East 
and declared its willingness to promote peace in the region. Following this approach 
and US pressure, the Turkish government, with the command of Prime Minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, met with foreign ministers of countries located in the Middle East such 
as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, and Syria to promote peace, keep stability, and destroy the 
possibility of war (Güney, 2005). 
Meanwhile, the US was impatient to learn of Turkey’s final decision. As an economic 
promotion, Turkey was offered 20 billion dollars in loans through the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and 14 billion dollars in grant by the US if it participates in the 
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Iraq intervention (Güney, 2005, p. 349). As a deterrent, the US also declared that the 
rejection by the Turkish government would result in the cut-off of military aid. While 
the Erdoğan government did not want to lose US support, in March 2003, the TBMM 
rejected the US use of Turkish soil to intervene in Iraq with 264 ‘no’s’ and 251 ‘yes’s’, 
and 19 abstentions. After all of the US’s promises of support to Turkey and the 
deterrent factor, the disapproval of the TBMM to the US request of use Turkish soil for 
the transfer of American troops to Iraq came as a shock to the US (Congress of the 
United States, 2003). According to American evaluations, "the potential threat from 
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction has gone largely unnoticed in Turkey" (Kesgin & 
Kaarbo, 2010, p. 26). Obviously, the TBMM’s rejection, which came as "the most 
significant foreign policy decision in its history" (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 19) after 
long-lasting negotiations with the US severely damaged the Turkish-American alliance. 
The Turkish public was also strongly objecting a potential war in Iraq as well as any 
kind of Turkish involvement (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). As Filkins and Miller claims, 
The showdown between the Bush administration and Turkey reflects the 
deep-seated antipathy felt by an overwhelming majority of the Turkish 
people for the American military plans. Turkey’s leaders say that despite 
their country’s 50-year-old military alliance with the United States, they are 
finding it difficult to disregard the public’s anti-war feelings (as cited in 
Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 26). 
However, in accordance with realist expectations, the Turkish government, as a 
preventive action, which would be in line with its interests, offered a new bill to the 
TBMM to strengthen the alliance, a bill, which makes it possible for the US to use the 
Turkish airspace and lands to provide logistic and humanitarian support to Americans 
located in Iraq due to the intervention. The Turkish government’s intention was to 
prevent a potential US standing against Turkey due to the TBMM’s disapproval of the 
first bill. As a member of NATO and a traditional ally of the US, the failure to assist the 
US in its efforts would jeopardize Turkey’s national interests in the region and 
especially would harm its political and economic system (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010). 
Finally, the Assembly approved the latter bill and it was quite beneficial for the US, 
while, it offered less than the US expected in the first place. Turkey appeared as not 
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willing to be a part of the Iraq war; however, the approval of the second bill in the 
TBMM demonstrated that Turkey was in favour of the Iraq invasion. In October 2003, 
the TBMM approved a further bill that paves the way for the deployment of 10,000 
Turkish military personnel in the northern region of Iraq. Upon this approval, in early 
February, former Prime Minister, Abdullah Gül, stated that "his government had 
abandoned efforts for a diplomatic solution and decided to join the United States in 
military action" (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 30). Turkish response to the criticisms 
arisen in the US and Western European countries was that the increasing level of the 
Kurdish threat in the region justified such a move (Oguzlu, 2004). 
Following the US’s adoption of a more aggressive and interventionist foreign policy, it 
can be argued that Turkish foreign policy underwent a transformation and has become 
more ‘activist’ and independent (Barkey, 2008, p. 43). As previously mentioned, 
Turkey did not hesitate to show its interest in cooperating with the US; however, Turkey 
also demonstrated that it could act independently according to its expected gains and 
losses. Turkey’s political presence in the Middle East and Balkans has thus been 
affected by the US, but is not solely a result of it (Tocci, 2011). It can be argued that 
Turkey has started to follow a more activist and independent foreign policy with 
President Özal, a stance which has been later furthered by the policies of the AKP 
government such as ‘zero problems with regional neighbours’ (Kayhan & Lindley, 
2006). According to Kirişçi, Turkey’s foreign policy towards Russia, Iran, Syria, and 
Iraq now can be examined through Turkey’s interests, domestic institutions, and state 
structures as well as civil society organizations (Kirişci, 2009). 
Right before the Iraq War in 2003, Turkey tried to communicate with its neighbours. 
During the 2000s, the Turkish government started cooperation with Iran to eliminate the 
PKK threat on their shared borders. Additionally, following the Syrian President’s visit 
to Turkey in January 2004, Turkey played the mediator in Israeli-Syrian relations 
(Tocci, 2011, p. 136). Furthering these attempts, once the US started to lose its prestige 
during the Iraq War, Turkey played the role of pacifier and attempted to provide 
stability in the Middle East. Upon Turkey’s ‘arm’s length’ policy towards the US policy 
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in the Middle East after disapproval of the first bill put forth by the TBMM, Turkey’s 
relations with Iran, Syria, and Iraq, Turkey’s attempts to play the mediator in some 
Middle East conflicts, and its more ‘active’ and independent foreign policy – all 
resulted in anxiety in Washington. Was "the US… losing Turkey?" (Lesser, 2008, p. 
221). During the Iraq crisis, when US-Turkey relations were strained, Turkey also paid 
attention to its Europeanization process by manifesting a fear of alienation from the 
West. Although Europe has been the most prioritized goal of Turkish foreign policy, 
Turkey understood the importance of its relations with the US and the US’s support, 
especially after the Helsinki Summit. 
3.2. An Overview of Turkey and EU Relations after the Cold War 
The relations between Turkey and the EU have always been complex and multi-
dimensional. From the first day of its founding, Turkey has seen itself as a part of the 
West, and the West as an important dimension of its modernization process. Similarly, 
the West has always wanted to develop its relations with Turkey through a realistic 
approach that it has adopted. Contrasting with this fact, both sides have perceived these 
relations within different contexts. While Turkey has attempted to closely relate itself to 
Europe and wanted to become a member state of the EU, Turkey’s membership has 
been perceived differently in member countries and ignited a controversial debate on 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. Following the change of Turkish association agreement  
in 1987, relations between the EU and Turkey have been transformed in such way that 
reflects two different periods: the Cold War and the post-Cold War. 
From the 1950s until the 1990s, Europe like the US perceived Turkey as an important 
ally against the Soviet threat due to its geo-strategic position (Kramer, 2001, p. 223). 
Similar to the US’s perception, according to the West, Turkey was in such a location 
that could actually serve the security interests of European states. As Gordon et al. put 
it:  
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As a NATO member country that shared borders with the Soviet Union and 
tied down some twenty-four Russian divisions, Turkey’s credentials as a 
valuable military asset to the West were undisputed. Thorny questions about 
democratic standards, military interventions, human rights, and Muslim 
identity were set aside (Gordon, Taşpınar, & Özel, 2009). 
Soviet threats that were intensely felt by the West prevented European states from 
adopting and reflecting an ideology against Turkey in their foreign policies. In this 
context, Turkey has successfully become a founding member of the Council of Europe 
in 1949. It has also become the founding member of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1961 and 1973 respectively. 
During the 1960s, Turkey started to have its first official relations with the European 
Community (EC). In 1959, Turkey submitted its official request to become a member. 
Following the Ankara agreement, it obtained associate membership in 1963 after two 
years of Greece’s membership (Onis, 2000, p. 467). The Ankara agreement was also the 
basis of Turkey’s membership to the Customs Union. Turkey’s membership to the 
Customs Union was anticipated in three phases. A preparatory phase of five years and a 
transition phase of twelve (Franck, 2002, p. 109). According to the agreement Article 
28: 
…When the operation of the agreement makes it possible to envisage 
acceptance by Turkey of the full obligations deriving from the Treaty 
establishing the Community, the contracting parties shall examine the 
possibility of the accession of Turkey to membership of the Community (as 
cited in Franck, 2002, p. 109). 
The Additional protocol of the Ankara agreement, which was signed in 1970 and 
subsequently came into effect in 1973, indicated the direction of transition phase for full 
membership of Turkey to the Customs Union. Here, we should note that Turkey could 
complete the transition phase foreseen by the Additional protocol in January 1996 
(Franck, 2002, p. 109). 
Especially during the Cold War, bilateral relations between Turkey and the EC had 
further progressed. At the same period, there was no significant difference between 
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Turkey and Greece in the EC, and Turkey, Greece, Portugal or Spain was not 
considered different (Onis, 2000, p. 467).  For example, Turkey’s association agreement 
was signed in the context of the EC Mediterranean policy dated 1972 as analogous to 
Malta’s agreement in 1970 and Cyprus’s agreement in 1972 (Franck, 2002, p. 109). 
Since Turkey did not share a different pathway other than what the other non-member 
states followed, it can be argued that the EU had the same perception regarding Turkey 
as well as the US. 
Confirming this situation, before Turkish association, a Christian Democrat from 
Germany, Herr Hallstein made the following declaration:  
Turkey is part of Europe: today that means that she has established an 
institutional relationship with the European Community. As for the 
Community itself, the relationship is imbued with the concept of evaluation  
(as cited in Franck, 2002, p. 109).  
Furthering Hallstein’s sayings, the President of the Council of Ministers, Schaus in 
1963 made the following declaration and solidified the Community’s security oriented 
policy towards Turkey: 
Turkey has been one of the first European countries to express its trust in 
the Community and its role in the organization of the free world underlines 
the importance of its participation in our common endeavour (as cited in 
Tocci, 2011, p. 93). 
During the Cold War, Turkey was one of the states which was not affected by the Soviet 
threat and Turkey "played a key role in the defence of ‘Western civilizations’ in its 
struggle against the Soviet Union" (Tocci, 2011, p. 90). Additionally, during the same 
period, half of Turkey’s trade was with the EC and economic relations between Turkey 
and the EC also indicated Turkey’s importance as an economic player (Franck, 2002, p. 
108). 
Contrasting with what the US did, the Western states started to lose their interest in 
Turkey once the security concerns posed by the Soviet threat disappeared. Furthermore, 
due to the decrease in security concerns, the EU had the chance to primarily focus on its 
internal dynamics and reshape them, considering that its political and economic 
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structure experienced nothing but drama (Onis, 2000, p. 464) since the Single European 
Act in 1987. Following these developments, a hidden ideology regarding Turkey started 
to emerge in the European political and economic system and this ideology started to be 
affected by two main events: (1) the systemic nature arisen during the post-Cold War 
period and (2) religious and political opinions that emerged after the September 11 
attacks (Alessandri, 2010, p. 94). 
However, even after these problematic events, good relations with Turkey have been 
accepted as an important asset by a number of European states, since Turkey has still 
been a prominent actor in providing security in the Middle East and Eurasia (F.S. 
Larrabee & Lesser, 2001). From the very beginning, the European states adopted a 
realist perspective regarding Turkey by always considering its location which emerges 
as a connecting bridge between Europe, Russia, and Central Asian countries, and 
Turkey’s economic importance that it presents in the European markets (Onis, 2000, p. 
466). Rather than considering Turkey’s location in the same way that the US does, 
Europe interpreted its location in a broader sense (Kramer, 2000, p. 223). As Kramer 
puts it: 
For the Europeans, relations with Turkey kept their strategic value but were 
defined in more general and imprecise terms, such as the country’s function 
as a bridge to the Islamic world or to Central Asia, or as a barrier against the 
advance of threatening Islamic fundamentalism. This is a consequence of 
the equally vague way the Europeans tend to define their new security 
interests more generally: stability, prosperity, and peace in Europe and its 
neighbourhood (Kramer, 2000, p. 223). 
When these changes occurred, Turkey was forced to determine its place and stance in 
the international system. With the intention of determining its position, Turkey started 
to launch policies to further its political system and economy, since it was now crucial 
to be a part of "progressive and increasingly democratic institutions that Europe 
represented (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 39). Right after the 1980 Turkish coup d’état, when 
the military administration left Turkey gained democracy back in 1983, the Turkish 
government still made a formal application to the European Community to become a 
member (Onis, 2000, p. 468). In 1987, the Turgut Özal government formally applied to 
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the EC in order to speed up Turkey’s economic and political development. This formal 
membership application to was considered important since it brought the Turkish issue 
back to the EC debates (H. Yılmaz, 2009).  
Confirming the changing approach of European states towards Turkey, the EC rejected 
the Turkish application indicating its political and economic deficits. The formal 
application altered the nature of Turkey-EU bilateral relations by transforming the 
Turkish issue into a more delicate one. Despite the above-mentioned association 
agreement between Turkey and the EC, the Turkish application to become a full 
member was considered serious, and it ignited a wave of fear in European countries. As 
a consequence, the EC/EU approached the Turkish application with concerns related to 
the Turkish political and economic system, cultural, and religious differences (Onis, 
2000, p. 466), as well as the future of European political and economic integration after 
Turkey’s full membership. 
Three major reasons that acted to slow EU-Turkey relations were the Turkish military 
intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the worsening of the Turkish political and economic 
system, and the resulting 1980 Turkish coup d’état (Onis, 2000, p. 468). Economic 
problems and the political struggles that Turkey faced under the attacks of the PKK, the 
removal of the Turkish Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (Gordon et al., 
2009, p. 40), and the aforementioned concerns were the major reasons behind this 
rejection. Additionally, during the same period, the inclusion of the countries located in 
Eastern Europe, which emerged right after the collapse of the Soviet Union became the 
major concern for Europe (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 40). 
On the other hand, this did not mark the end of Turkish hopes for full membership, and 
Turkey did not change its perception regarding its integration with the West after 
getting the European Commission’s approval of Turkish ‘eligibility’ for membership in 
1987 (Tocci, 2011, p. 2). After the rejection of the application of Özal government, the 
Customs Union was interpreted as the second chance for Turkey to prove its place in the 
West. With an intention of not missing this chance, Turkey applied an intense lobbying 
in European institutions while it was adopting a number of reforms within its political 
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and economic system. As a consequence, in December 1995, the European Parliament 
ratified the Customs Union agreement signed with Turkey. The Customs Union 
agreement was obviously important for the Turkish economy since it was offering the 
chance to integrate the Turkish economic system with the West. Following the initiation 
of the Customs Union agreement, "50 percent of Turkey’s yearly trade was with the 
EU" (Nachmani, 2003, p. 64) during the late 1990s. While Turkey viewed the Customs 
Union agreement as the first step of its membership to the European Union, most 
Western states viewed this development in the bilateral relations as the ‘maximum’ for 
Turkey (Yılmaz, 2009, p. 56), so there was no need to further Turkish inclusion and 
giving the Turkish state member status. 
In the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, Turkey was not declared as a candidate 
country in the long list of candidate states which mainly consisted of Central and 
Eastern European countries, since it did not meet membership criteria. Before the 
Summit, the European Christian Democratic Union declared that "the EU is in the 
process of building a civilization in which Turkey has no place" (as cited in Gordon et 
al., 2009, p. 41). This result of the Summit further demonstrated that EU-Turkey 
bilateral relations would not progress as much the bilateral relations between Turkey 
and the US. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Summit by not listing Turkey as a candidate 
country, demonstrated that Turkish integration will not be solely based on the geo-
strategic importance of Turkey as was done with the US (Onis, 2000, p. 465), and put 
Turkey in the "framework of a new European strategy" (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 41). 
Of course, as expected, the Luxembourg Summit harmed the atmosphere created by the 
Customs Union. The Turkish nation did not reach positively after the rejection of its full 
membership application, and the disappointment spread with the end of the Summit. 
According to Turkey, the decision of the European Union was not fair since (1) the 
other listed candidate countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic were not ahead of Turkey in terms of economic and political status and (2) 
Turkey had applied for membership much earlier (Onis, 2000, p. 463). Then Turkey-EU 
relations came to a stopping point and the Turkish government finally froze its relations 
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with the EU institutions with the threat of withdrawing its membership application by 
the end of 1998 (Barchard, 1998, p. 2). 
Contrasting with the Luxembourg Summit decision, which did not list Turkey as a 
candidate country, even ‘paradoxically’ –so-to-speak– the EU in the Helsinki Council 
of 1999 reversed its decision (Onis, 2000, p. 464) by listing Turkey as a candidate 
country to heal the worsening relations since the Luxembourg Summit. In the Helsinki 
Council of 1999, the European Union declared that it would start negotiations with 
Turkey, once Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria, which are the provisions of the 
European Union to determine the membership eligibility of any country that wishes to 
apply for membership. During this period, the European Union also offered economic 
aid to Turkey to accelerate its economic and political reformation process for further 
integration to the membership criteria. As a consequence, the EU and the European 
Commission started to monitor the Turkish reform process as well as political and 
economic developments in the country and recommended suggestions with the first 
Accession Partnership for Turkey (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). 
Obviously, after the Helsinki Summit, the political and economic reforms demanded by 
the European Union became one of Turkey’s top targets. During the early 2000s, 
Turkey underwent a very comprehensive reformation process. Becoming a member of 
the European Union became the driving force to overcome the deficits indicated by the 
European Union; this transformation process also played an important role to solve the 
problematic aspects of relations with neighbouring countries (Alessandri, 2010, p. 88). 
During this reformation process, Turkey adopted various changes such as increasing 
minority rights, especially for the Kurds, increasing civil control over the National 
Security Council, improvements for human rights and the freedom of speech, 
liberalizing the Turkish economy, and removing the State Security Courts established 
during the 1980 Turkish coup d’état (Gordon et al., 2009, p. 44). All of these reforms 
appeared to be done by the request of the European Union. Upon these developments, in 
October 2005, the European Union gave consent to further accession talks, so start the 
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negotiations since Turkey had ‘sufficiently’ met the pre-conditions for membership 
(Tocci, 2011, p. 4). 
In December 2005, negotiations that were already started and reforms created a belief in 
Turkey that its performance would determine and guarantee its membership in the 
European Union. As expected, once the negotiations started, the European Union started 
to trace Turkey’s progress and continued to further the negotiations. The EU also 
provided help to Turkey in its membership and reform process with accession 
partnerships and progress reports published by the Commission (Tocci, 2011, p. 4). 
Although, the European Union started to help Turkey regarding its application, as the 
French President Jacques Chirac said: "Let’s be clear if conditions allow the 
negotiations to start at the beginning of next year, we have to know these negotiations 
will be long, very long" (Guardian, 2004). Confirming Chirac’s declaration at some 
level, the transformation process was including "economic, political, cultural, ethnic, 
social, religious, secular and excessive national issues, the democratic process and 
military interventions in that process, human rights, minority rights, immigration and 
other aspects" (Nachmani, 2003, p. 55). At this point, as mentioned above, one can 
argue that the relations between Turkey and the EU are different than the relations 
between Turkey and the US. As Kuhnhardt explains: 
The United States perceives Turkey primarily as a strategic asset, whereas 
the European states tend to concentrate more on conditions in Turkey, in 
particular human rights and problems of democratic consolidation but also 
the divide between Christianity and Islam (Kühnhardt, 1999, p. 234). 
In this regard, it would be problematic not to conclude that Turkey-EU relations will be 
based on a more complex and multi-dimensional context rather than depending solely 
on a geostrategic partnership. 
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3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter introduced a historical review of Turkey-EU and US-Turkey bilateral 
relations after the Cold War, most of which occurred after the West division during the 
1980s into two separate sections. The first half of this chapter presented the 
fundamental dynamics of US-Turkey relations as well as the formation of these 
dynamics by emphasizing major turning points in bilateral relations of the two 
countries. In the second half of this chapter, significant historical events in Turkey-EU 
bilateral relations have been introduced to further elaborate on American support in the 
forth chapter.  
Along with the assumptions of neorealism, the details of which have been given in 
Chapter 2, the fourth chapter stems from (1) the historical framework of the US-EU and 
Turkey-US relations, which has been put forth in Chapter 3 and (2) the quantitative 
content analysis results, details of which have been given in the second half of the 
second chapter, to evaluate the American perception regarding the Turkish membership 
in the EU after the Cold War, US attempts to support Turkish membership, and, of 
course, the consequences of these perceptions and attempts on US-Turkey bilateral 
relations. 
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CHAPTER 4  
TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP: AMERICAN APPROACH 
4.1. Introduction 
To understand the US support in the process of Turkey’s membership to the European 
Union from the 1990s until the early 2000s, this chapter will focus on the American 
perception regarding Turkish membership to the EU after the Cold War, US attempts to 
support Turkish membership, and, of course, the consequences of these perceptions and 
attempts regarding bilateral relations between the US and Turkey. The first aim of this 
chapter is to provide a comprehensive background to understand the US’s strategic 
expectations from Turkey especially after the Cold War and the September 11 attacks, 
which, in general, emerged as a support for Turkish accession to the European Union. 
Then, this chapter will explain how and when US support arose in the relations between 
Turkey and the EU within the timeframe from the 1990s until 2005. With an intention 
to elaborate on this aspect, this chapter will also underline the responses of European 
leaders and politicians to US interventions.   
In this chapter, the analysis is concentrated around the effects of the international 
system, which is an independent variable as set in the previous chapter, on the 
American approach towards EU-Turkey bilateral relations. In general, this chapter 
evaluates the changing structure of the international system from the end of the Cold 
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War to post-September 11, as well as the effects of these developments on the US. 
Additionally, this chapter treats the approaches of the American presidents as an 
indicator of American support during the post-Cold War to comprehensively elaborate 
on the form of American interventions in world politics. In sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 
4.5, the political structure of the Clinton administration was examined to understand 
American efforts and support in EU-Turkey bilateral relations. In section 4.6 and 4.7, 
efforts and support of the Bush administration were evaluated by considering the 
changing international climate with the September 11 incidents and events occurring in 
the Middle East such as the Iraq Crisis. Finally, in section 4.8, the quantitative content 
analysis results have been presented in a comparative fashion. In summary, this chapter 
indicates a correlation between increasing American intervention in bilateral relations 
between the EU and Turkey and changing external circumstances. 
4.2. The US Perception towards Turkish Accession to the European Union 
Due to increasing Soviet threat, the Western alliance in general and transnational 
cooperation between the European states and the U.S. were based on a realist consensus 
of reaching a power balance against the common enemy. Especially following the end 
of World War II, the US was one of major supporters of European integration, thus 
creating a powerful block against the Soviet expansionism. As mentioned previously, 
the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were only two of the many tools used by the 
US to support this integration. After the end of the Cold War, the US willingly 
continued to support European integration and cooperation by following a support 
policy for Western expansionism into Central and Eastern Europe, due to its "geo-
strategic interests" (Morningstar, 2010, paragraph 2). For the US, Turkey was 
considered within this context, and it appeared important for the US to have Turkey and 
the major European states as stable and strong allies. As Carlucci and Larrabee put it: 
Turkey’s entry into the European Union is in the long-term interest of the 
United States. It will make Europe a stronger strategic partner and 
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strengthen efforts to promote democratic reform in Turkey (Carlucci & 
Larrabee, 2005, p. A18). 
Following the years of alliance, the sharp end of the Cold War, of course, affected the 
trilateral relations between the US, Western European states, and Turkey. The US 
continued to fully support Turkish participation in the European Union, since Turkey’s 
ties with the Western block were important in removing the residue of Soviet influence. 
For the US, Turkey remained as an important and strategic asset with its unique 
location, which makes it available for the US to reach the Balkans, Central Asia, the 
Caucasus, and the Middle East. Since Turkish support was required for the US to 
implement its policies in those regions, Turkey remained critical for the US national 
interests. 
As one of former US ambassadors to Turkey, Mr. Parris, asserts: 
From a security perspective, the military dimension of the relationship 
proved as important as during the Cold War. Turkish participation in 
peacekeeping actions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia 
demonstrated to the Pentagon and White House planners Ankara’s 
capabilities and readiness to shoulder responsibility as a ‘security 
producing’ nation (Parris, 2003, p. 9). 
During the post-Cold War period, Turkey and the US operated together for a number of 
reasons in the Balkans and the Middle East. As previously mentioned in the first 
chapters, the US financially supported Turkey and helped the Turkish government to 
capture Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. With all this support, US support to 
Turkey in its relations with the EU, was actually to maintain Turkish-American 
relations for US regional interests (Sayarı, 2006). Additionally, supporting Turkey in its 
relations with the EU would be consolation to Turkey for (1) keeping its relations stable 
with the US and (2) providing help during the Gulf War in 1990-1991 (Tocci, 2011). As 
Öniş asserts, the best assistance that the US could offer was to encourage the EU to 
actively deal with the Turkish issue and Turkish membership (Öniş, 2001, p. 165). 
Furthering this approach, according to Sayarı, US intervention in the EU-Turkey 
relations: 
 91 
 
…has rested on the recognition of the fact that membership is an internal 
matter for the EU and that Turkey’s progress towards full integration 
depends on Ankara’s ability to undertake the reform measures needed to 
comply with the Copenhagen criteria (Sayarı, 2011, p. 255). 
According to the Clinton administration, for Turkey to be considered in the Western 
world as a democracy, it should somehow be attached to the EU (Tocci, 2011). At this 
point, Kayhan and Lindley assert: 
In an era in which American strategic interests have focused on dealing with 
the instability and chaos in the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, and the 
Middle East, it is crucial for the US that Turkey stays strongly anchored to 
the West as a stable, modern, secular, and democratic ally (Kayhan & 
Lindley, 2006, p. 3). 
The development of the Turkish political system was essential, especially for the 
Clinton administration. With Turkey, which practically adopts global norms and 
democratizes itself, would the US have a democratic ally connected to the West, so the 
US could then advocate Turkish membership in the European Union. At the very 
beginning, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European 
Community/European Union emerged as opportunities to tie Turkey to the West (Öniş 
& Yılmaz, 2005). One of former US ambassadors to Turkey, Eric Edelman declared 
that the US had been willing to see to Turkey adopting the reforms required for the EU 
membership. Furthermore, Edelman declared that US interests and strategic 
expectations could only be actualized with a strong Turkey and these could only happen 
through the Turkish membership in the European Union (Yetkin, 2005). 
As a general approach, the US supported Turkey’s connection to Western institutions by 
thinking that Turkey would follow a westernized policy in its foreign policy and 
security-related policies (Makovsky, 2001, p. 362). The only way the US could further 
Turkish westernization by keeping the secularism and democracy without any rupture in 
the political and economic system was to support its membership process in the EU 
(Özel, Yılmaz, & Akyüz, 2009). With this support, the US would have a democratic and 
stable ally as Turkey, which would help the US in implementing its security policies in 
a very wide region. Additionally, the US would not be held fully responsible in the 
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Turkish transformation process if European institutions would be involved. As 
Teitelbaum and Martin report: 
It is in the strategic interest of the U.S. that Turkey continues to 
democratize, westernize and modernize. A stable and prosperous Turkey 
will be an anchor for the entire region from the Balkans to the Middle East 
to the Caucasus and Central Asia (Teitelbaum & Martin, 2003, p. 3).  
As one can conclude, the US efforts would be as effective as the EU requirements for 
membership. Considering the recent changes in the Turkish political system, the EU 
emerges as a more prominent and effective actor rather than US encouragement and 
suggestions. As Özel et al. put it: 
Should that process falter either because the EU proves utterly 
unimaginative or beholden to its members that want only an ambiguous 
‘privileged partnership’ or because Turkey loses interest completely, the 
result could well be a deterioration of democratic standards and practices in 
Turkey. Such an outcome would certainly be detrimental for the nation. It 
should also be against the interests of Turkey’s EU and NATO partners, 
particularly the United States (Özel et al., 2009, p. 29). 
If Turkey could be a member of the EU, then close relations leading to this result and its 
membership "would enhance Turkey’s political stability and promote economic growth, 
as well as help ensure a strong, democratic Turkey on the doorstep of a sometimes 
turbulent Middle East and Central Asia" (Atlantic Council, 2004). Additionally, Turkish 
membership in the EU would obviously accelerate its democratization (Kuniholm, 
2001, p. 37) and its modernization, which would eventually result in a more stable 
Turkey that would be more beneficial for the US. 
Especially after the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration understood the 
increasing importance of Turkey and furthered support available to Turkey in EU-
Turkey relations. Particularly for the invasion of Iraq and in obtaining Turkey’s support 
in using to use its soil and air space for the American troop deployment in 2002, the 
Bush administration promoted its diplomatic advocacy. In this context, public speeches 
made to the leaders of European states, the 2002 Annan Plan to resolve the conflict in 
Cyprus, and many more initiatives before the Copenhagen Summit in 2002 all 
constituted primary efforts of the US to once again start negotiations between the EU 
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and Turkey (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). Although these efforts were interpreted by a 
number of European states as the efforts of the Bush administration to obtain Turkey’s 
support in paving the way for the US to use Turkish soil and airspace for troop 
deployment in Iraq and open a new northern front through Turkey (Sayarı, 2006). 
In addition, a Turkey who is anchored to the West with its Muslim population would be 
able to act as a secular democratic role model for those countries located in the Middle 
East and would thus help the US fight against radical Islamic groups (Kayhan & 
Lindley, 2006; Kuniholm, 2001; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). So, one of the reasons behind 
the American support in EU-Turkey relations was for Turkey to be a role model in 
providing stability required of American foreign policy. Contrasting with the opinions 
of major European states such as Germany and France, the US was thinking that Turkey 
must be attached to the Western society to act as a bridge between the Islamic world 
and the rest.  
On the other hand, Turkey might also help the US fight against the anti-Americanism 
that arose in Muslim countries as well as controversial debates regarding American 
foreign policy. By admitting Turkey to the Union, European society would also have the 
chance to declare to the world that it did not oppose the world’s the Muslim population 
(Debnar & Smith, 2006, p. 20). In line with this approach, the EU would seem as an 
anti-Muslim entity in delaying Turkish accession to the Union. Turkey’s membership to 
the Union represented great importance to silence the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
(Huntington, 1996) oriented debates within Europe and decrease the risk of Islamic 
terrorism. As Robert asserts: 
…welcoming Turkey into the European club would send a powerful 
message to the rest of the Muslim world. It would say that the largely white, 
Christian West is not biased against those who hold the Islamic faith. It 
would say that it wishes to reconcile, let bygones be bygones, and start the 
relationship afresh with a new partnership of equality and mutuality (Robert, 
2005, p. 7). 
The westernization and modernization of the Turkish political and economic system 
through Turkish membership in the EU were especially important for the US, because 
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the US was afraid of a Turkey which might seek to regionally cooperate with other 
Muslim countries by giving up on its relations with the West (Sayarı, 2006, p. 7). As 
previously mentioned, Turkey’s membership and cooperation were considered 
important and critical to build a bridge between the Islamic world and the West. 
With a Turkey, and as a member of the EU, the US would also have the chance to 
cooperate with the EU directly regarding security issues in the regions surrounding 
Turkey. This membership would obviously decrease the burden on American shoulders 
by involving the EU in a region where US security interests lie. According to the 
Atlantic Council: "If admitted to the EU, Turkey would expand the Union’s borders, 
bringing it into direct contact with some problematic neighbours" (Atlantic Council, 
2004, p. 9). By containing Turkey as a member, the borders of the EU would reach 
countries such as Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and this would eventually result in the European 
Defence and Security Policy to involve this area. So, the EU would be required to 
launch consistent and stable policies regarding the region and would have to cooperate 
with the US. 
Furthermore, Turkey would have arguably the most significant role in decision making 
processes of the Union in the case of admission due to its very high population. As 
Turkey was an important and faithful ally of the US for a very long time, a number of 
European states interpreted the Turkish membership into the EU as the increasing 
influence of the US in the EU, which had gradually decreased since the end of the Cold 
War to the early 2000s. According to some European states, US support for Turkish 
membership in the Union was actually a strategy of the Bush administration to decrease 
the role of France and Germany in the EU since these two countries were against the 
interventionist and aggressive policies of the US in early 2000s.  
Whether these debates are legitimate or not, it is clear that the US started to worry right 
after the Nice Summit in 2000. The ‘separate operational movement capability’ of the 
European Security and Defense Policy and future relations of the Union with NATO 
were behind this concern (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 37). Starting or furthering relations 
between European Security and Defense Policy and the North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organization, and eliminating the risk of the NATO’s decreasing role in Europe would 
be possible through Turkish accession to the Union, as Turkey’s existence in the 
European Security and Defense Policy would relieve US concerns, since Turkey has 
been a faithful member of NATO for a long time and would increase the power of the 
European Security and Defense Policy, and lead to a cooperation between NATO and 
European Security and Defense Policy (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 25). In this context, 
the EU would emerge as a strategic partner to the US in case of Turkish admission to 
the Union (Carlucci & Larrabee, 2005). 
I should also note the rumour that Turkey would turn to Brussels rather than turning to 
Washington D.C., so that it in the case of admittance into the Union, it would become 
more ‘European’, did not interrupt US support in EU-Turkey relations (Carlucci & 
Larrabee, 2005). On the contrary, Turkey was expected to be the country that has an 
Atlanticist approach in the Union. With this expectation, the US would be more actively 
heard in the Union regarding the transatlantic issues (Tocci, 2011, p. 79). Additionally, 
Turkish membership in the Union would have economic consequences both for Turkey, 
the US, and the European Union. With membership, Turkey would be able to open its 
labour market to the EU, which would transform the European market into a more 
appealing one for American investors. As a result, this recovery in the economic 
relations would result in closer ties between the US and the European Union (Atlantic 
Council, 2004, p. 24).  
As previously mentioned, a divergence between the policies adopted by the US and the 
EU emerged right after the end of the Cold War. This dilemma has been transformed 
into a problematic series of relations following the September 11 attacks and the Iraq 
War. The US continued to follow the same policy regarding its bilateral relations with 
Turkey. As Makovsky puts it: "probably in no other internal EU issue has the U.S. been 
so actively involved and asserted a right" (Makovsky, 1998, p. 60). In fact, supporting 
Turkey in its relations with the EU and the membership process did not result in a 
significant cost for the US, except for the reaction of some leaders in European states 
(Abramowitz, 2004; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005; Sayarı, 2006, 2011). Here I should also note 
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that Turkish accession to the EU might not affect relations between the US and the EU 
as the US expected. Admitting Turkey as a member does not necessarily mean that the 
EU would follow a policy similar that of the US in the Middle East and surrounding 
regions. Additionally, Turkey might in fact, become, a more Eurocentric country and 
the ties between Turkey and the US might weaken (Bremmer, 2004). After joining the 
EU and European Security and Defense Policy, Turkey might choose the side of the EU 
and distance itself from NATO, which might result in the EU to follow unique and 
active policies, especially in the Middle East rather than duplicating US policies. 
However, Turkish accession negotiations and its membership to the EU still have 
become a significant part of the US agenda starting by the end of 1980s (Sayarı, 2006). 
As the international structure underwent a transformation following the end of the Cold 
War, it would not be problematic to conclude that the US expectations also have been 
transformed. 
4.3. The US Support in the 1990s: the Customs Union and the Helsinki Summit 
4.3.1. The US Support in the Customs Union 
The American administration during the 1990s was aware that liberal norms and 
increase in the strength of the political and economic system in continental Europe 
would aid in removing the communist threat that stemmed from the Soviet Union and 
reconstruction of the continent. As a consequence, the US supported EU enlargement 
towards Central and Eastern Europe. From the very beginning, it was important for the 
US to have an economically and politically strong and stable Europe, which shares the 
same interests with the US and could fight against Soviet influence and thus, Soviet 
threat. As President Clinton declares: 
We must build a new security for Europe; the old security was based on the 
defense of our bloc against another bloc. The new security must be found in 
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Europe’s integration... an integration of security forces, of market 
economies, of national democracies (as cited in Daalder, 2002, p. 75). 
Obviously, the European Union as a sui generis entity with the opportunities that "its 
unique market" offers (Peterson & Cowles, 1998, p. 251) have had the power to become 
a new economic player and it would be beneficial for the US if Turkey could become 
part of this growing economy. 
According to President Clinton, Turkey’s relations with the EU would also develop 
bilateral relations between Turkey and the US, most of which are based on geo-politics 
and economy. As he puts it: "When Turkey enters the EU, Turkish-US relations will not 
weaken but grow stronger" (as cited in Kohen, 2002). In this context, the Turkish 
accession to the Customs Union had great importance, since it would pave the way for 
trilateral relations to grow stronger and help Turkey to integrate with the West as much 
as possible. Following the Turkish Association Agreement with the European 
Community in 1963, it had already become important to prepare the Turkish economy 
for further integration. With this scope, the Clinton administration started to push the 
European states to further cooperate with Turkey in the Customs Union negotiations. 
Indicating the importance of Turkey in the European Union after the rejection of the 
Commission in 1989, the US officially lobbied the European leaders and EU institutions 
(Sayarı, 2006). Before membership in the Customs Union, the European Parliament 
made it clear that "approval would depend on human rights reform" (Makovsky, 1995, 
paragraph 9). Similarly, the Clinton administration also pointed out the reforms that 
Turkey must comply with as soon as possible such as the Copenhagen criteria. Within 
this framework, the American intervention of EU-Turkey relations continued in two 
dimensions. First, the Clinton administration promoted Turkish membership in 
European capitals, and second, it encouraged Turkey to adopt the reforms as soon as 
possible (Tocci, 2012). Since Turkey has not ever lost its significance for the US, nor 
did the US ever force or harshly criticize the Turkish political or economic system 
cruelly, but on the contrary, has the US always supported the Turkish membership in 
the EU by encouraging Turkey with the human rights report and public speeches related 
to the Turkish democracy and human rights (Tocci, 2011). However, the European 
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Parliament was not quite sure about the Turkish existence in a formal Customs Union 
agreement and a close vote was expected to be on the agenda (Sayarı, 2006). To prevent 
this, Stuart Eisenstat, former chief US trade negotiator, personally lobbied the EU 
(Sayarı, 2006). Additionally, during this period, before the Customs Union agreement, 
former US ambassador Mark Grossman and former Assistant Secretary of the 
Department of State attempted to convince Turkey to release jailed journalists, 
ameliorate the conditions in jails, and expand freedom of speech (Tocci, 2011). 
Following this pressure of the US, Turkey adopted minor changes in its constitution and 
initiated the 1995 Anti-Terror Law before furthering to the Customs Union (Tocci, 
2011, p. 80). 
Contrasting with all of these efforts, the Cyprus issue was still a barrier in front of the 
Turkish accession to the EU, and in this case, the Customs Union. The officials of the 
Turkish government at that time and the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic leader Rauf 
Denktaş were aware that Turkey’s official application to the EU has only been for 
Turkey and not for the Northern Cyprus Turkish Republic (Park, 2000, p. 35). In 
addition, the resolution of the Cyprus conflict has also been one of the demands of the 
West. At the Dublin Summit in 1990, the EC announced that "future relations with 
Turkey would depend on Ankara adopting a more cooperative stance on the Cyprus 
issue" (as cited in Park, 2000, p. 35). As a mediator, the Clinton administration also 
attempted to resolve the conflict on the island to accelerate the ratification of the 
Customs Union agreement in the European Parliament. Furthermore, Clinton indicated 
the importance of resolving the Cyprus conflict with Turkey as NATO partners in his 
talks with former Prime Minister of Turkey, Tansu Çiller. While Çiller claimed that the 
Cyprus conflict was now on her agenda, Clinton did not hesitate to use the Cyprus issue 
as a slogan before the US presidential elections in 1996 by exclaiming: "I will solve the 
Cyprus issue." Confirming this approach, in the very beginning of the year 1996, 
Clinton also attempted to arrange a meeting with the Cypriot leaders Klerides and 
Denktaş in New York. However, these attempts to resolve the Cyprus issue were not 
successful (Duğan, 1995). On the other hand, the positive atmosphere created by 
Clinton and Çiller was perceived as important in the EU. 
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According to the March 1995 European Union Council report, the Customs Union 
agreement with Turkey would be effective from 1996 and the accession negotiations 
would start following the "conclusion of 1996 Intergovernmental Conference" (Franck, 
2002, p. 105). The purpose of the agreement was that Greece would not be able to veto 
the Turkish accession to the Customs Union due to the ongoing Cyprus conflict 
(Franck, 2002). 
Contradictory to the relations between Israel and Turkey in 2014, at that time Israel 
effectively lobbied the EU with the support of the US for the Turkish accession to the 
Customs Union (Franck, 2002, p. 105). Improving relations between Israel and Turkey 
was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. In speeches of Israeli officials and former Israeli 
Prime Minister Peres, the bias in favour of the Turkish accession could be demonstrated 
(Makovsky, 1995 paragraph 3). As one of the socialist members of the European 
Parliament at that time, Pauline Green asserts: "…these countries had addressed ‘wise 
words’ to the Assembly and the EP’s assent was finally given in December 1995 by 343 
votes to 149 and 36 abstentions" (Franck, 2002, p. 105). 
After a short period of time since the ratification of the Customs Union agreement, an 
additional conflict emerged between Greece and Turkey. In 1995, a Turkish boat named 
Figen Akat ran aground near an islet called Imia, which is located nearly 4 miles from 
the Turkish coast. Greece declared that the accident occurred within its sea borders; 
Turkey declared the reverse. This debate escalated very quickly and ended up with the 
waving of the Greek flag in the islet. Upon this development, Tansu Çiller, former 
Prime Minister of Turkey, demonstrated Turkish readiness for a fight against Greece by 
declaring, "This flag will go down and this soldiers will go out of the island" 
(Wikipedia, 2014c). In 1996, Clinton intervened in this conflict as well as the EU. The 
EU announced that Turkey was violating the EU’s Aegean border (Cooley, 1996). 
When each side was declaring that they were ready for a fight against each other, the 
Clinton administration attempted to resolve the conflict by inviting both sides to the 
negotiation table and calling them to remove their flags from the islands. At that time, 
this effort was positively perceived by the leaders of both conflicting countries. While 
 100 
 
the efforts of the Clinton administration were positively perceived in Turkey, it ignited a 
controversial debate in Greece (Cooley, 1996). 
The US’s attempts to support Turkish accession and its encouragement to Turkey for 
the adoption of suggested reforms turned out to be very influential. The positive 
approach of the European leaders to the US attempts before and after the Customs 
Union agreement simply justified the US’s efforts to anchor Turkey to the West. This 
fact also furthered US support and created a great deal of expectation in Turkey 
regarding American support. 
From the US point of view, one of the reasons behind the Clinton administration’s 
success was the form of US interventions. Most interventions during the Clinton 
presidency emphasized the importance of the liberal norms, values, EU enlargement, 
and the reforms adopted in Turkey (Tocci, 2011). While lobbying for Turkish 
membership in the EU, the US also attempted to accelerate reforms to be adopted in 
Turkey. As an example, the US decreased the level of economic aid to Turkey and 
declared that 10% of the total amount will be given only if Turkey could progress in the 
Kurdish issue (Tocci, 2011). Furthermore, the US rearranged the export licences for 
Cobra helicopters as part of this manipulation (Kirişci, 2001, p. 138). Additionally, the 
Clinton administration’s efforts never contained harsh or direct criticisms toward either 
Turkey or the EU (Tocci, 2011). The US and the EU communication was pretty much 
based on telephone lines, and as a result, the Clinton administration’s support for 
Turkey was through "diplomats privately engaged with European counterparts" (Tocci, 
2011, p. 84). 
From another point of view, the Customs Union agreement obviously came with 
advantages for the European states. First, the agreement created an economic 
opportunity for EU members. Besides, Turkey’s role in the Balkan crisis, its geo-
strategic importance, security concerns during the 1990s, the EU’s structural problems 
were also significantly and positively affected the climate of perceptions about Turkey. 
Different from all of these aspects, the Clinton administration’s direct influence in 
 101 
 
domestic reforms in Turkey emerged as influential and important in the European 
Parliament’s ratification of the Custom Union agreement.  
4.3.2. The U.S. Support in the Helsinki Summit 
For the 5
th
 enlargement of the EU, the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 declared 
that the EU would start accession negotiations with Slovenia, Poland, Southern Cyprus 
Greek Cypriot Administration, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia in December 
1999, starting from the Helsinki Summit. As previously mentioned, Turkey was not 
included in the list of candidate countries; furthermore, this fact created a huge 
disappointment both in Turkey and the US administration. 
However, the result of the Luxembourg European Council did not stop the Clinton 
administration’s efforts to include Turkey as a European country. Furthermore, the 
Clinton administration interpreted the decision as a ‘mistake’ (as cited in Franck, 2002, 
p. 105). As former Under Secretary Richard Holbrooke puts it: 
We think that the invitation to Cyprus was correct and the treatment to 
Turkey was a mistake, and we hope that the EU and Turkey will work 
together actively to improve the situation for Turkey (as cited in Franck, 
2002, pp. 105-106). 
Additionally, as a reaction to the Luxembourg European Council’s decision, anti-EU 
movements started to emerge in Turkey, especially within the coalition government 
consisting of the Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action Party members (Öniş 
& Yılmaz, 2005, p. 6). Then Turkey-EU relations came to a stopping point and the 
Turkish government finally froze its relations with the EU institutions with the threat of 
withdrawing its membership application by the end of 1998 (Barchard, 1998, p. 2). As 
Kinzer explains: 
That set off a storm of protest in Turkey, highlighted by emotional 
denunciations of Europe and suggestions that Turkey should look for friends 
elsewhere. American leaders, including President Clinton, criticized the 
 102 
 
European decision and urged that Turkey be made to feel unwelcome in the 
West (Kinzer, 1998). 
The US attempted to restore relations between Turkey and the EU (Öniş & Yılmaz, 
2005). According to a former US official: "American diplomats would not miss an 
opportunity to lecture European counterparts on the imperative of reversing the 
Luxembourg decision" (as cited in Barkey, 2003, p. 215). As a result, President Clinton 
followed both an informal and formal policy regarding the Luxembourg decision. His 
aim was to "press EU leaders to revise the Luxembourg decision" (Franck, 2002, p. 
106). As part of his policy towards Turkey and the EU, President Clinton had several 
telephone meetings with European officials in order to change their decision regarding 
Turkey (Gordon et al., 2009; Sayarı, 2006). President Clinton particularly wanted to 
show to the West that Turkey and its transformation were still significant for the EU.  
Experienced US diplomats started to intensely lobby the EU officials and European 
leaders for the adoption of a much more moderate approach towards Turkey (Kinzer, 
1998). To change European leaders and the EU’s attitude towards Turkey, US officials 
attempted to adopt mainstream measures in favour of Turkey until the Cardiff Summit 
in 1998. Former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, arranged a meeting with the 
Foreign Minister of France, Hubert Vedrine, the Foreign Minister of Germany, Klaus 
Kinkel, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Robin Cook, so as to form a 
policy of appeasement towards Turkey. According to the report, Madeleine Albright 
experienced progress during the meeting but also had the opportunity to observe the 
anti-Turkish attitude in Greece and the forthcoming elections in Germany as the main 
obstacles to more positive EU-Turkey relations (Kinzer, 1998). As one of former US 
officials acknowledges: "This Turkey question is probably the most serious 
disagreement we have with Germany" (as cited in Kinzer, 1998). 
Additionally, as one of former US diplomats working on the Turkish issue claims: 
We are now engaged in a full-court press to get the EU to ease up on 
Turkey, to make the Turks feel more welcome in Europe… There are 
intense negotiations going on aimed at getting the EU to improve the terms 
of its offer. The European countries have accused us of not understanding 
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their problems. We do recognize that it will be a long time before Turkey is 
ready to join (as cited in Kinzer, 1998).  
With a very similar approach, as former Under Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, 
expresses the following US sentiment: 
As a very interested non-member and non-applicant, the US has urged the 
EU to find ways to bring Turkey more fully into the process of enlargement. 
We have done so and we will persist in doing so-for reasons that have as 
much to do with our hopes for Europe as with our hopes for Turkey. We do 
not believe that European unity and integration will be fully successful if a 
key European country is set uniquely alone and apart (as cited in Franck, 
2002, p. 106). 
As previously mentioned, an ideology about Turkey has surfaced in Europe, particularly 
after the disappearance of Soviet security concerns. Confirming this anti-Turkish 
ideology, Helmut Kohl, former German Chancellor, in his statement in 1997 confirmed 
this anti-Turkish ideology with the phrase "the gap in culture and civilization between 
Europe and Turkey," a statement which appeared to be confirming the one of criticisms 
about the EU being a "Christian club" (Kohen, 1997). Contrasting with the ideology 
rising in Europe, the Clinton administration promoted Turkish membership as an 
opportunity which could unite the East with the West. Publicly, US officials argued that 
Turkey could play the role of the bridge between the West and the Islam world (Kohen, 
1997). The Clinton administration also promoted European values as one of the ways to 
provide peace in the continent; in other words, the US wanted to indicate the importance 
of the expansion of these values while advocating Turkish membership. President 
Clinton when talking to his European counterparts frequently pointed out the 
importance of Turkish membership in the EU for providing peace, economic and 
political stability in the continent As President Clinton declares regarding the Turkish 
participation in European enlargement: 
The foresight to see that our vision of a Europe that is undivided, 
democratic and at peace for the first time in all of history will never be 
complete unless and until it embraces Turkey. The United States is not a 
member of the European Union, but I have consistently urged European 
integration to move further and faster, and that includes Turkey. There are 
still those who see that body of water or, worse, where people stopped to 
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worship God in a different way. But there is a growing and encouraging 
consensus that knows Europe is an idea as much as a place, the idea that 
people can find strength in diversity of opinions, cultures and faiths, as long 
as they are commonly committed to democracy and human rights; the idea 
that people can be united without being uniform, and that the community we 
loosely refer to as the West is an idea, it has no fixes frontiers, it stretches as 
far as the frontiers of freedom can go (Clinton, 1998, p. 2096). 
Especially and interestingly after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the European 
enlargement was pretty much centred on liberal values and democratic norms such as 
human rights. In this context, Clinton’s speech became a very effective one in the EU 
(Tocci, 2011). 
As previously mentioned, the Clinton administration continued to support Turkey by 
encouraging Turkey to adopt necessary reforms. So that, the Clinton administration 
would be able to get a result in favour of Turkey, a result different than the results of the 
Luxembourg Summit. Former Prime Minister of Turkey, Mesut Yılmaz and US 
officials arranged several meetings in 1997 to discuss reforms to be adopted such as the 
liberation of journalists and parliamentary members, reducing torture, enhancing human 
rights, political participation rights, non-governmental organizations, the southern issue, 
and the issue of internally displaced persons (Barkey, 2003). Additionally, the US 
encouraged Turkey to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Former Under Secretary of State, 
Richard Holbrooke, visited Cyprus as a mediator on behalf of the US in this context; 
however, he could not arrive at any significant conclusion after his meetings with 
Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders. Following his visit to Cyprus, Holbrooke 
declared that Turkish Cypriots would not accept serious compromises as long as the EU 
did not treat Turkey as Turkish Cypriots would have expected (Kinzer, 1998). Apart 
from this support, Clinton also visited Turkey a month before the Helsinki Summit, a 
visit which was very important in the history of US-Turkey bilateral relations, since this 
was the third visit of an American president to Turkey (Abramowitz, 2001b). Clinton 
visited both Turkey, Greece, as well as former German Chancellor Schöder (Marsden, 
1999). Clinton’s visit to Turkey might be interpreted as successful as it further 
encouraged the adoption of reforms that strengthened Turkey’s position against the EU, 
and increased US influence (Abramowitz, 2001b, p. 3). 
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During his visit, Clinton made a statement in the Turkish Grand National Assembly on 
November 1999 regarding the US support for the Turkish accession and the importance 
of Turkish membership: 
The coming century will be shaped in good measure by the way in which 
Turkey itself defines its future and its role today and tomorrow, for Turkey 
is a country at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia… 
the future can be shaped for the better if Turkey becomes a fully a part of 
Europe as a stable democratic-secular nation… Turkey is where Europe and 
the Muslim world can meet in peace and harmony (Clinton, 1999). 
Along with this, in November 1999 Summit of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Istanbul, Clinton offers the following: 
What Turkey does, and what we do together in the coming years, will help 
determine whether stability takes root in the Balkans and the Aegean, 
whether true and lasting peace comes to the people of the Middle East, and 
whether democratic transformation in the states of the former Soviet empire, 
from the Caucasus to Central Asia, actually succeeds (as cited in Niblett, 
2005, paragraph 2). 
The Helsinki Summit created a turning point in the EU-Turkey relations. The Summit 
decision in December 1999 paved the way for Turkish membership in the EU, and the 
US played a very important role before and during the Helsinki Summit. In one of the 
interviews of former US ambassador to Turkey, Eric Edelman, he announced that the 
Helsinki Summit decisions actually were the result of the efforts of the US. Eric 
Edelman himself was the US ambassador to Finland at the time of the Summit and he 
declared that he and Marc Grossman from the US Department of State, Mark Parris as 
the US ambassador to Turkey, Jim Jeffrey as a US official, and Nicholas Burns in 
Greece strongly attempted to change the Luxembourg decisions in such a way that 
Turkey would be listed as a candidate country. Edelman was the US ambassador to 
Turkey when the EU gave a date to Turkey for the start of accession negotiations. 
According to Edelman, this was the most satisfying day in his whole career (Yetkin, 
2005). 
Considering the fact that Cyprus’s negotiation talks with the EU started without the 
resolve of the Cyprus conflict, former Prime Minister of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit objected 
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to the candidate status given by the EU. Upon this development, President Clinton 
attempted to convince Ecevit not to reject the agreement. Later, Ecevit in one of the 
press releases declared that it was the President Clinton who convinced him regarding 
the advantages of being a candidate country to the EU (Tocci, 2011, p. 82). 
Finally, the efforts of the Clinton administration resulted in an advantageous situation 
for Turkey in the Helsinki Summit in 1999. After the EU declared Turkey as a 
candidate country, President Clinton made the following statement with "pleasure":  
The US had long supported Turkey’s bid to join the EU in belief that this 
would have lasting benefits not only for Turkey, but also for EU members 
and the United States (as cited in Sayarı, 2006, p. 169). 
Aside from this statement, President Clinton especially thanked the Greek Prime 
Minister, members of the EU, and the nation of Finland for their acceptance of Turkey 
as a candidate country. Clinton also thanked the Turkish government for their progress 
in the democratization of the country and adoption of reforms (Hürriyet Daily News, 
1999). EU enlargement towards the East that came with the Helsinki Summit had 
basically met the expectations of the US (Lippert, 2002, p. 45), since Central and 
Eastern Europe were playing a significant role for the stability of the continent (Lippert, 
2002). 
4.4. Mapping American Support: the Clinton Administration 
Overall, during the Clinton administration, the President, vice presidents, and 
responsible White House officials, in total, made 369 different public speeches related 
to Turkey. According to Scale A mentioned in Chapter 4, and details of which are given 
in throughout the second half of the second chapter and Appendix B, the mean value for 
Clinton documents is 3.19, where median value is 4.36 and standard deviation is 5.82. 
Furthermore, Clinton documents received a mean value of 2.43, a median value of 2.43, 
and a standard deviation of 0.40 on Scale B. During his presidency, Clinton 
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demonstrated great effort (any score greater than 3.0) to support Turkey in European 
circles in 1996 (49 documents with a mean value of 3.01 and a standard deviation of 
5.10), 1997 (45 documents with a mean value of 4.15 and a standard deviation of 4.15), 
1998 (49 documents with a mean value of 3.18 and a standard deviation of 7.19), 1999 
(111 documents with a mean value of 4.05 and a standard deviation of 6.10) 
respectively. Accordingly, the level of support for Turkish membership in the EU, the 
mean values of documents scores according to Scale B by year tend to increase in years, 
in which critical events occur in EU-Turkey bilateral relations such as Customs Union 
negotiations and the Helsinki Summit. These findings related to the Clinton presidency 
have been within my expectations. A comparison of these findings with the Bush 
administration values will be made and discussed in section 4.8 of this chapter. 
4.5. The Factors Effecting American Support during the Clinton Administration 
Obviously, the US lobbying was not the only reason behind the Helsinki Summit 
decisions. The decisions of the Council had been considerably affected by the Kosovo 
War factor. The Kosovo War in 1998-1999 demonstrated that the EU was dependent on 
NATO and the US (Kuniholm, 2001, p. 42). Additionally, the EU’s evaluations of 
Turkey from the geo-strategic and military point of view did lead to these decisions. 
The Turkish assistance with the US during the Balkan Crisis also helped the EU 
consider Turkey as a valuable asset for the future security and defence of the Union. 
During the Balkan Crisis, the EU was not able to cope with the issue by itself, since it 
did not have a strong and sufficient Common Security and Defence Policy. Help from 
both NATO and the US was considered necessary which could bring the problems the 
continent was facing to an end. As a result, the US policy in the Balkans and the 
American-Turkish alliance were recognized as strategic and significant actions in the 
EU. This approach strengthened an argument related to Turkey’s military capabilities. 
At that time, Turkey’s role as the second largest military force in NATO and its 
capabilities were discussed in identifying Turkey as an asset for the future of the 
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Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. As a result, Turkey’s accession would 
make the EU intervention in Eastern Europe and Middle East easier (Tocci, 2011). 
While Turkey was not a candidate country due to the decisions of the Luxembourg 
Summit, embodiments in the Balkans and Turkey’s contributions in the Balkans helped 
the European Commission reconsider its previous decision. As a result, Turkey was 
announced as a candidate country along with the Eastern European states after the 
Helsinki Summit in 1999 (Tocci, 2011). Before the Helsinki Summit, the EU was also 
not comfortable with the status with Turkey that emerged after the Luxembourg 
Summit. At economic, military and geo-strategic levels, Turkey constituted a valuable 
asset for the EU. 
Political changes in the EU also played an important role. Increasing number of Social 
Democratic party members in the EU, who generally embrace different cultures in a 
society, affected the outcome (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 6). Especially in Germany, the 
removal of the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl (Abramowitz, 2001a, p. 262) and the 
election of the Social Democrat, Schröder were also other factors that affected the 
Helsinki Summit. Furthermore, Greece-Turkey relations started to improve following 
the 1999 earthquakes. Greece’s democratic transformation had a considerable effect 
regarding its changing attitude towards Turkey. Following the cooperation of two 
countries in the 1999 Gölcük earthquake in Turkey, one of the Socialist parties of 
Greece, PASOK supported Turkey’s position in the EU (Tocci, 2011). Former British 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair’s lobbying activities in the EU and domestic relations 
(Daniel, 2002; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005), US support for the Turkish membership in the 
EU, and Turkish lobbies such as Turkish Industry and Business Association (Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2005) also were the joint factor that resulted in the change of the Luxembourg 
Summit decisions. Additionally, the form of American interventions during the Clinton 
administration did not encounter harsh or direct criticisms from the EU and European 
leaders (Tocci, 2011). In other words, the US needed to be very cautious, since, as 
Makovsky claims: "US diplomacy was crucial to the process of Turkey achieving 
candidate status" (Makovsky, 1999, paragraph 1).  
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Considering the end of the security threat and anti-Turkish ideology arose in the West 
after the end of Cold War, the US’s direct support played a very important role for 
Turkey’s relations with the EU from the Customs Union to the Helsinki Summit (Sali, 
2010, p. 30). As Sali furthers: 
The US was successful both in egging the EU to press forward its relations 
with Turkey and in contributing to a more favourable climate in the Eastern 
Mediterranean which in turn eased an EU-Turkey rapprochement, especially 
on Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations (Sali, 2010, p. 30). 
To sum up, one can argue that without American support, Turkey would have furthered 
its relations with the EU under worse conditions. As a result of this assumption, 
processing times might have been longer, as Turkey would have had to wait more and 
probably receive delayed responses from the EU. 
4.6. The US Support in Accession Talks 
Especially after the September 11 attacks, Turkey’s role in President Bush’s security 
oriented policy became more important. As previously mentioned, anchoring Turkey to 
the West would provide a significant opportunity in the US’s fight against radical 
Islamist groups. To obtain Turkey’s support in the Iraq War against Saddam Hussein in 
the early 2000s, the Bush administration intensely intervened in the relations between 
the EU and Turkey. As Bush expected, these interventions would result in Turkish 
support in the Iraq War. 
In the Bush administration’s Turkey promotions, the US mostly indicated the role of 
Turkey as a Muslim country (Tocci, 2011). According to Bush, Turkey was a role 
model for those Muslim countries in the region and a bridge between Europe and the 
Muslim countries (Taylor, 2002). With the accession of Turkey to the EU, the EU 
would be able to expand the norms and values it adopted to the Muslim countries and 
would reach a balance between Muslim and Christian identities. As former President 
Bush stated: 
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America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European 
Union. Your membership would also be a crucial advance in relations 
between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. 
Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive 
club of a single religion, and it would expose the ‘clash of civilizations’ as a 
passing myth of history (Bush, 2004). 
With the Turkish membership in the EU, the Islamist terrorism risk in Europe would 
most likely decrease, since the EU would be accepting a secular and a Muslim country 
as a member. Within this manner, the Bush administration applied pressure to the EU 
and European leaders for the Turkish inclusion. As former US Deputy Secretary of 
Defence, Paul Wolfowitz expresses: 
Turkey offers a valuable model for Muslim-majority countries striving to 
realize the goals of freedom, secularism and democracy… Those who would 
criticize Turkey for its problems confuse what is challenging with what is 
fundamental. They focus too much on the problems Turkey is struggling 
today and ignore where it is heading (as cited in Gordon, 2002). 
Right before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the Bush administration who 
expected the consent of Turkey for the deployment of the American troops to Iraq from 
the Turkish soil, intensely put pressure on the EU for a specific date to be given to 
Turkey as the start of accession negotiations. Former President Bush also made the 
following statement when incumbent Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
made a visit to Washington D.C. in 2002 before the Copenhagen Summit: "the US stood 
side-by-side with Turkey in its desire to become a member of the European Union" 
(Radikal, 2002; Watson, 2002). Following this statement, Watson stated in one of his 
speeches in BBC News that: "In diplomacy, though, there is often a catch. The US also 
hopes that backing Turkey’s efforts to join the EU will, in turn, lead to Ankara 
supporting possible military action against Iraq" (Watson, 2002).  
Furthermore, the US cooperated with the British government to support Turkish 
accession to the EU (Daniel, 2002; Radikal, 2002). Furthering its support, former 
President Bush called the French President Jacques Chirac and the Prime Minister of 
Denmark and the revolving president of the EU, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, two times 
before the Copenhagen Summit (Radikal, 2002; Vinocur, 2002). As Rasmussen later 
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announced, the decision about the Turkish admission to the European Union was a 
"European one." Additionally, Rasmussen underlined: "We don’t allow ourselves to be 
pressured from any quarter" (Vinocur, 2002). Unlike the Clinton administration’s 
efforts to support Turkey, the Bush administration’s efforts were directly and harshly 
criticized. As Sayarı states: "It has angered many Europeans who have increasingly 
viewed the US policy as unwarranted American interference in the internal affairs of the 
EU" (Sayarı, 2011, p. 251). 
Similar to Rasmussen’s approach, the President of the European Commission, Romano 
Prodi of Italy, made the following declaration regarding the borders of the EU in the 
future: 
We should be allowed to decide our own future without any interference 
from the United States or anyone else… The debate on where Europe’s 
borders lie is a debate about our identity. It will be conducted in the 
European Parliament, in the national parliaments and involve all European 
citizens (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).  
The statements of both Rasmussen and Prodi gained support in the European circles. 
Enrique Barón Crespo, former leader of European Socialists group encouraged the 
approach: 
We support Prodi 100% on this. It’s a matter for the EU to decide who joins 
the Union. The Americans should leave the EU to handle its own affairs (as 
cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).  
Supporting Crespo’s expression, former chairman of European People’s Party, Hans-
Gert Pöttering said: 
We do not advise the Americans on their relations with neighbours such as 
Mexico. They should not be telling us what to do with our neighbours such 
as Turkey… Don’t push it (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002). 
The leader of liberal group, Graham Watson, also made a very similar statement 
regarding their disapproval of the US pressure in the EU-Turkey relations. Direct and 
harsh criticisms regarding the US pressure also emerged in the small groups of the EU. 
While Daniel Cohn-Bendit expressed that "I agree with Prodi. I wonder how President 
Bush would react it the EU insisted on Mexico or Canada being integrated into the US?" 
 112 
 
as the leader of Greens/European Free Alliance group, Francis Wurtz furthered Cohn-
Bendit’s speech by saying, "Of course Prodi’s right. The US totally overstepped the 
mark in interfering in the enlargement negotiations" as the leader of the European Left 
group (as cited in Banks & Chapman, 2002).  
According to former French President Valery Gisvard d’Estaing, those who help Turkey 
in its adventure of accession to the EU were actually "the adversaries of the European 
Union" (BBC News, 2002). Similarly, according to former French Minister of Industry 
and former president of the European Parliament, Nicole Fontaine: "It’s certainly not up 
to the president of the United States to interfere in something so important and which 
mainly concerns Europeans" (as cited in Vinocur, 2002). Additionally, former Trade 
Commissioner of the EU, Pascal Lamy of France gave a response to the US advocacy 
for Turkey:  
It’s a classic of US diplomacy to want to put Turkey in Europe. The further 
the boundaries of Europe extend, the better US interests are served… Can 
you imagine the reaction if we told them they had to enlarge into Mexico? 
(as cited in Vinocur, 2002). 
Contrasting with the approaches given above, former Danish Foreign Minister, Per Stig 
Moeller’s reaction to the US ‘pressure’ varied greatly. After a very intense diplomatic 
activity between US officials and the EU, in a phone call between former US Secretary 
of State, Colin Powell and Per Stig Moeller, Moeller said: "quite appropriate that our 
American friends speak their mind. It’s not a question of pressure, not at all" (as cited in 
Filkins, 2002). 
As previously mentioned, before the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the US 
pressured the EU for a specific date to be given to Turkey as the start for accession 
negotiations. This was an effort carried out by Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz in London 
promoted Turkey’s membership while most American diplomats were thinking that 
overcoming the EU’s attitude towards Turkey was "something of a long shot" (Gordon, 
2002). As Wolfowitz puts it: 
The decision on EU members is, of course, Europe’s to make, but history 
suggests that a European Union that welcomes Turkey will be even 
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stronger, safer and more richly diver than it is today. The alternative, 
exclusionary choice is surely unthinkable (as cited in Gordon, 2002). 
According to Wolfowitz, the Turkish accession to the EU was also important to 
overcome the risk of ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1996) in the Muslim world. 
Here should be noted that this speech was made just a day before Wolfowitz’s visit to 
Turkey regarding the potential Turkish support in Iraq intervention (Gordon, 2002). 
The US also attempted to resolve the Cyprus conflict which stands as one of the major 
obstacles in Turkey’s application to the EU for full membership. In this regard, the 2002 
Annan Plan was the first initiative to resolve the conflict through the channel of the 
United Nations. Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan prepared 
and introduced the first comprehensive plan regarding the resolve of Cyprus conflict 
(Morelli & Migdalovitz, 2009). The Annan Plan, which is supported by the US, was 
aiming to form a single state in Cyprus which consists of two nations: the Greek 
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The US promoted the Annan Plan for the resolve of 
the Cyprus conflict and so that, one of the obstacles facing Turkish membership would 
be removed. During the referendum in April 2004, while 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted 
‘yes’ for the Annan Plan, 75% of Greek Cypriots voted ‘no.’ With the influence of 
Greece as an EU member, Cyprus was admitted to the EU in 2004, while the dispute 
continues. However, Turkey’s stance against the efforts for the resolve of Cyprus 
conflict was welcomed in European circles.  
Finally, during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, the EU decided to start the 
accession negotiations with Turkey "without delay" upon a report from the European 
Commission in the European Council two years later, which confirms that Turkey met 
the Copenhagen political criteria (Commission of the European Union, 2002). 
Contrasting with the expectations of Turkey and the US, the EU preferred not to specify 
a date for the start of the accession negotiations. This statement of the EU demonstrated 
that "although American support is important, what ultimately matters is the ability of 
Turkey to undertake domestic economic and political reforms and to implement the 
Copenhagen criteria fully" (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005, p. 11). As can be understood, the 
decision of the EU was conditional and the US failed to manipulate the EU for a 
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specific date to be given to Turkey for the start of the accession negotiations. From this 
perspective, the US could not get what had set out for unlike the Customs Union and 
Helsinki Summit. 
Events that happened both before and after of the Copenhagen Summit demonstrated 
the decreasing effectiveness of the US support in relations between Turkey and the EU. 
As some authors think: "They (Europeans) perceived the American involvement as an 
illegitimate interference in internal EU affairs" (Islam, 2008, p. 22). According to Öniş 
and Yılmaz, the Copenhagen Summit "clearly displayed the limits of American power 
in so far as decision-making regarding EU membership was concerned" (Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2005, p. 10). The result of the Copenhagen Summit demonstrated both to 
Turkey and the US that decisions regarding the EU will belong to the EU and European 
leaders who rule it. Now the decisions of the EU would not be determined in 
accordance with American interests, but will be based on the domestic structures of the 
EU.  
Complementary to this result, US support for the Turkish accession to the EU became a 
liability rather than an advantage. The Copenhagen Summit decisions did not meet 
Turkey’s initial expectations. On the other hand, however, one of the reasons behind the 
Copenhagen Summit decisions was "the involvement of the US as an advocate on 
Turkey’s behalf, just at a time when transatlantic differences were becoming alarmingly 
prominent in the context of the developing Iraq crisis" (Robins, 2003, p. 555). Thus, 
efforts of the Bush administration to support Turkey started to be criticized with 
suspicion and created a controversial debate on the true intentions of the Turkish-
American alliance. In this regard, the efforts of the Bush administration were considered 
as the moves to obtain Turkey’s support in a potential Iraq War. Additionally, US 
efforts were even thought to be motives that aim to weaken the integration of the EU, 
considering the dichotomy between the major European powers such as Germany and 
France and the US regarding the Iraq War. 
Once compared with the Clinton administration, the Bush administration’s promotion of 
Turkey included more public speeches and significant pressure onto the EU and 
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European leaders (Tocci, 2011). The US was applying an intense pressure during the 
2000s that European leaders and the officials of the EU even started to complain. 
Former President of Finland and former Head of the European Council, Martti Ahtisaari 
made a speech during the 1999 Helsinki Summit wherein he stated; "don’t publicly 
interfere, but quietly support the process" (as cited in Tocci, 2011, p. 85). This might be 
given as an indicator to show an important implication of the American pressure. With a 
very similar approach to Ahtisaari’s, experienced commissioners of the EU suggested 
that the US follow "quiet diplomacy" (as cited in Tocci, 2011, p. 85). As one of the 
commissioners, Günter Verheugen, expressed his complaint about the US efforts: "the 
veiled pressure and threats that came from within Turkey but also from the outside… 
caused a kind of overkill… it was just a fraction too much, a fraction that triggered a 
negative reaction in Europe" (as cited in Robins, 2003, p. 556). On the other hand, US 
officials thought that these statements were ‘excuses’ of the EU to cover up its 
hesitancy towards the Turkish accession (Sayarı, 2006, p. 169). 
The Bush administration was following a foreign policy based on interventions with EU 
member states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark. 
During the 2000s, the relations between the US and many European countries were 
already problematic due to the policies followed by the US. As the Atlantic Council 
reports: 
The United States should focus on the new EU members and a few others, 
where the US advocacy could make a positive difference, but not a 
campaign openly in those countries such as Germany or France, where 
public efforts are likely to be counterproductive. In those countries, quiet 
encouragement of favourably inclined leaders is likely to be a more 
effective strategy (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. vii). 
After the comparatively disappointing Copenhagen Summit, the US continued and 
furthered its support towards Turkish accession to the EU, especially to reach an 
ultimate result regarding the starting date of accession negotiations in December 2004. 
While these were being planned, the Turkish Grand National Assembly rejected a bill to 
prevent the deployment of US troops from Turkish soil to Iraq and to prevent US from 
benefitting Turkish airspace as well as ground bases. As a consequence, US-Turkey 
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bilateral relations started to deteriorate. However, the US continued to support Turkey 
in its adventure with the EU. After the disappointment created by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, former US Secretary of the Department of State, Robert Powell 
stated: 
Turkey is a good friend, a good ally… We have a good partnership with 
Turkey and I’m sure it will continue to grow in the years ahead (as cited in 
Grossman, 2004, p. 67). 
Obviously, while following a policy related to its national interests, as previously 
mentioned, the US also supported Turkey in its application for full membership in the 
EU. While doing so, the US insistently attended lobbying activities in major European 
capitals. On the other hand, while the EU was in favour of reforms that Turkey should 
adopt first, but not in favour of starting negotiations; according to Turkey, Turkey was 
adopting a number of reforms since the 1999s (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 2). For the 
Bush administration, Turkey’s identity as a Muslim country was important to overcome 
the risk of the ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1996) and it was also important with 
its unique geo-strategic location to expand European norms and values in a wide 
geography. President Bush, in the NATO Summit in Istanbul made the following 
statement regarding the American-Turkish alliance, bilateral relations between Turkey 
and the US throughout history, and the US’s support for the Turkish accession to the 
EU before the decision on the accession negotiations with Turkey: 
For decades, my country has supported greater unity in Europe – to secure 
liberty, to build prosperity, and to remove sources of conflict on this 
continent. Now the European Union is considering the admission of Turkey, 
and you are moving rapidly to meet the criteria for membership. Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk had a vision of Turkey as a strong nation among other 
European nations. That dream can be realized by this generation of Turks. 
America believes that as a European power, Turkey belongs in the European 
Union. Your membership would also be crucial advance in relations 
between the Muslim world and the West, because you are part of both. 
Including Turkey in the EU would prove that Europe is not the exclusive 
club of a single religion; it would expose "the clash of civilizations" as a 
passing myth of history. Fifteen years ago, an artificial line that divided 
Europe – drawn at Yalta – was erased. And now this continent has the 
opportunity to erase another artificial division – by including Turkey in the 
future of Europe (Guardian, 2004). 
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Following Bush’s meeting with Prime Minister Erdoğan on June 2004, Bush furthered 
his statement: "As Turkey meets the EU standards for membership, the EU should begin 
talks that will lead to full membership for the Republic of Turkey" (as cited in Beatty, 
2004). As previously mentioned Bush’s statements regarding the EU decisions were 
directly and harshly criticized. For instance, former French President Jacques Chirac 
made a speech upon this statement and said: "Mr. Bush not only went too far but went 
on territory which is not his own… it’s as if I was advising the US on how they should 
manage their relationship with Mexico" (as cited in Black, White, & Trimlet, 2004). 
Finally, in December 2004, the EU decided to initiate accession negotiations with 
Turkey in October 2005. However, the US had to intervene in EU-Turkey relations once 
again to resolve the conflict between the two parties that emerged due to Turkey’s 
Accession Negotiations Framework. According to the provisional framework, Turkey 
should not have prevented an EU member country’s membership in an international 
organization. Obviously, this provision was against the Turkish interests regarding 
Cyprus. The issue has never been solved, but the attempts of former US Secretary of the 
Department of State, Condolezza Rice reduced the tension (Radikal, 2005). After a 
number of phone conversations with the Cypriot leaders, the United Kingdom, the EU 
and Turkey, Rice arranged a meeting of the US ambassadors to the EU to support 
Turkey. With her efforts, the British presidency of the EU published a note regarding 
Turkey and after all these efforts, the President of Turkey, Abdullah Gül thanked Rice 
(Radikal, 2005). 
The EU’s decision to initiate negotiations with Turkey in 2005, was somewhat due to 
the Turkish adoption of constitutional reforms and legal integration packages after the 
Helsinki Summit. Especially after the Helsinki Summit, Turkey underwent a democratic 
transformation and reform process to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey’s 
being given an official status regarding its application to become a member in the EU 
obviously accelerated the reform movements in the Republic. In this context, the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted a major package which changes a number of 
articles of the 1982 Turkish Constitution. With this package, improvement on the article 
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related to freedom of expression and death penalty were amended. This package 
constituted the first step of Turkey’s National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis (NPAA) (Müftüler-Baç, 2005, p. 21). 
After being elected and came to power with a huge victory, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) signalled more willingly that it would continue adopting the 
reforms asked by the EU (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2005). The victory of the AKP, that 
introduces itself as "a central-right and social conservative party" (Wikipedia, 2014b) 
was pretty welcomed in European countries such as Germany and Greece (Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2005, pp. 6-7). As the majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, the 
AKP adopted a number of reforms in 2002, which significantly affected EU-Turkey 
relations such as removal of the death penalty and betterment of minority rights. The 
Turkish government was also able to adopt economic reforms and plans foreseen by the 
International Monetary Fund (Atlantic Council, 2004, p. 4). At this stage, a potential 
negative attitude from the EU regarding the reforms that Turkey was adopting would 
have ignited a serious issue in the Muslim community living within the EU borders 
(Atlantic Council, 2004). 
Additionally, Turkey found the chance to work on the reforms and integration process 
in general that the EU requested, since Turkey was not participating in the Iraq War 
(Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). According to Kayhan and Lindley:  
If Turkey had entered the Iraq War with the US in 2003, Ankara 
administration and the military would solely concentrate on the war rather 
than reform and democratisation process for the EU and the attempts for 
meeting the criteria (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006, p. 7). 
As a result, Turkey would not have been able to start accession negotiations in October 
2005, since it would have solely concentrated on the Iraq War. However, Turkey could 
instead benefit from its decision and adopted a number of reforms as a part of its 
membership process. When the American-Turkish relations were problematic due to the 
Iraq Crisis, Turkey attempted to anchor itself to the West as a part of its 
Europeanization process it followed since the establishment of the Republic (Kayhan & 
Lindley, 2006). 
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According to Kayhan and Lindley, if Turkey had not turned on its ally during the Iraq 
Crisis, the military would have still had significant power over the Turkish government 
(Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). However, Turkey had to decrease the level of power that the 
Turkish military had to comply with the EU criteria. With the seventh harmonization 
package, in 2003 and 2004, the military lost power through decreasing power of the 
National Security Council of Turkey (Kayhan & Lindley, 2006). Along with these 
changes was also the removal of the requirement for the head of National Security 
Council’s to serve as a soldier. The number of civil officers in the Council has thus 
increased. The Council has been transformed into an advisory structure and the 
requirement of the Council meetings to convene every month was removed. Since 
Turkey witnessed three different military coup d’états before, the aim of these reforms 
was to prevent the military to take over the civilian government (F. S. Larrabee, 2010, 
p. 161). 
As previously mentioned, US attempts were not successful in determining the 
agreement for the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. American support was 
not successful during the 2000s as it was during the 1990s. Due to this fact, American 
support dramatically decreased and the officials of the EU as well as the European 
leaders did not welcome the US effect, especially the Bush administration in the EU-
Turkey relations, contrasting with what happened during the 1990s. As a response to the 
US, the officials of the EU and the European leaders blamed the US for the high level of 
lobbying and intense pressure for the accession of Turkey to the EU. As Tocci puts it: 
Their reactions have been either polite silences, long-winded explanations 
of the complications inherent in the accession process, or impassioned 
demans of non-interference in a quintessentially European affair (Tocci, 
2011, p. 83). 
The EU insistently disapproved US attempts and did not want the US to intervene in the 
domestic issues of the EU. On the other hand, the US’s insistence created another 
problematic aspect in European circles, since it ignited disapprovals and negative 
reactions as well as it created suspicion regarding the US and Turkey’s intentions. 
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4.7. Mapping American Support: the Bush Administration 
Overall, during the Bush administration, the President, vice presidents, and responsible 
White House officials, in total, made 297 public speeches. According to Scale A 
mentioned in Chapter 4, and details of which are given in throughout the second half of 
the second chapter and Appendix B, the verbal support reached its maximum in 2002 
(53 documents with a mean value of 4.57 and a standard deviation of 6.75), 2003 (90 
documents with a mean value of 3.36 and a standard deviation of 2.90), and 2005 (23 
documents with a mean value of 4.78 and a standard deviation of 6.93) respectively. In 
accordance with our expectations and the assumptions of literature, the Bush 
administration, like the Clinton administration demonstrated significant support for 
Turkey in European circles, by receiving a mean value of 2.15 and a standard deviation 
of 0.80 according to Scale B, details of which are given in Appendix B. A comparison 
of these findings with the Clinton administration values will be made and discussed in 
forth section of this chapter. 
4.8. A Comparison of Bush and Clinton Presidencies 
On Scale A, the Clinton administration received a mean value of 3.19, a median value 
of 4.36, and a standard deviation of 5.82. In line with these findings, the Bush 
administration, on Scale A, received a mean value of 3.46, a median value of 3.76, and 
a standard deviation of 5.12. On the other hand, the total number of documents analyzed 
for the Bush administration is 279, while the total number of documents analyzed for 
the Clinton administration is 279. As previously mentioned, Tocci claims that the Bush 
administration’s promotion of Turkey included more public speeches and a greater 
pressure to the European Union and European leaders once compared with the Clinton 
administration (Tocci, 2011). Once Tocci’s arguments are taken for granted, the fact 
that the Bush administration has less number of documents compared to the Clinton 
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administration in this study emerges as a problematic aspect of the APP data. However, 
Tocci’s analysis may also be relying on a number of different data sources, which this 
study does not need to consider. 
With an intention to compare the differences between clintona and gwbushrcheneya 
distributions (overall support for Turkey’s accession to the EU), unpaired, two-sample t-
test has been conducted. The results as well as their interpretation are as follows:  
Two-sample t test  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
clintona 369 3.19091 0.303182 5.823929 2.594724 3.787096 
gwbushrcheneya 279 3.469092 0.306778 5.124207 2.865188 4.072995 
Combined 648 3.310683 0.217282 5.531106 2.884019 3.737347 
Diff   -0.27818 0.439021   -1.14026 0.585899 
diff = mean (clintona) - mean (gwbushrcheneya) 
  
t= -0.6336 
Ho: diff = 0 
     
df= 646 
       Ha: diff <0 
 
Ha: diff !=0 
 
Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.2633 
 
Pr (|T| > |t|) =  0.5265 Pr (T>t) = 0.7367 
 
Table 6: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale A) 
 
The value of 0 falls within the 95% confidence interval, and the value for two-tailed 
alternative, which we look at in this study, is 0.5265 and greater than the alpha level. As 
a consequence, we do not reject the null (Ho: diff=0) and conclude that the Bush and 
Clinton presidencies do not significantly differ when it comes to the supporting 
(overall) Turkey in European circles according to Scale A.   
The above-mentioned process has been followed for clintonb and gwrcheneyb 
distributions (overall norms and values oriented support). The results as well as their 
interpretation are as follows:   
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Two-sample t test  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Err. 
Std. 
Dev. 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
clintona 369 2.30658 0.02125 0.40825 2.26479 2.34837 
gwbushrcheneya 279 2.15599 0.04818 0.80473 2.06115 2.25083 
Combined 648 2.24174 0.02417 0.61532 2.19428 2.28921 
Diff   0.15059 0.48495   0.05536 0.24581 
diff = mean (clintonb) - mean (gwbushrcheneyb) 
  
t= 3.1053 
Ho: diff = 0 
     
df= 646 
       Ha: diff <0 
 
Ha: diff !=0 
 
Ha: diff > 0 
Pr (T < t) = 0.9990 Pr (|T| > |t|) =  0.0020 Pr (T>t) = 0.0010 
 
Table 7: Two Sample T-Test for the Clinton and Bush Administration (Scale B) 
 
The value for two tailed alternative is 0.0020, which is smaller than the alpha value 
(0.05); in which the value of 0 also does not fall within 95% confidence interval, these 
two groups differ. Additionally, the one-tailed probability of getting a difference this 
large is 0.0010, as a consequence, we reject the null (H0: diff=0).  These results show 
that, in presidential speeches, press releases and other related documents analyzed in 
this study, the Clinton administration statistically significantly used ‘clearer and 
modest’ sentences and paragraphs, which touch upon liberal norms and values to 
support Turkey in European circles (2.30±0.02). 
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter, US Perception towards the Turkish Accession to the EU, presented the 
relatively declining effectiveness of the US support in the bilateral relations between 
Turkey and the EU during the 2000s compared to the 1990s. After the end of the Cold 
War, during the 1990s, Turkey was a significant player and an ally for the US with its 
unique geo-strategic location which could help the US implement its security-oriented 
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foreign policy in a wide region. In accordance with the neorealist expectations, the US 
interests were shaped by external, changing systemic influences such as the unexpected 
end of the Cold War and incidents in the Middle East and the Balkans. While the efforts 
of the Clinton administration resulted in fruitful decisions both during the Customs 
Union and Helsinki Summit negotiations; President Bush and the efforts of its 
administration during the Copenhagen Summit received harsh and direct criticisms both 
from the officials of the EU and European leaders. It is also important to note here that 
during the 1990s, the effects of the political structure of the Clinton administration were 
much clearer on the type of US interventions, especially when the international system 
was comparatively stable due to the lack of security-related concerns. In other words, 
the comparative stability in the international system due to the lack of security related 
concerns, directed the Clinton administration to support Turkey in a ‘peaceful’ manner 
in European circles. Additionally, the Clinton administration pointed out the importance 
of liberal values of the European Union and reforms that Turkey should adopt. This 
study successfully demonstrated this aspect of the Clinton administration.  
However, following September 11 incident, external systemic variables started to 
dominate foreign behaviours of the states. As a consequence, the type of American 
support started to shift during the Bush administration. During the early 2000s, 
President Bush first increased US attempts to involve in EU-Turkey bilateral relations 
and drastically presented his effort in the context of his war against terrorism and Iraq 
War. In accordance with realist expectations, external security scarcity was the most 
important variable which determined the actions of actors. Accordingly, the US 
attempted to support Turkey consistently and urged the EU for Turkey’s inclusion. In 
summary, the structural influences were the main motives behind US foreign policy 
regarding Turkey-EU relations during the 1990s and the early 2000s, as well as these 
variables were responsible for the increase in American interventions, especially during 
the early 2000s. 
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has mainly been about the support of the US in bilateral relations between 
the EU and Turkey. It answered the question of what shaped the US support for Turkish 
membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between the 1990s and the 
early 2000s. From the US perspective, this study demonstrated that Turkey has become 
an ‘enabling partner’ for the US in carrying out vital US security interests during the 
post-Cold War period
4
. Turkey with its unique location has had the ability to increase 
American capacity to secure the US’s security oriented interests in the wide region 
surrounding Turkey. At this point, Turkey’s comparatively stable characteristics as well 
as its Western-oriented, classic foreign policy improved Turkey’s foreign policy 
potential and the possibility of an active cooperation between the US and Turkey.  
Additionally, the US also perceived the EU, similar to Turkey, as an ‘enabling partner’ 
for American economic, military, and political interests. Following the end of World 
War II, particularly since the end of the Cold War, the US was one of major supporters 
of European integration, thus creating a powerful block against the Soviet 
expansionism. After improving its capacity in world politics and economy, the EU also 
                                               
4
 The term, enabling partner, has been put forth by the former US Undersecretary of 
State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, Stuart Eizenstat, in his speech on 
the EU at Nixon Center on October 1998. 
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made commitments in common security and defence mechanisms. While the US was 
having a problem in balancing between NATO and a potential ESDP mechanism, the 
US also supported the EU’s attempts, since a stronger Europe with a security-providing 
capability, who admitted Turkey as a member, could prevent the security-related threats 
in the regions surrounding Turkey. On the other hand, the EU, as an efficient security 
provider both within Europe and beyond the borders of the Union, would be the ‘right-
arm’ of the US in stabilizing Turkish foreign policy as well as preventing problems in 
the region.  
The above-mentioned argument unfolds in nearly all chapters of this thesis. The fourth 
chapter of this thesis, Turkey’s EU Membership: American approach, presented the 
bilateral relations between the EU and the US during the post-Cold War period as well 
as the US approach towards Turkey by introducing the historical development of these 
relations. Both the EU and the US wanted to have a close relationship with Turkey due 
to its highly important geographic location. The US’s and Western European states’ 
foreign policies that were born out of the security concerns due to the Soviet threat 
helped Turkey to be a part of the Western bloc until the end of the Cold War. As a 
consequence, Turkey became one of the founding members of the Council of Europe, 
became a member of NATO, and obtained the associate member status in the European 
Union in 1963. Following the end of the Cold War, Turkey’s strategic importance due 
to its unique geographic location continued for the US, furthering US-Turkey bilateral 
relations. On the contrary, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of Western 
concerns related to security changed the atmosphere in relations between the European 
Union and Turkey. While Turkey continued its efforts to become a part of the Western 
world and a member of the EU, the idea of Turkey’s membership in the Union created a 
variation in the views of Europeans. This issue further ignited a number of controversial 
debates and conflict within the EU. Furthermore, the EU’s new vision regarding the 
Turkish application came to the surface when the Union rejected Turkey’s official 
membership application in 1989. As Müftüler-Baç summarizes very-well, 
Since 1989, European security has been reformulated around the notions of 
common European values, norms, and a European identity. Turkey’s 
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problem is that its European identity has always been questioned. Thus, in 
this new European order, the extent to which Turkey has integrated into the 
European identity becomes a crucial factor in determining Turkey’s position 
as a security partner as well (Müftüler-Baç, 1998, p. 10).  
After the end of the Cold War, the US efforts and support for Turkey significantly 
decreased; however, during the 1990s, American support still succeeded to play 
catalyzer in some of the historical events in the relations between the EU and the US. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and 4, the US supported further European enlargement 
covering Central and Eastern European countries and attempted to influence the EU to 
include Turkey in this process. The continued and furthered American support for 
Turkey during the 1990s and the early 2000s was prominently determined by the 
changing systemic structural factors. During the post-Cold War period, the primary 
form of American support was through public speeches in both non-official and official 
European circles.  
The US, with its geo-strategic concerns attempted to influence the EU to include Turkey 
in the European enlargement towards Central and Eastern European countries to have a 
NATO ally, which is anchored to the West with Western liberal values. The Clinton 
administration and President Clinton supported Turkey in the process through public 
speeches and lobbying in the EU and by indicating the importance of liberal values and 
attempting to convince Turkey to adopt the required reforms. From the point of view of 
the US, one of the reasons behind the Clinton administration’s success was the form of 
US interventions. Most interventions during the Clinton presidency emphasized the 
importance of the liberal norms, values, the EU enlargement, and the reforms adopted in 
Turkey (Tocci, 2011). The quantitative aspect of this study, details of which have been 
given in the second half of the second chapter, also have been in line with the previous 
observations as well as my expectations. While these efforts failed during the 1997 
Luxembourg Summit, US support and efforts played the most essential role during the 
1999 Helsinki Summit, and the Customs Union agreement negotiations. Furthermore, 
Chapter 4 presents how the Bush administration continued to support Turkey after the 
September 11 attacks to involve Turkey as an ally in President Bush’s ‘War on 
Terrorism.’ President Bush and the officials of the Bush administration intensely 
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attended lobbying activities in European circles, made public speeches and meetings 
through the phone for the EU to determine a date for the start of accession talks with 
Turkey. Despite these efforts, American support for Turkey during the early 2000s, 
created the greatest controversial debate in the Union ever and received direct and harsh 
criticisms from European leaders and the officials of the European Union.  
As a result, this study, by evaluating American perspective on Turkey’s accession to the 
EU in accordance with neorealism, demonstrated that American efforts in supporting 
Turkey in both non-official and official European circles within the period from the 
1990s until the early 2000s were due to the US’s security policy which aims to protect 
and increase American economic, political, and military interests at all levels. 
Furthermore, this study indicates the essential importance of changing geo-political 
hierarchies and the changing balance in the international system for understanding the 
policy outcomes of related actors. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX A: Algorithm for the Categorization of Documents 
Problem: Having a dataset of speeches, which belong to former US presidents or US 
officials SUS = {s1, s2, s3, …, sn}, classify each document as ‘Turkey related’ or 
‘Irrelevant.’ 
The algorithm I adopt here is based on the keywords contained in each document or 
phrase. The list of keywords as well their provisional points are given below:  
Keyword Point to be Assigned 
Turkey 5 
Turkish 5 
Neither Turkey nor Turkish 0 
 
Table 8: Document Categorization Rules 
After looking up the keywords given above, assign a score to each document as stated; 
then categorize them based on the algorithm below: 
if(Turkey score > 0) 
return Turkey ; 
add to the secondary database ;  
if(Turkish score > 0) 
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return  Turkey; 
add to the secondary database ; 
if (Document score = 0) or (none of the cases above) 
return irrelevant ; 
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APPENDIX B: Information and Consent Form 
INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
FOR YASIN BOSTANCI’S MASTER’S THESIS IN EUROPEAN STUDIES 
 
Thursday, July 3, 2014 
Study Title: The US, EU and Turkey Triangle: American Support in Turkey’s 
Accession Talks with the EU. 
Researcher: Yasin Bostanci, MA Candidate in European Studies at Sabanci University.  
Thesis Advisor: Meltem Müftüler Baç, Professor, Jean Monnet Chair in the Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences at Sabanci University. 
Purpose of the Research: This research answers the question of what shaped US 
support for Turkish membership in the EU and the reasons behind this support between 
the 1990s and the early 2000s in order to be able to elaborate on the future of Turkey as 
a candidate country.   
What You Will Be Asked to Do in the Research: You will be given a random, 
electronic set of speech records, which belong to former US Presidents. You will read 
the files electronically and one by one, and assign them scores as the following: 
The Score to be Assigned: When to Assign? How to Assign? 
Do not assign and report 
the file as NOT 
SUITABLE FOR 
RESEARCH. 
If the document you are 
reading is NOT related to 
Turkey’s membership in 
the European Union or 
Report the file as NOT 
SUITABLE FOR 
RESEARCH. 
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Turkey AT ALL. 
-10 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
best evaluation, appears to 
be AGAINST Turkey’s 
membership in the 
European Union.  
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
0 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
best evaluation, appears to 
be about Turkey, but 
neither AGAINST nor IN 
FAVOUR OF Turkey’s 
membership in the 
European Union. 
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
10 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
best evaluation, appears to 
be IN FAVOUR OF 
Turkey’s membership in 
the European Union. 
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
 
If you assigned a document a score of 10, then ASSIGN AN ADDITIONAL 
SCORE according to the rules stated below: 
The Score to be Assigned: When to Assign? How to Assign? 
1 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
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best evaluation, appears to 
be SLIGHTLY IN 
FAVOUR OF Turkey’s 
membership in the 
European Union. 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
2 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
best evaluation, appears to 
be SOMEHOW IN 
FAVOUR OF Turkey’s 
membership in the 
European Union. 
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
3 If the document you are 
reading, according to your 
best evaluation, appears to 
be VERY STRONGLY IN 
FAVOUR OF Turkey’s 
membership in the 
European Union. 
Please write down your 
score as well as the 
document name on a paper 
OR enter your score as well 
as the document name to a 
computerized sheet. 
 
Risks and Discomforts: I do not foresee any risks or discomfort from your 
participation in research.  
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and 
you may choose to stop participating at any time. Your decision not to volunteer will 
not influence the nature of the ongoing relationship you may have with the researcher or 
your relationship with Sabanci University either now, or in the future.  
Withdrawal from the Study: You can stop participating in the study at any time, for 
any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to stop participating will not affect your 
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relationship with the researcher or Sabanci University. Should you decide to withdraw 
from the study, all data generated as a consequence of your participation will be 
destroyed. 
Confidentiality: All information you supply during the research will be held in 
confidence and, unless you specifically indicate your consent, your name will not 
appear in any page of the thesis. Your data will be safely stored in a locked facility and 
a server, and only the researcher will have access to this information. Confidentiality 
will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law.  
Questions about the Research: If you have questions about the research in general or 
about your role in the study, please feel free to contact Yasin Bostanci, MA candidate in 
European Studies, at Sabanci University, 34956, Tuzla, Istanbul. Turkey, telephone 
(554) 992-0809, or by e-mail (bostanci@sabanciuniv.edu).  
Legal Rights and Signatures:  
I (fill in your name here), consent to participate in ‘The US, EU and Turkey Triangle: 
American Support in Turkey’s Accession Talks with the EU’ conducted by Yasin 
Bostanci. I have understood the nature of this project and wish to participate. I am not 
waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below indicates my 
consent.  
 
 
Signature     Date       
Participant  
 
Address: 
E-Mail:                                             Telephone: 
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Signature      Date     
Yasin Bostanci   03/07/2014 
Sabanci University, 34956, Tuzla. Istanbul, Turkey.  
bostanci@sabanciuniv.edu – 0554-992-0809 
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APPENDIX C: Automated Content Analysis Results  
Word Frequency Tables 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 3.6117 0.1367 103 8.5145 1.7291 5.0563 11.9728 183 97 
t2 3.5113 0.0479 527 7.2446 0.6057 6.0332 8.4561 2,028 96 
t3 3.0754 0.02 1,961 1.7297 0.2525 1.2247 2.2346 16,759 93 
t4 2.9935 0.0374 828 0.6934 0.4733 -0.2532 1.6399 4,163 95 
t5 3.1719 0.0633 374 2.9507 0.801 1.3487 4.5526 1,092 93 
t6 3.2429 0.0638 390 3.8484 0.8072 2.234 5.4628 1,214 96 
t7 3.1551 0.1791 78 2.7383 2.2657 -1.793 7.2696 162 90 
t8 3.2506 0.022 1,217 3.946 0.2777 3.3906 4.5014 9,194 94 
t9 3.1737 0.0445 460 2.9729 0.5631 1.8467 4.099 1,820 89 
t10 3.1199 0.0529 551 2.2927 0.6692 0.9542 3.6312 1,747 93 
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t11 3.1299 0.0597 393 2.4196 0.7555 0.9086 3.9306 1,204 95 
t12 3.2191 0.0317 708 3.5471 0.4005 2.7461 4.3482 3,811 94 
t13 3.192 0.073 344 3.2041 0.9241 1.356 5.0523 939 95 
t14 2.9045 0.0428 815 -0.4326 0.5411 -1.5149 0.6497 3,793 95 
t15 3.0837 0.1615 135 1.8351 2.043 -2.2509 5.9212 230 91 
t16 3.2226 0.018 1,648 3.5915 0.2277 3.1361 4.0469 15,843 95 
t17 3.1555 0.0589 380 2.7431 0.7453 1.2524 4.2337 1,134 93 
t18 3.421 0.0331 800 6.1021 0.4185 5.2651 6.939 3,747 94 
t19 2.309 0.0486 670 -7.9661 0.6147 -9.1956 -6.7367 1,903 94 
t20 3.3607 0.0338 652 5.3395 0.4276 4.4843 6.1947 3,461 95 
t21 3.1676 0.1535 164 2.8962 1.9422 -0.9883 6.7807 286 92 
t22 2.6515 0.1031 245 -3.6333 1.3037 -6.2407 -1.0259 564 79 
t23 3.2451 0.1842 129 3.8759 2.3306 -0.7853 8.5372 205 90 
t24 3.1323 0.0241 1,129 2.4492 0.3044 1.8404 3.0581 7,825 96 
t25 3.5034 0.0325 1,066 7.1442 0.4106 6.3231 7.9654 5,181 94 
t26 2.1329 0.0388 803 -10.1938 0.4912 -11.176 -9.2113 2,077 100 
t27 3.4132 0.0319 872 6.0032 0.404 5.1952 6.8111 4,239 94 
t28 2.29 0.0453 713 -8.2068 0.573 -9.3527 -7.0608 1,946 96 
t29 3.4538 0.0251 1,083 6.5163 0.3172 5.8819 7.1506 6,492 94 
t30 3.5726 0.1512 156 8.0194 1.9134 4.1925 11.8463 283 93 
t31 2.3834 0.0454 748 -7.0251 0.574 -8.1731 -5.877 2,257 94 
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t32 3.1755 0.1096 204 2.9957 1.386 0.2237 5.7677 694 87 
t33 3.2078 0.0472 521 3.4051 0.5968 2.2116 4.5987 1,755 96 
t34 3.3867 0.0301 912 5.6674 0.381 4.9054 6.4295 4,936 94 
t35 3.3502 0.0285 899 5.2058 0.3602 4.4853 5.9263 5,369 91 
t36 3.4541 0.0275 1,190 6.521 0.3483 5.8245 7.2175 6,785 91 
t37 2.5026 0.2078 49 -5.5175 2.6287 -10.775 -0.26 78 82 
t38 3.4742 0.0302 1,000 6.7743 0.3815 6.0114 7.5373 5,338 94 
t39 3.5631 0.049 751 7.899 0.6195 6.66 9.138 2,685 94 
t40 3.2871 0.0289 981 4.4082 0.3654 3.6773 5.139 5,183 93 
t41 2.968 0.0356 586 0.3709 0.4507 -0.5306 1.2723 1,851 100 
t42 3.667 0.0237 1,223 9.2146 0.2998 8.615 9.8141 8,166 95 
t43 3.1436 0.1721 134 2.5924 2.1769 -1.7613 6.9461 225 89 
t44 2.2663 0.047 686 -8.506 0.5942 -9.6944 -7.3176 1,964 94 
t45 2.3843 0.0432 605 -7.0138 0.5469 -8.1075 -5.92 1,665 100 
t46 3.1909 0.0244 932 3.1909 0.3085 2.5739 3.8078 6,142 90 
t47 3.5294 0.0267 1,197 7.4733 0.3373 6.7987 8.1478 6,773 94 
t48 2.4483 0.0439 662 -6.2034 0.555 -7.3134 -5.0934 1,896 99 
t49 2.2624 0.0957 142 -8.5558 1.2109 -10.978 -6.1339 525 89 
t50 2.2887 0.0874 212 -8.2225 1.1058 -10.434 -6.0108 1,058 79 
t51 3.3532 0.0466 810 5.2444 0.5895 4.0653 6.4235 2,668 93 
t52 2.3632 0.0469 681 -7.2808 0.5937 -8.4681 -6.0935 1,961 93 
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t53 3.3886 0.0299 975 5.6915 0.3783 4.9349 6.448 5,557 95 
t54 3.479 0.0341 757 6.8362 0.4317 5.9728 7.6996 3,405 94 
t55 3.3581 0.0319 889 5.3057 0.4038 4.4981 6.1133 4,372 93 
t56 3.0212 0.1663 126 1.0435 2.1039 -3.1643 5.2512 223 86 
t57 3.3626 0.0292 1,121 5.3632 0.3694 4.6244 6.1019 5,644 93 
t58 2.2359 0.0962 181 -8.8911 1.2165 -11.324 -6.4582 547 86 
t59 2.9742 0.1486 128 0.4488 1.8803 -3.3119 4.2095 336 89 
t60 2.6002 0.1079 229 -4.282 1.3645 -7.0109 -1.5531 546 80 
t61 3.2186 0.0304 945 3.5409 0.3842 2.7725 4.3093 5,021 95 
t62 3.1633 0.0423 638 2.8416 0.5352 1.7713 3.9119 2,487 95 
t63 3.4046 0.028 1,014 5.8948 0.3542 5.1863 6.6032 5,717 94 
t64 3.443 0.0281 971 6.38 0.3551 5.6698 7.0902 5,490 93 
t65 2.833 0.1206 155 -1.3374 1.5253 -4.3881 1.7133 334 89 
t66 2.4578 0.0408 844 -6.0832 0.5156 -7.1143 -5.052 3,024 90 
t67 3.3323 0.0352 786 4.9803 0.445 4.0903 5.8702 3,372 94 
t68 2.8324 0.0472 498 -1.3449 0.5976 -2.5402 -0.1496 2,347 88 
t69 3.3913 0.0253 1,163 5.7266 0.32 5.0865 6.3666 6,989 94 
t70 3.5641 0.0396 655 7.9122 0.5013 6.9095 8.9148 2,960 93 
t71 3.3825 0.0175 1,752 5.6144 0.2213 5.1718 6.057 14,287 95 
t72 3.3682 0.0376 786 5.4344 0.4754 4.4837 6.3852 3,281 93 
t73 2.2467 0.1048 168 -8.7541 1.3258 -11.406 -6.1025 434 86 
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t74 3.4197 0.0315 815 6.0858 0.3985 5.2888 6.8829 4,236 94 
t75 2.8758 0.2892 59 -0.7958 3.6584 -8.1125 6.5209 86 82 
t76 2.9993 0.0467 645 0.767 0.5909 -0.4147 1.9487 2,647 91 
t77 2.9784 0.153 139 0.5029 1.9359 -3.3689 4.3748 285 84 
t78 3.4636 0.0263 994 6.6413 0.3324 5.9766 7.306 5,864 94 
t79 3.2334 0.0288 805 3.7289 0.364 3.0008 4.457 4,723 92 
t80 2.4257 0.0458 785 -6.4904 0.5796 -7.6496 -5.3312 2,511 90 
t81 3.357 0.0244 1,173 5.2922 0.309 4.6741 5.9102 6,861 95 
t82 3.3044 0.0266 1,082 4.6268 0.336 3.9547 5.2988 5,938 95 
t83 3.0485 0.0417 714 1.3892 0.5275 0.3341 2.4442 2,706 93 
t84 3.4098 0.03 861 5.9607 0.3794 5.2018 6.7196 4,719 94 
t85 2.9312 0.1871 115 -0.0945 2.3666 -4.8276 4.6386 184 85 
t86 3.4721 0.0244 1,209 6.7487 0.3086 6.1315 7.3658 7,461 95 
t87 3.4635 0.0519 412 6.6393 0.6567 5.326 7.9526 1,332 96 
t88 3.4507 0.0266 1,105 6.478 0.3369 5.8041 7.1519 5,973 95 
t89 3.3842 0.0329 961 5.6362 0.416 4.8042 6.4681 4,334 93 
t90 2.6924 0.1754 51 -3.1161 2.2191 -7.5544 1.3221 86 98 
t91 3.5479 0.0237 1,274 7.7072 0.3002 7.1068 8.3076 8,092 94 
t92 3.5528 0.0413 703 7.7696 0.5221 6.7253 8.8138 2,917 95 
t93 3.6137 0.0553 713 8.5392 0.7002 7.1388 9.9395 2,305 93 
t94 3.4451 0.0262 1,050 6.4063 0.3309 5.7444 7.0681 6,050 94 
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t95 3.607 0.0256 1,208 8.4548 0.3242 7.8064 9.1031 7,000 95 
t96 3.3644 0.0228 1,265 5.386 0.2879 4.8102 5.9618 8,419 94 
t97 2.5597 0.2156 87 -4.7948 2.7271 -10.249 0.6594 137 82 
t98 2.7163 0.1514 137 -2.8132 1.9158 -6.6447 1.0183 240 85 
t99 2.2533 0.1254 135 -8.6702 1.5868 -11.844 -5.4967 332 82 
t100 3.2049 0.0331 962 3.3683 0.4193 2.5298 4.2069 4,852 93 
t101 3.4697 0.0331 900 6.7174 0.4186 5.8802 7.5546 4,070 94 
t102 3.4578 0.0273 1,068 6.567 0.3449 5.8773 7.2567 5,951 94 
t103 4.2083 0.0281 1,345 16.0624 0.3556 15.3513 16.7735 6,840 100 
t104 3.3885 0.0293 1,063 5.6905 0.3707 4.9491 6.4319 5,461 93 
t105 3.0685 0.0354 989 1.6424 0.4474 0.7477 2.5372 4,826 94 
t106 3.3882 0.0272 1,114 5.6869 0.3441 4.9986 6.3751 5,881 94 
t107 3.0995 0.0599 492 2.034 0.7582 0.5175 3.5504 1,346 90 
t108 3.1732 0.2034 98 2.9673 2.5734 -2.1794 8.1141 158 87 
t109 3.3668 0.0292 916 5.4167 0.3692 4.6784 6.1551 5,315 94 
t110 3.1486 0.0484 731 2.6553 0.6124 1.4304 3.8802 2,392 92 
t111 2.4862 0.1863 97 -5.7247 2.3572 -10.439 -1.0104 154 82 
t112 3.152 0.0254 834 2.6986 0.3216 2.0554 3.3417 5,492 90 
t113 3.1042 0.0749 342 2.0935 0.9474 0.1988 3.9882 1,064 87 
t114 3.5714 0.0304 939 8.0044 0.385 7.2345 8.7744 5,391 95 
t115 3.557 0.0289 944 7.8221 0.3657 7.0907 8.5534 5,311 95 
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t116 2.497 0.037 934 -5.5875 0.4682 -6.5239 -4.6512 3,621 89 
t117 3.4813 0.0307 891 6.865 0.3878 6.0894 7.6405 5,160 95 
t118 2.8167 0.0435 787 -1.5436 0.5501 -2.6437 -0.4435 3,281 85 
t119 3.4703 0.03 879 6.726 0.3795 5.967 7.485 5,065 96 
t120 2.7086 0.2286 72 -2.9102 2.8925 -8.6952 2.8747 117 80 
t121 3.0252 0.0576 565 1.0941 0.7285 -0.363 2.5511 1,620 92 
t122 2.8808 0.0986 212 -0.7323 1.2479 -3.228 1.7635 471 88 
t123 2.1549 0.0579 336 -9.9161 0.733 -11.382 -8.45 704 100 
t124 3.3662 0.0277 972 5.4082 0.3499 4.7084 6.108 5,467 93 
t125 2.6298 0.0828 289 -3.9078 1.048 -6.0037 -1.8118 761 83 
t126 3.4463 0.0286 979 6.4214 0.3612 5.699 7.1439 6,478 94 
t127 3.5491 0.0382 768 7.7222 0.4838 6.7545 8.6899 3,431 93 
t128 3.1404 0.0477 534 2.5515 0.6033 1.345 3.758 1,907 93 
t129 3.4795 0.0264 1,051 6.8416 0.3343 6.173 7.5103 6,529 94 
t130 3.3535 0.0338 882 5.2478 0.4271 4.3935 6.102 4,001 94 
t131 2.35 0.124 159 -7.4477 1.5681 -10.584 -4.3115 363 84 
t132 3.5581 0.0858 300 7.8368 1.0851 5.6666 10.007 702 93 
t133 3.5765 0.0315 910 8.0686 0.3979 7.2727 8.8644 4,851 95 
t134 3.3184 0.0374 770 4.804 0.4732 3.8576 5.7504 3,257 94 
t135 3.1144 0.0599 458 2.2232 0.7577 0.7078 3.7386 1,552 94 
t136 3.5889 0.031 892 8.2254 0.3923 7.4408 9.01 5,108 95 
 144 
 
t137 3.2319 0.0304 908 3.7096 0.3848 2.9399 4.4792 4,414 94 
t138 3.4877 0.029 1,256 6.9458 0.3665 6.2127 7.6788 6,368 94 
t139 3.4001 0.0276 892 5.838 0.3496 5.1388 6.5372 5,775 95 
t140 2.4953 0.0338 1,105 -5.6095 0.4279 -6.4654 -4.7537 4,867 88 
t141 3.5212 0.0349 733 7.3689 0.4416 6.4857 8.2521 3,596 94 
t142 3.4546 0.0222 1,421 6.5268 0.2811 5.9646 7.089 9,219 95 
t143 3.6827 0.098 211 9.4121 1.2403 6.9315 11.8928 433 95 
t144 3.4457 0.025 1,123 6.414 0.316 5.7821 7.046 6,915 96 
t145 3.5972 0.0298 901 8.3312 0.3773 7.5766 9.0858 5,219 95 
t146 3.1171 0.0395 574 2.2567 0.4995 1.2576 3.2558 2,682 92 
t147 3.4604 0.0606 566 6.6005 0.7664 5.0676 8.1333 1,787 94 
t148 3.0467 0.0968 281 1.367 1.2245 -1.0821 3.816 675 92 
t149 3.1965 0.0911 270 3.2617 1.153 0.9557 5.5676 561 93 
t150 3.3937 0.0648 486 5.7565 0.8203 4.116 7.397 1,295 92 
t151 3.2814 0.0412 752 4.3363 0.5217 3.2929 5.3797 2,892 95 
t152 3.1847 0.049 606 3.1127 0.6201 1.8726 4.3529 1,951 95 
t153 3.2094 0.0455 687 3.4249 0.5753 2.2742 4.5756 2,407 94 
t154 3.4639 0.0257 1,372 6.6443 0.3254 5.9934 7.2952 7,685 94 
t155 3.6484 0.0734 534 8.9782 0.929 7.1201 10.8363 1,531 91 
t156 3.901 0.0853 348 12.1738 1.0794 10.015 14.3325 850 94 
t157 3.2481 0.1025 262 3.9142 1.2969 1.3204 6.508 628 90 
 145 
 
t158 3.353 0.0354 927 5.2421 0.448 4.346 6.1381 5,325 89 
t159 3.4763 0.0458 613 6.8011 0.5796 5.6418 7.9603 2,439 94 
t160 3.5804 0.0381 655 8.1186 0.4818 7.155 9.0821 2,920 95 
t161 2.9272 0.039 744 -0.145 0.493 -1.1309 0.841 2,173 100 
t162 2.4895 0.0439 822 -5.6827 0.5552 -6.7931 -4.5722 2,876 89 
t163 3.2807 0.1218 185 4.3268 1.5414 1.244 7.4096 388 93 
t164 3.4752 0.041 884 6.7873 0.5185 5.7502 7.8243 3,430 93 
t165 2.8709 0.2328 89 -0.8574 2.9451 -6.7476 5.0328 139 85 
t166 3.5831 0.0377 647 8.1523 0.4767 7.1989 9.1057 2,794 93 
t167 3.5812 0.0566 447 8.1284 0.716 6.6965 9.5603 1,449 95 
t168 1.9429 0.1138 204 -12.5979 1.44 -15.478 -9.718 420 78 
t169 2.8638 0.0649 418 -0.948 0.8211 -2.5903 0.6943 1,178 89 
t170 3.6534 0.0342 755 9.0419 0.4332 8.1754 9.9083 3,722 95 
t171 2.698 0.0393 801 -3.0451 0.4975 -4.0401 -2.0501 3,366 91 
t172 2.2746 0.0912 171 -8.401 1.1538 -10.709 -6.0933 575 87 
t173 2.7677 0.1343 136 -2.1633 1.6988 -5.561 1.2344 385 90 
t174 2.8954 0.0555 576 -0.5471 0.7016 -1.9503 0.8562 1,916 93 
t175 3.3432 0.0281 1,096 5.1174 0.3551 4.4072 5.8277 6,136 94 
t176 3.2527 0.0308 986 3.9723 0.3897 3.1929 4.7518 5,441 94 
t177 3.0086 0.2164 87 0.8842 2.7375 -4.5907 6.3592 129 88 
t178 2.1432 0.1394 107 -10.0643 1.7632 -13.591 -6.5379 170 93 
 146 
 
t179 3.0084 0.0195 1,458 0.8817 0.2461 0.3895 1.3739 8,034 100 
t180 3.3005 0.0385 723 4.5774 0.487 3.6034 5.5514 3,212 92 
t181 3.3361 0.2794 48 5.0283 3.5352 -2.0422 12.0988 117 94 
t182 1.8357 0.1011 141 -13.9543 1.2785 -16.511 -11.397 202 100 
t183 2.6145 0.1946 86 -4.1009 2.4624 -9.0256 0.8239 193 89 
t184 3.4711 0.0339 783 6.7354 0.4288 5.8778 7.593 3,975 94 
t185 3.2122 0.2623 60 3.4599 3.3184 -3.177 10.0968 87 93 
t186 2.9922 0.1958 96 0.6775 2.4771 -4.2767 5.6317 147 87 
t187 3.4488 0.0351 878 6.4541 0.4435 5.5671 7.341 4,309 93 
t188 4.9271 0.0937 281 25.1551 1.1854 22.7842 27.5259 618 100 
t189 3.6686 0.0369 788 9.2347 0.4672 8.3002 10.1691 3,677 95 
t190 3.2142 0.0578 352 3.4858 0.7311 2.0237 4.9479 1,122 93 
t191 2.2381 0.1168 139 -8.8636 1.4772 -11.818 -5.9092 403 85 
t192 3.1711 0.2079 90 2.9402 2.6296 -2.3189 8.1993 208 89 
t193 3.0265 0.0672 475 1.1105 0.8498 -0.5891 2.81 1,480 94 
t194 3.0879 0.0504 592 1.8879 0.6378 0.6123 3.1634 1,878 90 
t195 3.4963 0.0282 1,080 7.0544 0.3564 6.3417 7.7672 6,686 95 
t196 3.5543 0.0326 850 7.7886 0.4118 6.9649 8.6122 4,719 95 
t197 3.6182 0.0318 866 8.5971 0.4026 7.7919 9.4023 4,550 95 
t198 2.3193 0.1175 143 -7.8363 1.4871 -10.81 -4.8621 401 89 
t199 3.2453 0.2083 100 3.8786 2.6349 -1.3913 9.1485 206 91 
 147 
 
t200 3.4229 0.0453 540 6.1252 0.5731 4.979 7.2715 2,050 94 
t201 3.2068 0.2276 68 3.3926 2.8797 -2.3669 9.152 110 99 
t202 4.4311 0.0377 1,251 18.8812 0.477 17.9273 19.8351 4,638 100 
t203 3.7241 0.03 924 9.9366 0.3791 9.1784 10.6948 5,649 96 
t204 3.4301 0.0766 394 6.2163 0.9688 4.2788 8.1539 994 96 
t205 3.3936 0.0314 973 5.7557 0.3972 4.9613 6.55 4,693 94 
t206 3.4622 0.0682 398 6.6229 0.8628 4.8973 8.3485 999 95 
t207 2.8906 0.0385 936 -0.6077 0.4865 -1.5807 0.3653 4,297 85 
t208 2.7446 0.0749 352 -2.4554 0.9471 -4.3496 -0.5611 1,153 85 
t209 3.2885 0.1923 114 4.4258 2.4324 -0.4389 9.2906 180 87 
t210 3.494 0.0327 831 7.0252 0.4134 6.1984 7.852 4,344 95 
t211 3.6173 0.0353 777 8.5856 0.4463 7.693 9.4783 3,705 95 
t212 3.2142 0.0518 429 3.4851 0.6557 2.1737 4.7965 1,378 95 
t213 3.7948 0.0305 1,041 10.8307 0.3856 10.0596 11.6018 5,503 95 
t214 3.4444 0.1472 142 6.3973 1.862 2.6733 10.1214 261 92 
t215 3.5631 0.073 395 7.8994 0.9233 6.0528 9.746 1,019 94 
t216 3.4246 0.0799 262 6.1472 1.0109 4.1254 8.1689 682 97 
t217 3.6881 0.0499 516 9.4811 0.6316 8.2179 10.7443 1,899 96 
t218 3.6513 0.0449 834 9.0148 0.5678 7.8792 10.1504 2,861 94 
t219 3.4383 0.1271 176 6.3212 1.6079 3.1054 9.5369 336 94 
t220 3.2868 0.0817 312 4.404 1.0334 2.3372 6.4708 717 94 
 148 
 
t221 3.733 0.0413 696 10.0491 0.5224 9.0044 11.0938 2,932 96 
t222 3.4475 0.0425 503 6.4375 0.5371 5.3633 7.5117 2,064 95 
t223 3.1529 0.0403 488 2.7098 0.5102 1.6893 3.7303 2,071 90 
t224 3.036 0.0695 415 1.2306 0.879 -0.5274 2.9886 1,284 89 
t225 3.136 0.0882 180 2.4968 1.1156 0.2655 4.728 480 97 
t226 3.4818 0.059 498 6.8704 0.7463 5.3777 8.363 1,441 95 
t227 3.574 0.0474 523 8.0368 0.6002 6.8364 9.2372 1,923 95 
t228 3.5786 0.0685 477 8.0961 0.8672 6.3618 9.8304 1,321 95 
t229 3.3821 0.0498 597 5.6091 0.6305 4.3481 6.8701 2,118 92 
t230 3.7124 0.051 478 9.7881 0.6457 8.4966 11.0795 1,915 96 
t231 3.6529 0.0398 720 9.0358 0.504 8.0278 10.0439 3,182 94 
t232 3.4901 0.0948 275 6.9764 1.1995 4.5775 9.3753 591 93 
t233 3.6261 0.0607 425 8.696 0.7683 7.1594 10.2326 1,288 96 
t234 3.8317 0.1285 140 11.2973 1.626 8.0453 14.5494 289 96 
t235 3.4941 0.0308 984 7.0263 0.3898 6.2468 7.8058 4,874 95 
t236 3.173 0.0846 380 2.9641 1.0703 0.8235 5.1047 858 95 
t237 3.7344 0.0406 738 10.0666 0.5131 9.0403 11.0929 3,034 95 
t238 3.5794 0.0399 939 8.1063 0.5047 7.0969 9.1157 3,673 93 
t239 4.4121 0.0319 1,238 18.6402 0.4037 17.8328 19.4477 5,869 100 
t240 2.9619 0.0541 436 0.2936 0.6841 -1.0746 1.6618 1,444 90 
t241 3.2612 0.0448 568 4.0796 0.5668 2.946 5.2133 2,211 94 
 149 
 
t242 3.1202 0.052 681 2.2967 0.6583 0.98 3.6133 2,138 90 
t243 4.5405 0.0653 488 20.2651 0.8261 18.6129 21.9174 1,244 100 
t244 3.5534 0.0342 794 7.7766 0.4328 6.911 8.6423 4,107 96 
t245 4.0515 0.1612 134 14.0784 2.0391 10.0002 18.1567 242 93 
t246 2.7193 0.0794 277 -2.7753 1.0044 -4.7841 -0.7664 811 92 
t247 3.4057 0.0304 954 5.9084 0.3842 5.14 6.6769 4,957 93 
t248 3.7072 0.0467 586 9.7231 0.5914 8.5404 10.9059 2,397 95 
t249 3.4847 0.2347 91 6.9072 2.9696 0.9679 12.8465 132 90 
t250 3.3613 0.049 603 5.3467 0.6202 4.1063 6.5871 2,010 92 
t251 2.5845 0.0659 457 -4.4809 0.8332 -6.1474 -2.8145 1,557 73 
t252 3.46 0.043 652 6.5958 0.5442 5.5074 7.6842 2,697 95 
t253 3.1784 0.0278 1,486 3.0327 0.3523 2.3281 3.7372 8,454 94 
t254 3.4387 0.0243 1,288 6.3258 0.3074 5.711 6.9406 8,014 94 
t255 3.5579 0.0257 1,061 7.8342 0.3252 7.1838 8.4845 6,488 95 
t256 2.8009 0.1062 216 -1.743 1.343 -4.4289 0.943 481 85 
t257 3.2704 0.037 742 4.1969 0.4687 3.2596 5.1343 3,218 92 
t258 3.2953 0.0376 672 4.512 0.4754 3.5611 5.4629 3,031 94 
t259 3.3245 0.0335 831 4.8809 0.4239 4.0331 5.7287 3,932 93 
t260 4.021 0.2274 88 13.6928 2.8775 7.9379 19.4477 132 96 
t261 3.0622 0.208 88 1.5621 2.6319 -3.7018 6.826 128 85 
t262 3.1887 0.1791 102 3.1636 2.2656 -1.3677 7.6948 167 88 
 150 
 
t263 2.7626 0.0336 981 -2.2281 0.4251 -3.0784 -1.3779 6,822 91 
t264 3.2423 0.038 1,053 3.841 0.4804 2.8801 4.8018 4,106 91 
t265 4.9194 0.0477 1,097 25.0578 0.6036 23.8506 26.265 3,360 100 
t266 3.2288 0.0549 604 3.6699 0.6939 2.2821 5.0577 2,118 90 
t267 4.2567 0.0176 2,810 16.6744 0.2223 16.2299 17.1189 19,816 100 
t268 3.2939 0.0264 821 4.4945 0.3342 3.8261 5.1628 4,875 91 
t269 2.9867 0.1924 61 0.6075 2.4342 -4.2609 5.4758 126 86 
t270 3.0907 0.0145 2,815 1.923 0.1835 1.5561 2.2899 30,391 89 
t271 2.6176 0.2239 86 -4.0615 2.8325 -9.7265 1.6035 133 81 
t272 3.0765 0.0168 2,342 1.7433 0.213 1.3174 2.1692 21,878 91 
t273 2.788 0.214 87 -1.9062 2.7075 -7.3213 3.5089 130 86 
t274 3.4916 0.0346 792 6.9954 0.4382 6.119 7.8718 3,668 94 
t275 3.6627 0.0407 545 9.159 0.5145 8.1299 10.188 2,483 95 
t276 3.5941 0.0526 460 8.2914 0.6651 6.9613 9.6216 1,458 96 
t277 3.3173 0.0507 605 4.7904 0.6415 3.5074 6.0733 1,808 94 
t278 2.5307 0.0293 1,210 -5.1615 0.3705 -5.9024 -4.4205 7,191 87 
t279 3.7259 0.0335 777 9.9594 0.4233 9.1129 10.806 3,797 95 
t280 2.5934 0.1388 168 -4.3688 1.7559 -7.8806 -0.857 346 83 
t281 1.9832 0.0991 149 -12.0883 1.2541 -14.597 -9.58 220 100 
t282 3.4411 0.0281 1,020 6.3557 0.355 5.6457 7.0656 5,342 96 
t283 2.6346 0.0657 402 -3.8465 0.8306 -5.5078 -2.1852 1,563 81 
 151 
 
t284 2.9427 0.2029 95 0.0507 2.5667 -5.0828 5.1842 155 83 
t285 2.8326 0.0344 1,052 -1.3426 0.4355 -2.2135 -0.4717 5,182 85 
t286 3.3049 0.0336 802 4.6331 0.4256 3.7819 5.4844 3,939 93 
t287 2.9992 0.0941 259 0.765 1.1911 -1.6171 3.1472 602 89 
t288 3.378 0.0404 721 5.558 0.5107 4.5367 6.5793 2,947 94 
t289 3.4584 0.0258 1,216 6.5749 0.3263 5.9224 7.2275 6,839 94 
t290 3.7141 0.0486 476 9.8096 0.6143 8.581 11.0383 1,722 96 
t291 3.5467 0.045 590 7.6921 0.5698 6.5526 8.8316 2,416 94 
t292 2.8627 0.2273 79 -0.9609 2.875 -6.7109 4.7891 125 85 
t293 3.3341 0.0849 207 5.0026 1.074 2.8545 7.1507 517 94 
t294 3.4174 0.0517 427 6.056 0.6547 4.7467 7.3653 1,388 95 
t295 2.9413 0.0199 1,258 0.0337 0.2511 -0.4686 0.536 7,650 100 
t296 3.2646 0.0228 1,194 4.1236 0.2881 3.5473 4.6998 8,038 95 
t297 3.2105 0.026 955 3.4393 0.3291 2.7811 4.0976 5,450 94 
t298 3.3102 0.0254 1,374 4.7 0.3219 4.0562 5.3438 7,272 94 
t299 2.6463 0.2389 76 -3.6986 3.0228 -9.7441 2.3469 111 84 
t300 2.785 0.1989 87 -1.944 2.5168 -6.9776 3.0896 181 84 
t301 3.2468 0.0558 426 3.8985 0.7062 2.4861 5.3108 1,317 95 
t302 3.2187 0.0898 328 3.5428 1.1358 1.2712 5.8145 888 92 
t303 2.66 0.0539 625 -3.5259 0.6823 -4.8905 -2.1614 1,909 89 
t304 3.3497 0.0262 880 5.1998 0.3314 4.5371 5.8626 5,482 93 
 152 
 
t305 2.4322 0.1168 173 -6.4078 1.4773 -9.3625 -3.4532 451 83 
t306 2.4107 0.0888 164 -6.6801 1.1236 -8.9273 -4.4328 896 82 
t307 2.6156 0.0516 680 -4.0876 0.6524 -5.3924 -2.7828 2,197 89 
t308 2.9076 0.0808 224 -0.3928 1.0218 -2.4364 1.6509 549 93 
t309 2.6225 0.0455 746 -3.9996 0.5754 -5.1503 -2.8489 2,665 90 
t310 2.9359 0.0573 465 -0.0352 0.7244 -1.4839 1.4136 2,002 89 
t311 3.3327 0.0316 959 4.9847 0.3999 4.185 5.7845 4,547 94 
t312 2.9425 0.1938 118 0.0483 2.4514 -4.8545 4.9511 212 89 
t313 3.3856 0.0236 1,181 5.6536 0.2979 5.0578 6.2495 7,249 95 
t314 3.1959 0.0234 957 3.2535 0.2957 2.6621 3.8448 6,409 94 
t315 3.0929 0.037 671 1.9514 0.4679 1.0156 2.8872 2,865 94 
t316 2.8844 0.0301 850 -0.6866 0.3811 -1.4487 0.0756 3,210 100 
t317 3.47 0.0429 578 6.722 0.5432 5.6355 7.8085 2,409 95 
t318 3.4038 0.0482 508 5.8848 0.6102 4.6643 7.1053 1,780 95 
t319 3.4873 0.0455 589 6.9405 0.5757 5.789 8.092 2,342 94 
t320 2.8975 0.2037 80 -0.5213 2.5772 -5.6758 4.6331 169 89 
t321 3.0632 0.1099 208 1.5755 1.3908 -1.206 4.357 487 92 
t322 3.6753 0.1786 136 9.3194 2.2591 4.8012 13.8376 238 92 
t323 3.442 0.0467 524 6.3677 0.5913 5.1851 7.5503 2,032 93 
t324 3.3844 0.2213 84 5.6392 2.7999 0.0394 11.2391 139 85 
t325 1.2809 0.0712 851 -20.9723 0.9008 -22.774 -19.171 3,397 100 
 153 
 
t326 3.1985 0.0619 417 3.2865 0.7827 1.7212 4.8519 1,233 92 
t327 3.4436 0.0303 840 6.3874 0.3829 5.6215 7.1533 4,501 95 
t328 3.3386 0.0268 1,081 5.0593 0.3392 4.3809 5.7378 6,103 94 
t329 3.4238 0.0238 1,059 6.1373 0.3014 5.5345 6.7401 6,505 95 
t330 2.3352 0.1542 127 -7.6347 1.9509 -11.537 -3.7328 283 84 
t331 3.3407 0.0241 1,077 5.0856 0.3053 4.4749 5.6963 6,952 95 
t332 3.3558 0.0357 853 5.2765 0.4523 4.3719 6.181 3,700 95 
t333 3.353 0.0403 852 5.2415 0.5092 4.2231 6.2599 3,166 93 
t334 3.5264 0.0331 778 7.4347 0.4193 6.5961 8.2733 3,747 94 
t335 2.8177 0.1444 99 -1.5305 1.8273 -5.1851 2.124 283 91 
t336 3.0841 0.0316 895 1.8395 0.4001 1.0393 2.6396 4,834 92 
t337 3.2626 0.0328 739 4.0974 0.4151 3.2671 4.9276 3,912 92 
t338 3.5575 0.0651 330 7.8282 0.8232 6.1817 9.4746 878 94 
t339 2.9232 0.0673 331 -0.1954 0.8509 -1.8972 1.5065 901 93 
t340 3.2346 0.0751 388 3.7435 0.9495 1.8445 5.6426 994 92 
t341 3.284 0.0307 831 4.3691 0.3889 3.5914 5.1468 4,367 96 
t342 1.8035 0.0656 263 -14.3608 0.8296 -16.02 -12.702 584 100 
t343 3.4104 0.0249 1,001 5.9675 0.315 5.3375 6.5976 6,206 95 
t344 1.8035 0.0656 263 -14.3608 0.8296 -16.02 -12.702 584 100 
t345 3.334 0.029 907 5.0007 0.3667 4.2673 5.7342 4,602 95 
t346 3.3637 0.029 970 5.3763 0.3666 4.643 6.1096 5,189 94 
 154 
 
t347 2.5972 0.0795 355 -4.3202 1.0053 -6.3308 -2.3097 915 78 
t348 3.2056 0.1725 69 3.3766 2.1817 -0.9868 7.74 133 89 
t349 3.3581 0.1944 126 5.3062 2.459 0.3881 10.2242 210 91 
t350 2.2035 0.0906 198 -9.301 1.1459 -11.593 -7.0093 545 86 
t351 2.6762 0.1623 87 -3.3201 2.0536 -7.4272 0.787 218 89 
t352 3.3839 0.0292 865 5.6319 0.37 4.8919 6.3719 4,515 94 
t353 3.466 0.0285 959 6.6708 0.3604 5.95 7.3915 5,417 95 
t354 1.9887 0.1492 97 -12.0184 1.8876 -15.794 -8.2432 226 87 
t355 3.4501 0.033 764 6.4703 0.4172 5.636 7.3047 3,588 95 
t356 3.1694 0.0441 422 2.9189 0.5573 1.8042 4.0336 1,977 87 
t357 3.4634 0.0611 333 6.6388 0.7725 5.0937 8.1838 1,193 97 
t358 3.3437 0.0277 1,006 5.1235 0.3499 4.4237 5.8233 5,315 94 
t359 3.2398 0.1025 232 3.8091 1.2971 1.2149 6.4033 543 88 
t360 3.4708 0.0399 601 6.7317 0.5043 5.723 7.7403 2,664 95 
t361 3.1765 0.2115 107 3.0081 2.6755 -2.3429 8.3592 163 91 
t362 3.481 0.0612 331 6.8604 0.7744 5.3116 8.4093 1,076 97 
t363 3.438 0.0345 768 6.3165 0.4362 5.4441 7.189 3,535 94 
t364 3.4702 0.036 810 6.7241 0.455 5.8141 7.6341 3,523 94 
t365 3.5596 0.0545 414 7.8557 0.6899 6.476 9.2355 1,412 96 
t366 2.9616 0.0619 423 0.2903 0.7828 -1.2754 1.856 1,331 89 
t367 3.023 0.0294 1,196 1.0665 0.3725 0.3215 1.8115 6,456 94 
 155 
 
t368 2.9897 0.0163 2,553 0.6453 0.2057 0.2338 1.0568 24,013 88 
t369 3.2118 0.0278 807 3.4554 0.352 2.7514 4.1594 4,645 91 
 
Table 9: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE A) 
 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 2.5195 0.0247 91 2.6976 0.0454 2.607 2.789 169 90 
t2 2.4788 0.0081 434 2.6228 0.0149 2.593 2.653 1,878 89 
t3 2.3118 0.0041 1,215 2.3162 0.0075 2.301 2.331 14,786 82 
t4 2.3814 0.0069 590 2.444 0.0127 2.419 2.469 3,722 85 
t5 2.3351 0.0141 295 2.3589 0.0258 2.307 2.411 989 85 
t6 2.4192 0.0116 309 2.5133 0.0213 2.471 2.556 1,111 88 
t7 2.1729 0.0511 60 2.061 0.0938 1.874 2.249 138 77 
t8 2.3269 0.005 836 2.344 0.0093 2.325 2.363 8,213 84 
t9 2.2619 0.0122 363 2.2245 0.0225 2.18 2.269 1,666 82 
t10 2.3481 0.0114 432 2.3828 0.021 2.341 2.425 1,577 84 
t11 2.2827 0.0151 313 2.2627 0.0278 2.207 2.318 1,046 82 
 156 
 
t12 2.2575 0.0087 501 2.2164 0.0161 2.184 2.249 3,297 81 
t13 2.4461 0.0131 284 2.5629 0.024 2.515 2.611 870 88 
t14 2.4194 0.0067 602 2.5138 0.0123 2.489 2.538 3,457 86 
t15 2.1479 0.0424 107 2.0152 0.0779 1.859 2.171 196 78 
t16 2.4058 0.0034 1,097 2.4887 0.0062 2.476 2.501 14,432 86 
t17 2.4389 0.0119 313 2.5496 0.0219 2.506 2.593 1,051 86 
t18 2.3574 0.0075 614 2.4 0.0138 2.372 2.428 3,382 85 
t19 1.9922 0.0183 389 1.7291 0.0337 1.662 1.797 1,455 72 
t20 2.3587 0.0078 509 2.4023 0.0144 2.374 2.431 3,089 85 
t21 2.3787 0.028 141 2.439 0.0515 2.336 2.542 259 84 
t22 1.8632 0.0364 175 1.4922 0.0668 1.359 1.626 472 66 
t23 2.0358 0.0517 98 1.8092 0.095 1.619 1.999 168 73 
t24 2.4438 0.0044 812 2.5587 0.008 2.543 2.575 7,165 88 
t25 2.4455 0.0055 816 2.5616 0.0101 2.541 2.582 4,799 87 
t26 2.0034 0.0179 404 1.7497 0.0328 1.684 1.815 1,499 72 
t27 2.3742 0.0068 644 2.4307 0.0125 2.406 2.456 3,839 85 
t28 2.0199 0.0178 404 1.78 0.0327 1.715 1.845 1,471 73 
t29 2.3795 0.0054 782 2.4406 0.01 2.421 2.461 5,900 86 
t30 2.306 0.0312 128 2.3054 0.0572 2.191 2.42 251 82 
t31 2.0147 0.0165 448 1.7705 0.0302 1.71 1.831 1,737 73 
t32 2.0465 0.0278 141 1.8289 0.0511 1.727 1.931 585 73 
 157 
 
t33 2.5436 0.0077 428 2.7419 0.0141 2.714 2.77 1,650 90 
t34 2.3526 0.0066 654 2.3912 0.0121 2.367 2.415 4,418 84 
t35 2.323 0.0066 641 2.3367 0.0121 2.313 2.361 4,900 83 
t36 2.3582 0.0055 869 2.4014 0.0101 2.381 2.422 6,277 84 
t37 2.0148 0.0868 38 1.7707 0.1593 1.452 2.089 67 71 
t38 2.4025 0.0057 761 2.4828 0.0105 2.462 2.504 4,913 86 
t39 2.49 0.0072 612 2.6434 0.0132 2.617 2.67 2,517 88 
t40 2.2998 0.007 694 2.2941 0.0128 2.268 2.32 4,623 83 
t41 2.5452 0.0074 437 2.7449 0.0137 2.718 2.772 1,673 90 
t42 2.3993 0.0047 889 2.4769 0.0086 2.46 2.494 7,423 86 
t43 2.0948 0.0459 104 1.9176 0.0842 1.749 2.086 191 75 
t44 1.9547 0.0187 399 1.6602 0.0344 1.591 1.729 1,477 71 
t45 2.1003 0.0175 343 1.9277 0.0321 1.864 1.992 1,268 76 
t46 2.2943 0.0063 667 2.284 0.0116 2.261 2.307 5,649 83 
t47 2.3979 0.0052 885 2.4743 0.0095 2.455 2.493 6,190 86 
t48 2.0784 0.0168 381 1.8875 0.0308 1.826 1.949 1,448 75 
t49 1.8708 0.0392 91 1.5062 0.072 1.362 1.65 395 67 
t50 1.6577 0.0319 118 1.1148 0.0586 0.998 1.232 792 59 
t51 2.4267 0.0083 645 2.5273 0.0152 2.497 2.558 2,469 86 
t52 1.9979 0.0178 412 1.7397 0.0327 1.674 1.805 1,525 72 
t53 2.3512 0.0061 679 2.3885 0.0113 2.366 2.411 4,978 85 
 158 
 
t54 2.4285 0.0068 581 2.5305 0.0125 2.506 2.555 3,145 87 
t55 2.3193 0.0074 642 2.3299 0.0136 2.303 2.357 3,897 83 
t56 2.0221 0.0484 100 1.7841 0.0889 1.606 1.962 191 74 
t57 2.4133 0.0057 841 2.5026 0.0104 2.482 2.524 5,183 86 
t58 1.8844 0.0383 110 1.5312 0.0703 1.391 1.672 425 67 
t59 1.8166 0.0532 75 1.4066 0.0976 1.211 1.602 243 65 
t60 1.8661 0.0368 173 1.4975 0.0676 1.362 1.633 454 67 
t61 2.3287 0.0068 678 2.3472 0.0126 2.322 2.372 4,432 84 
t62 2.4752 0.0073 522 2.6163 0.0135 2.589 2.643 2,314 88 
t63 2.3533 0.0061 727 2.3925 0.0112 2.37 2.415 5,130 85 
t64 2.3577 0.006 724 2.4006 0.011 2.379 2.423 5,042 85 
t65 2.2437 0.0315 129 2.1911 0.0578 2.076 2.307 298 79 
t66 1.9846 0.0144 526 1.7152 0.0264 1.662 1.768 2,392 71 
t67 2.3483 0.008 590 2.3833 0.0148 2.354 2.413 3,008 84 
t68 2.1239 0.0136 362 1.9711 0.025 1.921 2.021 2,042 76 
t69 2.3503 0.0056 835 2.3868 0.0102 2.366 2.407 6,260 84 
t70 2.3951 0.0077 513 2.4692 0.0142 2.441 2.498 2,730 86 
t71 2.4503 0.0032 1,185 2.5706 0.0059 2.559 2.582 13,237 88 
t72 2.4212 0.0071 623 2.5171 0.0131 2.491 2.543 3,059 87 
t73 1.83 0.0446 103 1.4312 0.0818 1.268 1.595 330 65 
t74 2.4215 0.0063 631 2.5177 0.0116 2.495 2.541 3,913 87 
 159 
 
t75 1.8818 0.0864 48 1.5263 0.1587 1.209 1.844 73 70 
t76 2.2787 0.0099 489 2.2553 0.0182 2.219 2.292 2,395 82 
t77 1.9937 0.0445 107 1.732 0.0818 1.569 1.896 244 72 
t78 2.3784 0.0057 734 2.4384 0.0106 2.417 2.46 5,307 85 
t79 2.3851 0.0061 630 2.4509 0.0113 2.428 2.473 4,398 86 
t80 1.9322 0.0167 467 1.619 0.0306 1.558 1.68 1,947 70 
t81 2.4586 0.0046 884 2.5858 0.0084 2.569 2.603 6,365 88 
t82 2.3609 0.0059 773 2.4064 0.0109 2.385 2.428 5,314 85 
t83 2.3392 0.0094 554 2.3665 0.0172 2.332 2.401 2,438 83 
t84 2.3598 0.0066 629 2.4044 0.0122 2.38 2.429 4,228 85 
t85 1.9621 0.0582 86 1.6738 0.1068 1.46 1.888 153 71 
t86 2.36 0.0053 850 2.4047 0.0097 2.385 2.424 6,685 85 
t87 2.55 0.0085 353 2.7537 0.0155 2.723 2.785 1,256 90 
t88 2.3785 0.0057 778 2.4386 0.0105 2.418 2.46 5,366 85 
t89 2.4475 0.0059 765 2.5655 0.0109 2.544 2.587 4,060 87 
t90 2.3289 0.0531 42 2.3476 0.0975 2.153 2.543 74 84 
t91 2.4045 0.0046 919 2.4865 0.0085 2.47 2.504 7,415 86 
t92 2.5357 0.0059 589 2.7274 0.0109 2.706 2.749 2,754 90 
t93 2.482 0.008 592 2.6288 0.0147 2.599 2.658 2,167 87 
t94 2.3477 0.006 759 2.3821 0.011 2.36 2.404 5,439 84 
t95 2.5267 0.0039 925 2.7109 0.0072 2.697 2.725 6,606 90 
 160 
 
t96 2.3084 0.0054 840 2.31 0.01 2.29 2.33 7,434 83 
t97 2.0012 0.0641 73 1.7456 0.1178 1.51 1.981 120 71 
t98 1.9769 0.0504 100 1.7011 0.0925 1.516 1.886 199 71 
t99 1.8832 0.0466 96 1.5289 0.0856 1.358 1.7 274 67 
t100 2.3385 0.0068 725 2.3652 0.0125 2.34 2.39 4,398 84 
t101 2.4742 0.0058 708 2.6144 0.0107 2.593 2.636 3,804 88 
t102 2.3425 0.0061 766 2.3726 0.0112 2.35 2.395 5,319 84 
t103 2.3469 0.0058 759 2.3805 0.0107 2.359 2.402 5,752 84 
t104 2.2723 0.0072 722 2.2437 0.0132 2.217 2.27 4,790 82 
t105 2.4235 0.006 740 2.5214 0.011 2.5 2.543 4,420 86 
t106 2.3396 0.0062 800 2.3673 0.0113 2.345 2.39 5,281 84 
t107 2.2735 0.015 400 2.2459 0.0275 2.191 2.301 1,206 81 
t108 2.0797 0.0565 76 1.8899 0.1038 1.682 2.098 134 74 
t109 2.3686 0.0061 686 2.4204 0.0111 2.398 2.443 4,843 85 
t110 2.3747 0.0094 561 2.4317 0.0173 2.397 2.466 2,188 84 
t111 1.9381 0.0633 77 1.6298 0.1163 1.397 1.862 132 70 
t112 2.2868 0.0069 606 2.2702 0.0126 2.245 2.295 4,988 82 
t113 2.1424 0.0197 253 2.005 0.0361 1.933 2.077 938 77 
t114 2.4281 0.0054 690 2.5298 0.01 2.51 2.55 4,956 87 
t115 2.456 0.0051 715 2.581 0.0094 2.562 2.6 4,955 88 
t116 1.9697 0.0132 576 1.6879 0.0243 1.639 1.737 2,890 71 
 161 
 
t117 2.4034 0.0058 650 2.4843 0.0107 2.463 2.506 4,710 86 
t118 1.972 0.0137 519 1.6921 0.0253 1.642 1.743 2,732 71 
t119 2.4582 0.0052 671 2.585 0.0096 2.566 2.604 4,681 88 
t120 1.9655 0.0727 58 1.6801 0.1336 1.413 1.947 102 70 
t121 2.3278 0.0125 438 2.3455 0.023 2.3 2.392 1,454 83 
t122 2.2632 0.0252 181 2.2268 0.0464 2.134 2.32 428 80 
t123 2.182 0.0251 215 2.0778 0.0461 1.986 2.17 545 77 
t124 2.3739 0.006 685 2.4303 0.011 2.408 2.452 5,005 85 
t125 1.9724 0.0286 216 1.6928 0.0525 1.588 1.798 641 70 
t126 2.4132 0.0051 704 2.5024 0.0094 2.484 2.521 5,945 87 
t127 2.3857 0.0074 592 2.4518 0.0136 2.425 2.479 3,157 86 
t128 2.3652 0.0106 417 2.4142 0.0194 2.375 2.453 1,723 84 
t129 2.4379 0.0048 777 2.5478 0.0089 2.53 2.566 6,090 87 
t130 2.4455 0.0063 683 2.5617 0.0115 2.539 2.585 3,687 87 
t131 1.9104 0.045 111 1.579 0.0826 1.414 1.744 293 68 
t132 2.479 0.014 270 2.6232 0.0257 2.572 2.675 667 88 
t133 2.4253 0.0058 664 2.5246 0.0106 2.503 2.546 4,453 87 
t134 2.4806 0.0065 612 2.6263 0.0119 2.603 2.65 3,036 88 
t135 2.3937 0.0108 354 2.4665 0.0199 2.427 2.506 1,412 86 
t136 2.4924 0.0049 689 2.648 0.0089 2.63 2.666 4,781 89 
t137 2.4516 0.0058 675 2.573 0.0107 2.552 2.594 4,077 87 
 162 
 
t138 2.4833 0.0047 976 2.6311 0.0086 2.614 2.648 5,946 88 
t139 2.3829 0.0056 652 2.4467 0.0104 2.426 2.467 5,228 86 
t140 1.9353 0.0119 679 1.6246 0.0218 1.581 1.668 3,846 70 
t141 2.4314 0.0065 566 2.5357 0.012 2.512 2.56 3,337 88 
t142 2.4621 0.0039 1,021 2.5922 0.0072 2.578 2.607 8,558 88 
t143 2.5089 0.0163 188 2.6781 0.03 2.618 2.738 410 90 
t144 2.522 0.0039 870 2.7022 0.0072 2.688 2.717 6,512 90 
t145 2.4664 0.0051 676 2.6001 0.0093 2.581 2.619 4,839 89 
t146 2.3652 0.0087 456 2.4143 0.016 2.382 2.446 2,494 85 
t147 2.4737 0.0089 473 2.6135 0.0163 2.581 2.646 1,670 88 
t148 2.3145 0.0191 237 2.3212 0.035 2.251 2.391 617 84 
t149 2.473 0.016 241 2.6122 0.0294 2.553 2.671 531 88 
t150 2.3885 0.0125 399 2.4571 0.0229 2.411 2.503 1,195 85 
t151 2.4967 0.0066 612 2.6558 0.0122 2.632 2.68 2,709 89 
t152 2.4032 0.0097 477 2.4841 0.0178 2.448 2.52 1,785 87 
t153 2.4293 0.0083 537 2.5319 0.0152 2.502 2.562 2,215 87 
t154 2.4533 0.0044 1,022 2.5761 0.008 2.56 2.592 7,178 88 
t155 2.4078 0.0112 451 2.4924 0.0206 2.451 2.534 1,429 85 
t156 2.5646 0.0106 309 2.7805 0.0196 2.741 2.82 811 90 
t157 2.1304 0.0266 197 1.9831 0.0488 1.885 2.081 532 77 
t158 2.2532 0.0077 676 2.2086 0.0141 2.18 2.237 4,796 80 
 163 
 
t159 2.4268 0.0081 490 2.5274 0.0148 2.498 2.557 2,265 88 
t160 2.4805 0.0065 534 2.6261 0.012 2.602 2.65 2,748 89 
t161 2.4652 0.0085 508 2.5979 0.0157 2.567 2.629 1,900 87 
t162 1.9668 0.0148 527 1.6825 0.0273 1.628 1.737 2,301 71 
t163 2.4352 0.0202 166 2.5428 0.037 2.469 2.617 363 87 
t164 2.416 0.0073 703 2.5075 0.0133 2.481 2.534 3,173 86 
t165 2.0151 0.0659 69 1.7712 0.121 1.529 2.013 116 71 
t166 2.4278 0.0073 533 2.5292 0.0135 2.502 2.556 2,634 88 
t167 2.4804 0.0093 368 2.6259 0.0171 2.592 2.66 1,349 89 
t168 1.6059 0.0528 120 1.0197 0.097 0.826 1.214 307 57 
t169 2.2861 0.0153 339 2.2689 0.0281 2.213 2.325 1,082 81 
t170 2.4861 0.0057 622 2.6362 0.0105 2.615 2.657 3,490 89 
t171 2.0823 0.0121 531 1.8946 0.0222 1.85 1.939 2,780 75 
t172 1.868 0.0375 107 1.501 0.0689 1.363 1.639 442 67 
t173 2.0474 0.0389 88 1.8306 0.0715 1.688 1.974 311 73 
t174 2.3787 0.0102 451 2.4391 0.0187 2.402 2.476 1,748 85 
t175 2.3805 0.0055 808 2.4423 0.0102 2.422 2.463 5,604 86 
t176 2.3799 0.0059 739 2.4413 0.0108 2.42 2.463 4,991 86 
t177 2.0943 0.0601 68 1.9168 0.1104 1.696 2.138 111 76 
t178 2.1367 0.0513 77 1.9946 0.0942 1.806 2.183 140 77 
t179 2.4141 0.0048 810 2.5041 0.0088 2.487 2.522 6,942 86 
 164 
 
t180 2.3468 0.0082 540 2.3804 0.015 2.35 2.41 2,938 84 
t181 2.0207 0.0767 32 1.7815 0.1409 1.5 2.063 89 71 
t182 2.127 0.0492 94 1.9768 0.0903 1.796 2.158 154 76 
t183 1.8888 0.0639 52 1.5393 0.1174 1.305 1.774 147 68 
t184 2.4342 0.0061 599 2.5411 0.0113 2.519 2.564 3,678 87 
t185 2.4071 0.0464 53 2.4912 0.0853 2.321 2.662 81 86 
t186 2.1431 0.0537 80 2.0063 0.0986 1.809 2.204 130 77 
t187 2.3759 0.0067 639 2.4339 0.0124 2.409 2.459 3,935 85 
t188 2.8759 0.0037 281 3.3522 0.0068 3.339 3.366 618 100 
t189 2.4339 0.0065 611 2.5405 0.0119 2.517 2.564 3,372 87 
t190 2.4732 0.0108 298 2.6126 0.0199 2.573 2.652 1,064 88 
t191 1.863 0.0445 90 1.4918 0.0817 1.328 1.655 314 67 
t192 1.9824 0.0549 64 1.7111 0.1008 1.51 1.913 168 72 
t193 2.4015 0.0115 371 2.4808 0.0211 2.439 2.523 1,341 85 
t194 2.23 0.0133 447 2.1659 0.0244 2.117 2.215 1,661 80 
t195 2.4459 0.0047 786 2.5625 0.0086 2.545 2.58 6,173 88 
t196 2.4415 0.0056 648 2.5543 0.0103 2.534 2.575 4,367 88 
t197 2.4482 0.0056 653 2.5668 0.0103 2.546 2.588 4,208 88 
t198 1.9326 0.0422 89 1.6197 0.0775 1.465 1.775 311 69 
t199 1.8414 0.0658 64 1.4521 0.1208 1.211 1.694 150 66 
t200 2.473 0.0081 443 2.6122 0.0149 2.583 2.642 1,916 88 
 165 
 
t201 2.3352 0.0493 56 2.3591 0.0906 2.178 2.54 92 83 
t202 2.8612 0.0018 1,251 3.3252 0.0032 3.319 3.332 4,638 100 
t203 2.4821 0.0047 701 2.6289 0.0087 2.612 2.646 5,243 89 
t204 2.4855 0.0114 326 2.6352 0.021 2.593 2.677 917 89 
t205 2.4538 0.0056 738 2.577 0.0104 2.556 2.598 4,364 87 
t206 2.4653 0.0122 336 2.5981 0.0224 2.553 2.643 925 88 
t207 1.994 0.0117 622 1.7325 0.0215 1.69 1.776 3,603 72 
t208 2.0036 0.0226 258 1.7501 0.0415 1.667 1.833 972 71 
t209 2.2181 0.0439 99 2.144 0.0806 1.983 2.305 164 79 
t210 2.4598 0.0056 617 2.5881 0.0103 2.567 2.609 4,054 88 
t211 2.463 0.006 598 2.5939 0.0111 2.572 2.616 3,455 88 
t212 2.4443 0.0106 351 2.5595 0.0194 2.521 2.598 1,266 87 
t213 2.4835 0.0048 832 2.6315 0.0087 2.614 2.649 5,210 90 
t214 2.4099 0.0268 125 2.4963 0.0492 2.398 2.595 244 86 
t215 2.5048 0.0113 334 2.6706 0.0208 2.629 2.712 955 88 
t216 2.617 0.0104 233 2.8767 0.0191 2.838 2.915 651 93 
t217 2.5586 0.0071 438 2.7695 0.0131 2.743 2.796 1,793 91 
t218 2.5103 0.0066 703 2.6808 0.0121 2.657 2.705 2,695 89 
t219 2.4948 0.0194 158 2.6523 0.0357 2.581 2.724 315 88 
t220 2.486 0.0141 266 2.636 0.026 2.584 2.688 667 87 
t221 2.4795 0.0066 562 2.6241 0.0122 2.6 2.649 2,743 89 
 166 
 
t222 2.5019 0.0075 418 2.6654 0.0138 2.638 2.693 1,953 90 
t223 2.3164 0.0105 397 2.3246 0.0193 2.286 2.363 1,930 84 
t224 2.1702 0.0175 310 2.056 0.0322 1.992 2.12 1,121 78 
t225 2.586 0.0129 160 2.8198 0.0238 2.772 2.867 454 92 
t226 2.5214 0.0092 426 2.7012 0.0169 2.667 2.735 1,353 89 
t227 2.4712 0.0082 433 2.6089 0.0151 2.579 2.639 1,797 89 
t228 2.4986 0.0098 414 2.6593 0.018 2.623 2.695 1,242 89 
t229 2.3649 0.01 487 2.4136 0.0183 2.377 2.45 1,937 84 
t230 2.5242 0.0073 404 2.7063 0.0134 2.68 2.733 1,812 91 
t231 2.4839 0.0063 588 2.6323 0.0115 2.609 2.655 3,027 90 
t232 2.4788 0.0158 243 2.6229 0.0291 2.565 2.681 554 87 
t233 2.8667 0.0026 468 3.3353 0.0047 3.326 3.345 1,349 100 
t234 2.5972 0.0168 128 2.8403 0.0309 2.779 2.902 277 92 
t235 2.4738 0.0053 763 2.6136 0.0097 2.594 2.633 4,559 89 
t236 2.3341 0.017 310 2.3571 0.0311 2.295 2.419 755 83 
t237 2.5667 0.0055 622 2.7844 0.0101 2.764 2.805 2,904 91 
t238 2.4504 0.0066 734 2.5707 0.0121 2.547 2.595 3,434 87 
t239 2.6469 0.0039 1,238 2.9317 0.0072 2.917 2.946 5,869 100 
t240 2.352 0.0122 357 2.39 0.0225 2.345 2.435 1,338 84 
t241 2.4147 0.0088 456 2.5052 0.0162 2.473 2.538 2,020 86 
t242 2.3071 0.0111 531 2.3075 0.0205 2.267 2.348 1,946 82 
 167 
 
t243 2.8732 0.0028 488 3.3472 0.0051 3.337 3.357 1,244 100 
t244 2.4949 0.0053 625 2.6524 0.0097 2.633 2.672 3,844 90 
t245 2.6106 0.0182 129 2.8649 0.0335 2.798 2.932 236 91 
t246 2.3834 0.0158 224 2.4476 0.029 2.39 2.506 741 84 
t247 2.3912 0.0061 705 2.4619 0.0112 2.44 2.484 4,576 86 
t248 2.4676 0.0076 479 2.6024 0.0139 2.575 2.63 2,237 89 
t249 2.1863 0.0546 75 2.0856 0.1002 1.885 2.286 115 78 
t250 2.4448 0.009 505 2.5605 0.0165 2.528 2.593 1,880 86 
t251 1.6978 0.0243 316 1.1884 0.0446 1.099 1.278 1,299 61 
t252 2.5031 0.0066 519 2.6675 0.0121 2.643 2.692 2,517 89 
t253 2.3637 0.0052 1,032 2.4115 0.0095 2.392 2.431 7,581 84 
t254 2.452 0.0044 923 2.5736 0.008 2.558 2.59 7,400 87 
t255 2.4533 0.0047 786 2.5761 0.0086 2.559 2.593 6,016 88 
t256 2.1652 0.0289 175 2.0469 0.0531 1.941 2.153 437 77 
t257 2.3116 0.0085 553 2.3159 0.0157 2.285 2.347 2,926 83 
t258 2.4706 0.0066 527 2.6078 0.0121 2.584 2.632 2,844 88 
t259 2.3986 0.0068 615 2.4757 0.0125 2.451 2.501 3,605 86 
t260 2.4856 0.0335 78 2.6353 0.0616 2.512 2.759 121 88 
t261 2.2691 0.0473 81 2.2378 0.0869 2.064 2.412 121 81 
t262 2.3207 0.0396 90 2.3325 0.0728 2.187 2.478 155 82 
t263 2.2703 0.0063 674 2.24 0.0117 2.217 2.263 6,095 82 
 168 
 
t264 2.3346 0.0077 773 2.358 0.0142 2.33 2.386 3,727 83 
t265 2.8762 0.0019 1,097 3.3527 0.0035 3.346 3.36 3,360 100 
t266 2.3155 0.0112 478 2.3229 0.0205 2.282 2.364 1,932 82 
t267 2.404 0.0031 1,127 2.4856 0.0056 2.474 2.497 17,022 86 
t268 2.3521 0.0065 628 2.3901 0.0119 2.366 2.414 4,526 85 
t269 2.2176 0.0546 49 2.1431 0.1003 1.943 2.344 114 78 
t270 2.1628 0.0037 1,631 2.0424 0.0068 2.029 2.056 26,389 77 
t271 1.8849 0.0745 64 1.5321 0.1368 1.259 1.806 110 67 
t272 2.2456 0.0039 1,433 2.1945 0.0072 2.18 2.209 19,097 80 
t273 2.1206 0.058 74 1.9649 0.1066 1.752 2.178 115 76 
t274 2.4302 0.0065 625 2.5336 0.0119 2.51 2.557 3,414 88 
t275 2.5036 0.0067 450 2.6684 0.0124 2.644 2.693 2,350 90 
t276 2.5552 0.008 384 2.7632 0.0147 2.734 2.793 1,368 90 
t277 2.4345 0.01 496 2.5416 0.0183 2.505 2.578 1,650 86 
t278 1.9302 0.0095 707 1.6153 0.0175 1.58 1.65 5,799 70 
t279 2.5414 0.005 643 2.7378 0.0092 2.719 2.756 3,609 90 
t280 2.0888 0.0375 137 1.9065 0.0689 1.769 2.044 308 74 
t281 2.1621 0.0468 102 2.0412 0.086 1.869 2.213 168 76 
t282 2.4891 0.0049 775 2.6417 0.0089 2.624 2.66 4,968 89 
t283 1.9232 0.0208 295 1.6025 0.0383 1.526 1.679 1,311 68 
t284 1.9819 0.0626 76 1.7102 0.115 1.48 1.94 132 71 
 169 
 
t285 1.9599 0.011 699 1.6697 0.0202 1.629 1.71 4,309 70 
t286 2.426 0.0063 627 2.5259 0.0115 2.503 2.549 3,687 87 
t287 2.3254 0.0203 222 2.3412 0.0373 2.267 2.416 555 82 
t288 2.3923 0.0078 562 2.4641 0.0144 2.435 2.493 2,700 86 
t289 2.498 0.0043 949 2.6581 0.0078 2.642 2.674 6,459 89 
t290 2.5927 0.0065 417 2.832 0.012 2.808 2.856 1,657 92 
t291 2.4423 0.0078 497 2.5558 0.0143 2.527 2.584 2,263 88 
t292 2.0423 0.0665 64 1.8211 0.1221 1.577 2.065 107 72 
t293 2.5393 0.0144 184 2.7341 0.0264 2.681 2.787 490 89 
t294 2.4947 0.0097 349 2.652 0.0178 2.616 2.688 1,292 89 
t295 2.335 0.0056 731 2.3589 0.0102 2.338 2.379 6,426 84 
t296 2.3707 0.005 840 2.4243 0.0091 2.406 2.443 7,247 85 
t297 2.3734 0.006 701 2.4293 0.0111 2.407 2.451 4,941 85 
t298 2.398 0.0051 999 2.4745 0.0093 2.456 2.493 6,654 86 
t299 1.8976 0.0799 58 1.5554 0.1467 1.262 1.849 91 68 
t300 1.9886 0.0573 65 1.7225 0.1053 1.512 1.933 154 71 
t301 2.5243 0.0094 362 2.7064 0.0173 2.672 2.741 1,243 90 
t302 2.4686 0.0129 287 2.6041 0.0238 2.557 2.652 840 87 
t303 1.9754 0.0182 412 1.6983 0.0334 1.632 1.765 1,525 71 
t304 2.3962 0.0057 656 2.4712 0.0104 2.45 2.492 5,090 86 
t305 1.7464 0.0462 102 1.2777 0.0848 1.108 1.447 339 63 
 170 
 
t306 1.6876 0.0343 87 1.1697 0.063 1.044 1.296 659 60 
t307 1.9814 0.0168 440 1.7093 0.0308 1.648 1.771 1,757 72 
t308 2.4368 0.0171 191 2.5457 0.0314 2.483 2.608 507 86 
t309 2.0358 0.0144 491 1.8092 0.0264 1.757 1.862 2,166 74 
t310 2.266 0.0118 360 2.232 0.0218 2.189 2.276 1,813 81 
t311 2.333 0.0071 684 2.3552 0.013 2.329 2.381 4,053 84 
t312 2.0951 0.0482 90 1.9181 0.0886 1.741 2.095 179 75 
t313 2.3799 0.0052 851 2.4413 0.0095 2.422 2.46 6,551 85 
t314 2.346 0.0058 681 2.3789 0.0106 2.358 2.4 5,775 84 
t315 2.3828 0.0082 526 2.4465 0.0151 2.416 2.477 2,619 85 
t316 2.32 0.009 524 2.3313 0.0165 2.298 2.364 2,672 83 
t317 2.4424 0.0079 449 2.556 0.0146 2.527 2.585 2,213 88 
t318 2.508 0.0081 427 2.6766 0.0149 2.647 2.706 1,671 89 
t319 2.3607 0.0094 470 2.406 0.0173 2.371 2.441 2,116 85 
t320 1.8621 0.0697 54 1.4902 0.128 1.234 1.746 128 67 
t321 2.3595 0.021 183 2.4037 0.0385 2.327 2.481 445 84 
t322 2.2433 0.0392 110 2.1903 0.072 2.046 2.334 205 79 
t323 2.4292 0.0087 432 2.5319 0.016 2.5 2.564 1,927 88 
t324 2.1411 0.0576 73 2.0027 0.1058 1.791 2.214 123 76 
t325 2.3965 0.0076 524 2.4717 0.014 2.444 2.5 2,901 85 
t326 2.4741 0.0109 360 2.6142 0.0199 2.574 2.654 1,177 88 
 171 
 
t327 2.4114 0.0061 645 2.4992 0.0113 2.477 2.522 4,109 87 
t328 2.3647 0.0058 777 2.4134 0.0106 2.392 2.435 5,501 85 
t329 2.3977 0.0053 763 2.474 0.0098 2.455 2.494 5,862 86 
t330 1.8474 0.0531 85 1.4632 0.0975 1.268 1.658 223 66 
t331 2.365 0.0054 764 2.4138 0.0099 2.394 2.434 6,259 85 
t332 2.3315 0.008 627 2.3523 0.0147 2.323 2.382 3,272 84 
t333 2.406 0.0079 660 2.4892 0.0144 2.46 2.518 2,885 85 
t334 2.4355 0.0063 606 2.5433 0.0116 2.52 2.567 3,496 88 
t335 1.8587 0.058 58 1.484 0.1064 1.271 1.697 202 65 
t336 2.2674 0.0076 648 2.2346 0.0139 2.207 2.262 4,312 82 
t337 2.3762 0.0069 546 2.4345 0.0127 2.409 2.46 3,622 85 
t338 2.3947 0.0145 275 2.4684 0.0266 2.415 2.522 806 86 
t339 2.3927 0.0147 272 2.4648 0.027 2.411 2.519 821 85 
t340 2.468 0.0122 347 2.6031 0.0223 2.558 2.648 945 87 
t341 2.5101 0.0051 639 2.6803 0.0094 2.662 2.699 4,045 89 
t342 1.8792 0.0396 117 1.5217 0.0728 1.376 1.667 390 67 
t343 2.4161 0.0052 727 2.5077 0.0096 2.489 2.527 5,644 86 
t344 1.8792 0.0396 117 1.5217 0.0728 1.376 1.667 390 67 
t345 2.3806 0.0065 672 2.4425 0.0119 2.419 2.466 4,152 85 
t346 2.3588 0.0063 721 2.4025 0.0116 2.379 2.426 4,702 85 
t347 1.8194 0.0292 253 1.4118 0.0537 1.304 1.519 763 65 
 172 
 
t348 2.4029 0.039 63 2.4835 0.0716 2.34 2.627 127 85 
t349 2.1793 0.0428 102 2.0727 0.0786 1.916 2.23 181 79 
t350 1.8926 0.0376 127 1.5461 0.069 1.408 1.684 427 67 
t351 1.6952 0.074 50 1.1837 0.136 0.912 1.456 147 60 
t352 2.3882 0.0064 660 2.4565 0.0118 2.433 2.48 4,105 86 
t353 2.3892 0.0059 713 2.4583 0.0107 2.437 2.48 4,897 86 
t354 1.796 0.0639 59 1.3688 0.1174 1.134 1.604 167 64 
t355 2.4199 0.0068 603 2.5146 0.0125 2.49 2.54 3,287 87 
t356 2.2722 0.0117 333 2.2435 0.0214 2.201 2.286 1,834 81 
t357 2.5919 0.0083 296 2.8306 0.0152 2.8 2.861 1,139 92 
t358 2.3524 0.0064 734 2.3908 0.0118 2.367 2.414 4,773 84 
t359 2.242 0.025 198 2.1881 0.0459 2.096 2.28 489 80 
t360 2.4677 0.0071 493 2.6025 0.013 2.577 2.628 2,499 90 
t361 2.0409 0.0586 81 1.8186 0.1077 1.603 2.034 131 73 
t362 2.6167 0.0077 294 2.8762 0.0142 2.848 2.905 1,034 93 
t363 2.5216 0.0055 636 2.7014 0.0102 2.681 2.722 3,363 90 
t364 2.4545 0.0064 648 2.5782 0.0118 2.555 2.602 3,298 88 
t365 2.5566 0.008 362 2.7657 0.0148 2.736 2.795 1,344 91 
t366 2.3185 0.0139 338 2.3285 0.0255 2.277 2.38 1,227 82 
t367 2.4082 0.0053 850 2.4932 0.0097 2.474 2.513 5,884 86 
t368 2.1472 0.0042 1,473 2.0139 0.0078 1.998 2.03 20,746 76 
 173 
 
t369 2.3594 0.0065 604 2.4036 0.012 2.38 2.428 4,312 85 
 
Table 10: William J. Clinton Document Analysis Results (SCALE B) 
 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 0.3823 0.0241 132 -1.0302 0.2403 -1.5109 -0.5495 264 100 
t2 0.698 0.1207 73 2.1242 1.2061 -0.288 4.5363 122 88 
t3 0.4388 0.0149 474 -0.4656 0.1484 -0.7624 -0.1688 1,445 100 
t4 0.4539 0.0215 349 -0.3144 0.2147 -0.7438 0.1149 1,155 94 
t5 0.4333 0.0752 63 -0.521 0.7518 -2.0247 0.9827 139 63 
t6 0.5112 0.0204 583 0.2574 0.2039 -0.1505 0.6652 1,417 100 
t7 0.4113 0.04 176 -0.7403 0.4001 -1.5405 0.0598 349 86 
t8 0.4942 0.0154 550 0.0883 0.1536 -0.2189 0.3955 2,626 94 
t9 0.4712 0.0173 443 -0.1419 0.1726 -0.4871 0.2033 1,976 92 
t10 0.3807 0.0389 98 -1.0463 0.3886 -1.8235 -0.269 280 76 
t11 0.5126 0.0165 914 0.2716 0.1652 -0.0589 0.6021 2,654 100 
t12 0.4894 0.016 607 0.0399 0.1595 -0.2792 0.359 2,392 89 
 174 
 
t13 0.5 0.1173 56 0.1457 1.1725 -2.1993 2.4906 82 92 
t14 0.4984 0.0254 340 0.1302 0.2541 -0.378 0.6384 875 91 
t15 0.5572 0.0418 247 0.7169 0.4172 -0.1175 1.5512 722 87 
t16 0.4459 0.011 764 -0.3946 0.1096 -0.6138 -0.1754 4,085 91 
t17 0.581 0.0888 103 0.9551 0.887 -0.8189 2.7292 199 85 
t18 0.5289 0.0922 57 0.4343 0.9214 -1.4085 2.2771 79 90 
t19 0.4708 0.031 291 -0.1455 0.3101 -0.7658 0.4747 743 80 
t20 0.5246 0.0168 753 0.3916 0.1678 0.056 0.7272 2,830 89 
t21 0.3629 0.0312 194 -1.2241 0.3113 -1.8467 -0.6016 335 100 
t22 0.6311 0.032 353 1.456 0.3197 0.8166 2.0954 933 91 
t23 0.4637 0.0159 626 -0.2168 0.159 -0.5347 0.1012 2,214 87 
t24 0.4207 0.0337 268 -0.6467 0.3367 -1.3201 0.0267 706 84 
t25 0.4779 0.0213 473 -0.075 0.2127 -0.5004 0.3505 1,593 89 
t26 0.4364 0.0534 174 -0.49 0.5335 -1.5569 0.577 380 77 
t27 0.4722 0.0118 688 -0.1315 0.1181 -0.3677 0.1048 3,533 93 
t28 0.4697 0.0235 438 -0.1564 0.2345 -0.6254 0.3125 922 100 
t29 0.5707 0.0396 266 0.8518 0.3952 0.0613 1.6423 647 92 
t30 0.4901 0.0475 214 0.0474 0.4748 -0.9023 0.997 508 83 
t31 0.5904 0.0363 251 1.0489 0.3628 0.3232 1.7745 744 84 
t32 0.6314 0.0579 114 1.4591 0.5787 0.3016 2.6166 250 87 
t33 0.5902 0.116 60 1.0468 1.1592 -1.2716 3.3653 98 90 
 175 
 
t34 0.3801 0.0357 85 -1.052 0.3566 -1.7652 -0.3388 128 100 
t35 0.5259 0.0351 304 0.4044 0.3507 -0.297 1.1058 734 89 
t36 0.495 0.0112 853 0.0956 0.112 -0.1284 0.3195 5,336 91 
t37 0.3994 0.0258 181 -0.8595 0.2575 -1.3745 -0.3445 415 92 
t38 0.496 0.0516 134 0.1059 0.5158 -0.9258 1.1375 249 87 
t39 0.4948 0.0104 812 0.094 0.1038 -0.1136 0.3016 5,906 93 
t40 0.5458 0.0157 579 0.6031 0.1573 0.2885 0.9177 2,971 92 
t41 0.4864 0.0158 518 0.0101 0.1581 -0.3061 0.3263 2,328 94 
t42 0.4613 0.0155 472 -0.2413 0.1551 -0.5515 0.0689 2,055 93 
t43 0.5266 0.0476 148 0.4118 0.4753 -0.5388 1.3625 341 87 
t44 0.6324 0.0206 626 1.4692 0.2062 1.0567 1.8816 2,778 91 
t45 0.5156 0.0414 186 0.3019 0.4133 -0.5247 1.1285 471 85 
t46 0.5521 0.0294 312 0.6668 0.2937 0.0795 1.2541 917 93 
t47 0.5328 0.0173 588 0.4736 0.173 0.1275 0.8197 2,911 92 
t48 0.6697 0.0372 276 1.8411 0.3717 1.0977 2.5845 802 88 
t49 0.5064 0.0127 741 0.2096 0.1271 -0.0445 0.4637 4,543 91 
t50 0.6549 0.0315 401 1.6936 0.3143 1.0651 2.3222 1,170 89 
t51 0.523 0.0221 517 0.3754 0.2207 -0.0661 0.8168 1,732 86 
t52 0.4356 0.0483 108 -0.4978 0.4829 -1.4637 0.4681 204 82 
t53 0.4996 0.0107 1,084 0.1415 0.1069 -0.0724 0.3554 5,179 100 
t54 0.491 0.0227 457 0.0563 0.2273 -0.3982 0.5109 1,428 85 
 176 
 
t55 0.502 0.0158 611 0.1655 0.1576 -0.1497 0.4806 2,888 93 
t56 0.5348 0.0837 106 0.4937 0.8364 -1.1791 2.1664 162 92 
t57 0.4522 0.0184 395 -0.3313 0.1842 -0.6997 0.037 1,517 94 
t58 0.5066 0.0124 785 0.2113 0.1239 -0.0365 0.4592 4,872 91 
t59 0.7361 0.061 184 2.5045 0.61 1.2846 3.7244 375 91 
t60 0.6501 0.027 520 1.6451 0.2698 1.1055 2.1847 1,746 88 
t61 0.5831 0.018 580 0.9757 0.1796 0.6166 1.3348 2,616 92 
t62 0.4709 0.0308 251 -0.1454 0.3077 -0.7608 0.47 719 94 
t63 0.5639 0.0174 602 0.7847 0.1737 0.4372 1.1321 2,591 93 
t64 0.6218 0.0349 323 1.363 0.3484 0.6661 2.0598 617 100 
t65 0.5843 0.0343 242 0.9879 0.3427 0.3025 1.6732 558 90 
t66 0.5548 0.0139 794 0.6933 0.1387 0.4159 0.9707 4,185 92 
t67 0.5309 0.0353 266 0.4549 0.3523 -0.2496 1.1594 781 91 
t68 0.4097 0.0195 270 -0.7565 0.1953 -1.1472 -0.3659 873 94 
t69 0.3603 0.064 58 -1.2499 0.6396 -2.5291 0.0294 105 67 
t70 0.6401 0.0239 628 1.5452 0.2386 1.068 2.0224 1,684 100 
t71 0.7073 0.0492 283 2.2171 0.4914 1.2344 3.1998 669 90 
t72 0.446 0.0302 234 -0.3938 0.302 -0.9977 0.2102 615 84 
t73 0.4015 0.0404 95 -0.8388 0.4032 -1.6453 -0.0324 200 80 
t74 0.5719 0.0276 402 0.8639 0.2753 0.3132 1.4145 1,180 90 
t75 0.7547 0.1414 49 2.6909 1.4126 -0.1343 5.5161 73 86 
 177 
 
t76 0.4582 0.0105 829 -0.2721 0.1054 -0.4829 -0.0613 5,130 91 
t77 0.5063 0.0775 95 0.2088 0.7746 -1.3404 1.758 196 81 
t78 0.6415 0.0433 222 1.5596 0.4323 0.6951 2.4242 598 90 
t79 0.6072 0.0382 247 1.2166 0.3814 0.4538 1.9794 781 91 
t80 0.4374 0.031 199 -0.4801 0.3097 -1.0995 0.1393 369 100 
t81 0.5633 0.0286 458 0.7787 0.2859 0.207 1.3505 1,307 89 
t82 0.6606 0.0388 264 1.7503 0.3874 0.9755 2.525 784 95 
t83 0.3733 0.0236 255 -1.1205 0.2358 -1.5921 -0.6489 774 73 
t84 0.5868 0.0265 306 1.0126 0.2648 0.4829 1.5423 1,077 95 
t85 2.8675 0.1166 333 23.8004 1.1654 21.4696 26.1312 693 100 
t86 0.4791 0.0551 91 -0.0631 0.5501 -1.1633 1.0372 150 100 
t87 0.4791 0.0551 91 -0.0631 0.5501 -1.1633 1.0372 150 100 
t88 0.5263 0.0266 253 0.4086 0.2654 -0.1221 0.9393 734 96 
t89 0.5359 0.0121 1,024 0.5049 0.1205 0.2638 0.746 5,983 90 
t90 0.471 0.015 909 -0.1438 0.1501 -0.444 0.1563 2,765 100 
t91 0.4605 0.0146 782 -0.2487 0.1456 -0.54 0.0426 2,724 93 
t92 1.052 0.2563 46 5.6611 2.5608 0.5395 10.7826 76 84 
t93 0.4262 0.0114 987 -0.5913 0.1138 -0.819 -0.3637 3,157 100 
t94 0.5632 0.0419 234 0.7778 0.4186 -0.0593 1.6149 626 91 
t95 0.3216 0.0289 68 -1.6371 0.2892 -2.2155 -1.0586 185 67 
t96 0.5077 0.0338 255 0.2232 0.3382 -0.4531 0.8996 774 91 
 178 
 
t97 0.4361 0.0135 707 -0.4931 0.1346 -0.7623 -0.2239 2,962 87 
t98 0.5235 0.0134 867 0.3808 0.1335 0.1137 0.6478 4,261 90 
t99 0.4998 0.0301 260 0.1442 0.3004 -0.4566 0.745 680 100 
t100 0.5825 0.1059 40 0.9698 1.0583 -1.1468 3.0864 61 81 
t101 0.3684 0.0469 111 -1.1688 0.4688 -2.1064 -0.2312 233 80 
t102 0.4633 0.0294 274 -0.2214 0.2939 -0.8092 0.3665 923 89 
t103 0.4331 0.0746 76 -0.5221 0.7452 -2.0126 0.9684 147 74 
t104 0.5249 0.0503 177 0.3942 0.5021 -0.6101 1.3984 327 90 
t105 0.4815 0.0336 278 -0.0395 0.3357 -0.7108 0.6319 826 87 
 
Table 11: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A) 
 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 1.4613 0.065 59 2.3836 0.4958 1.392 3.3753 166 63 
t2 1.352 0.0699 50 1.5486 0.5335 0.4817 2.6156 97 70 
t3 1.3674 0.0298 143 1.6663 0.2273 1.2117 2.121 855 59 
t4 1.3555 0.0323 120 1.5754 0.2465 1.0823 2.0684 720 59 
 179 
 
t5 0.9647 0.0786 40 -1.4076 0.5998 -2.6072 -0.208 107 48 
t6 1.3293 0.0308 172 1.3757 0.2348 0.906 1.8454 820 58 
t7 1.1905 0.0596 76 0.3158 0.4548 -0.5937 1.2254 220 54 
t8 1.3967 0.0211 179 1.8898 0.1612 1.5674 2.2123 1,679 60 
t9 1.3568 0.0244 152 1.5858 0.1861 1.2137 1.9579 1,266 59 
t10 1.0284 0.0541 43 -0.9211 0.413 -1.7471 
-
0.0951 195 53 
t11 1.3211 0.0229 210 1.3131 0.1748 0.9635 1.6626 1,518 57 
t12 1.3186 0.0223 195 1.2941 0.1705 0.953 1.6352 1,541 58 
t13 1.2526 0.1006 32 0.7898 0.7683 -0.7469 2.3264 57 64 
t14 1.3292 0.0356 129 1.3747 0.272 0.8307 1.9186 566 59 
t15 1.2477 0.0266 155 0.7524 0.2032 0.3461 1.1587 609 73 
t16 1.3149 0.0174 210 1.2658 0.1326 1.0006 1.5311 2,568 57 
t17 1.2374 0.0743 49 0.6743 0.5673 -0.4603 1.8089 131 56 
t18 1.2711 0.1064 34 0.9313 0.8118 -0.6924 2.555 56 64 
t19 1.1486 0.0401 118 -0.0037 0.3063 -0.6164 0.6089 483 52 
t20 1.3103 0.021 224 1.2305 0.1606 0.9093 1.5518 1,794 56 
t21 1.1081 0.0691 66 -0.3128 0.5273 -1.3675 0.7418 169 50 
t22 1.5015 0.0315 168 2.6902 0.2403 2.2097 3.1708 673 66 
t23 1.2574 0.0241 195 0.8272 0.1839 0.4595 1.1949 1,385 55 
t24 1.0291 0.0445 101 -0.9156 0.34 -1.5957 
-
0.2355 399 48 
 180 
 
t25 1.3037 0.0279 162 1.1803 0.2129 0.7545 1.6061 1,013 56 
t26 1.0793 0.0555 78 -0.533 0.4236 -1.3803 0.3143 248 50 
t27 1.3608 0.0182 203 1.6158 0.1386 1.3386 1.8929 2,269 60 
t28 1.2706 0.0398 118 0.9278 0.3038 0.3202 1.5355 503 55 
t29 1.3913 0.043 108 1.8489 0.3281 1.1927 2.5051 413 59 
t30 1.1789 0.0491 90 0.2273 0.3747 -0.522 0.9767 324 53 
t31 1.3377 0.0341 110 1.4398 0.2599 0.9199 1.9597 552 63 
t32 1.4354 0.0544 67 2.1854 0.4155 1.3544 3.0164 194 67 
t33 1.1834 0.0913 31 0.2619 0.6969 -1.1319 1.6557 66 61 
t34 1.2164 0.0964 36 0.514 0.7357 -0.9574 1.9854 72 56 
t35 1.2974 0.0415 123 1.132 0.3166 0.4988 1.7652 464 57 
t36 1.3911 0.0147 235 1.8473 0.1122 1.6228 2.0717 3,502 60 
t37 1.293 0.057 70 1.0985 0.4352 0.2281 1.9689 247 55 
t38 1.1921 0.0702 67 0.3281 0.5358 -0.7435 1.3997 156 55 
t39 1.4048 0.0135 244 1.9523 0.1028 1.7467 2.1579 3,957 62 
t40 1.3958 0.0191 191 1.8833 0.1455 1.5923 2.1743 1,977 61 
t41 1.3949 0.0222 179 1.8761 0.1698 1.5366 2.2157 1,505 61 
t42 1.366 0.0245 158 1.6559 0.1872 1.2815 2.0303 1,296 59 
t43 1.3648 0.0512 77 1.6463 0.3906 0.8651 2.4276 252 64 
t44 1.4332 0.0193 221 2.1689 0.1475 1.8739 2.4639 1,898 62 
t45 1.2997 0.0453 81 1.1494 0.3457 0.458 1.8408 330 60 
 181 
 
t46 1.5245 0.0332 132 2.8655 0.2536 2.3582 3.3728 635 64 
t47 1.4429 0.0196 187 2.2426 0.1495 1.9437 2.5415 1,935 61 
t48 1.5078 0.031 137 2.7383 0.2365 2.2652 3.2114 627 69 
t49 1.3573 0.0162 213 1.5894 0.1239 1.3416 1.8371 2,908 59 
t50 1.4261 0.0278 160 2.1149 0.2124 1.6901 2.5397 843 64 
t51 1.2583 0.0268 173 0.8334 0.2049 0.4237 1.2431 1,102 55 
t52 1.1574 0.0706 54 0.0637 0.5391 -1.0145 1.1419 140 56 
t53 1.3988 0.0153 240 1.9062 0.1169 1.6724 2.1399 3,159 61 
t54 1.275 0.0293 152 0.9613 0.2236 0.5141 1.4086 921 55 
t55 1.3891 0.0193 210 1.8321 0.1472 1.5378 2.1264 1,924 62 
t56 1.2703 0.0763 59 0.9254 0.5826 -0.2399 2.0907 111 63 
t57 1.3274 0.0284 143 1.3612 0.2168 0.9275 1.7949 946 59 
t58 1.3632 0.0157 242 1.6347 0.1195 1.3956 1.8738 3,152 59 
t59 1.5005 0.0495 100 2.6826 0.3778 1.927 3.4382 272 66 
t60 1.3987 0.0245 200 1.9054 0.1871 1.5312 2.2796 1,201 61 
t61 1.4593 0.0194 212 2.3683 0.1478 2.0728 2.6638 1,815 64 
t62 1.3929 0.0412 107 1.861 0.3147 1.2316 2.4903 459 60 
t63 1.4821 0.0197 202 2.5424 0.1503 2.2419 2.843 1,788 64 
t64 1.4919 0.0426 135 2.6171 0.3252 1.9667 3.2676 392 64 
t65 1.4437 0.0431 107 2.249 0.3292 1.5905 2.9074 383 62 
t66 1.4399 0.0155 256 2.2196 0.1181 1.9835 2.4557 2,902 64 
 182 
 
t67 1.4203 0.0391 113 2.0707 0.2985 1.4737 2.6676 513 60 
t68 1.3125 0.0378 106 1.2475 0.2886 0.6703 1.8247 538 58 
t69 0.8823 0.1016 29 -2.0364 0.7754 -3.5872 
-
0.4855 69 44 
t70 1.4637 0.0245 201 2.4016 0.1869 2.0278 2.7753 1,088 65 
t71 1.4763 0.0383 135 2.4976 0.2922 1.9131 3.0821 472 64 
t72 1.2421 0.0446 95 0.7097 0.3402 0.0294 1.39 398 54 
t73 1.0374 0.0753 47 -0.8524 0.5746 -2.0016 0.2969 126 50 
t74 1.4169 0.0305 157 2.0442 0.2327 1.5788 2.5095 798 61 
t75 1.508 0.0922 40 2.7401 0.7041 1.3319 4.1484 63 74 
t76 1.3312 0.0157 241 1.3899 0.1198 1.1502 1.6296 3,213 57 
t77 1.0598 0.0625 52 -0.6817 0.4772 -1.6361 0.2726 142 59 
t78 1.3588 0.0301 159 1.6008 0.2296 1.1417 2.0599 509 76 
t79 1.3276 0.0265 169 1.363 0.2027 0.9577 1.7683 646 76 
t80 1.2943 0.0579 77 1.1085 0.4417 0.2251 1.9919 215 58 
t81 1.2858 0.0324 153 1.0432 0.2475 0.5482 1.5382 795 54 
t82 1.4903 0.0364 123 2.6047 0.2779 2.0489 3.1605 529 64 
t83 1.0082 0.0347 116 -1.0753 0.2646 -1.6046 -0.546 550 52 
t84 1.5722 0.0299 139 3.2299 0.2285 2.773 3.6868 757 67 
t85 2.5773 0.0191 333 10.9029 0.1455 10.612 11.194 693 100 
t86 1.3449 0.0802 44 1.4949 0.6126 0.2698 2.7201 95 63 
t87 1.3449 0.0802 44 1.4949 0.6126 0.2698 2.7201 95 63 
 183 
 
t88 1.4928 0.0367 124 2.6239 0.28 2.0639 3.1839 510 67 
t89 1.3732 0.0138 265 1.7108 0.1052 1.5004 1.9211 3,970 59 
t90 1.2748 0.0224 190 0.9597 0.1712 0.6173 1.302 1,548 56 
t91 1.3017 0.0222 204 1.1648 0.1693 0.8263 1.5033 1,646 56 
t92 1.4108 0.0955 31 1.9977 0.7287 0.5404 3.455 60 67 
t93 1.2925 0.0216 188 1.0946 0.1649 0.7648 1.4243 1,755 56 
t94 1.2404 0.0289 152 0.6969 0.221 0.2549 1.1389 511 74 
t95 1.0195 0.0741 35 -0.989 0.5658 -2.1205 0.1425 134 49 
t96 1.297 0.0237 183 1.1292 0.181 0.7671 1.4912 681 80 
t97 1.2072 0.0213 201 0.4435 0.1623 0.119 0.7681 1,813 53 
t98 1.3823 0.0163 250 1.7804 0.1246 1.5311 2.0297 2,827 60 
t99 1.4227 0.0186 260 2.0883 0.1423 1.8037 2.3729 680 100 
t100 1.3167 0.1055 28 1.2798 0.8054 -0.3309 2.8905 48 64 
t101 1.019 0.0676 53 -0.9931 0.5158 -2.0247 0.0385 148 51 
t102 1.2034 0.022 171 0.4148 0.1679 0.0789 0.7507 782 75 
t103 1.0128 0.0807 37 -1.0403 0.6162 -2.2727 0.192 100 51 
t104 1.278 0.0634 75 0.9841 0.4839 0.0163 1.9519 199 55 
t105 1.1956 0.0255 169 0.3547 0.1947 -0.0346 0.744 675 71 
 
Table 12: George Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B) 
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Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 2.938 0.1042 121 -2.5287 1.1327 -4.7942 -0.2632 348 84.1 
t2 3.5142 0.0901 245 3.7378 0.9802 1.7773 5.6983 538 89.8 
t3 2.8739 0.0177 723 -3.2253 0.1922 -3.6097 -2.8409 10,987 76.8 
t4 3.4146 0.0243 1,004 2.6545 0.2642 2.1261 3.183 5,414 91.9 
t5 3.3108 0.0601 469 1.5262 0.6533 0.2196 2.8328 1,519 85.9 
t6 3.1322 0.0161 921 -0.4161 0.1755 -0.7671 -0.0651 8,155 86.3 
t7 3.4523 0.0397 485 3.0647 0.4316 2.2014 3.928 1,816 90.7 
t8 3.6267 0.0199 1,097 4.9615 0.2164 4.5287 5.3943 6,765 94.1 
t9 3.0815 0.0556 344 -0.9675 0.6049 -2.1774 0.2424 1,352 81.1 
t10 3.3032 0.0836 204 1.4436 0.9093 -0.375 3.2623 435 89.3 
t11 3.4743 0.0238 919 3.3044 0.2584 2.7875 3.8213 4,848 93.6 
t12 3.1793 0.0445 446 0.0964 0.4838 -0.8712 1.0639 1,544 90.8 
t13 4.1331 0.3123 47 10.4686 3.3959 3.6767 17.2605 57 81.4 
t14 3.4117 0.065 311 2.6226 0.7068 1.2089 4.0362 840 92.5 
t15 3.6558 0.0734 175 5.2779 0.7985 3.6809 6.8749 472 94.6 
t16 3.7091 0.0459 424 5.8573 0.4989 4.8594 6.8552 1,394 95.5 
t17 3.3989 0.018 1,260 2.4843 0.1956 2.0931 2.8754 7,654 100 
t18 3.5164 0.0178 1,201 3.7621 0.1933 3.3755 4.1487 8,052 94.8 
t19 3.5809 0.0226 958 4.4636 0.2462 3.9712 4.956 5,480 94.2 
 185 
 
t20 2.9694 0.1356 106 -2.187 1.4748 -5.1366 0.7626 225 84.3 
t21 3.196 0.0462 532 0.2778 0.5026 -0.7274 1.283 1,697 90.8 
t22 3.1246 0.04 639 -0.4992 0.4351 -1.3693 0.3709 2,271 90 
t23 3.3019 0.0217 1,157 1.4291 0.2357 0.9576 1.9006 5,595 100 
t24 3.4117 0.065 311 2.6226 0.7068 1.2089 4.0362 840 92.5 
t25 3.4946 0.1163 173 3.5243 1.2645 0.9954 6.0532 335 87 
t26 3.5596 0.0501 386 4.2316 0.5449 3.1419 5.3214 1,188 91.9 
t27 2.7322 0.1258 110 -4.7658 1.3676 -7.501 -2.0306 269 77.7 
t28 3.3923 0.0209 1,191 2.4126 0.2269 1.9589 2.8664 7,110 92.8 
t29 3.6583 0.0346 740 5.3052 0.3757 4.5537 6.0567 2,944 93.3 
t30 2.7993 0.0571 309 -4.037 0.621 -5.279 -2.7951 1,315 76.5 
t31 3.634 0.0225 787 5.0409 0.2452 4.5505 5.5314 5,329 92.1 
t32 3.5165 0.0725 338 3.7629 0.7888 2.1853 5.3405 912 88.7 
t33 3.4662 0.2281 83 3.2155 2.4809 -1.7463 8.1772 123 82 
t34 3.5926 0.0198 1,134 4.5901 0.2153 4.1595 5.0208 6,693 94.1 
t35 3.1948 0.0674 179 0.2645 0.7327 -1.2009 1.73 478 93 
t36 3.4274 0.2366 80 2.7941 2.5725 -2.3509 7.9391 123 82 
t37 3.5889 0.0197 1,089 4.5505 0.2145 4.1214 4.9796 6,732 95.6 
t38 3.5074 0.0388 490 3.6635 0.4224 2.8186 4.5084 1,625 94.1 
t39 3.2486 0.0378 812 0.849 0.4108 0.0274 1.6706 2,730 89.7 
t40 3.2447 0.0348 805 0.807 0.3786 0.0499 1.5642 2,983 90.3 
t41 3.7001 0.0227 1,030 5.7596 0.2472 5.2652 6.2539 5,711 94.1 
t42 3.5681 0.2372 81 4.3239 2.5793 -0.8348 9.4825 120 83.3 
 186 
 
t43 3.6378 0.077 141 5.0818 0.837 3.4079 6.7557 340 93.4 
t44 4.8754 0.0359 855 18.5407 0.3901 17.7606 19.3209 3,440 100 
t45 3.6604 0.0275 799 5.3274 0.2988 4.7297 5.925 4,072 95.6 
t46 3.8849 0.025 1,019 7.7688 0.2721 7.2246 8.313 6,048 95.3 
t47 2.9645 0.0709 329 -2.2398 0.7715 -3.7827 -0.6968 955 81.7 
t48 3.7923 0.0407 510 6.7619 0.4424 5.8772 7.6467 1,879 95.2 
t49 3.2827 0.0849 202 1.2198 0.9237 -0.6276 3.0672 453 91.1 
t50 3.6719 0.0206 1,099 5.4524 0.2244 5.0037 5.9011 7,008 96 
t51 3.5271 0.0548 324 3.8777 0.5957 2.6863 5.0691 1,139 88.4 
t52 3.4196 0.0424 516 2.7087 0.461 1.7867 3.6307 1,645 92.6 
t53 3.6317 0.0219 964 5.0161 0.2377 4.5407 5.4915 5,590 94.6 
t54 3.7152 0.1075 150 5.9234 1.1691 3.5853 8.2616 319 94.1 
t55 4.5039 0.0231 1,359 14.5009 0.2514 13.9982 15.0037 7,056 100 
t56 3.5322 0.0198 1,030 3.9335 0.2155 3.5026 4.3644 7,258 94.9 
t57 3.7401 0.0195 1,123 6.1948 0.2119 5.771 6.6187 7,757 95.3 
t58 7.2273 0.2392 74 44.1164 2.6016 38.9132 49.3196 107 100 
t59 3.7268 0.02 1,055 6.0493 0.2178 5.6136 6.4849 6,439 96.1 
t60 3.7419 0.0189 1,028 6.2135 0.205 5.8035 6.6235 7,753 95.9 
t61 3.7243 0.0214 1,011 6.0228 0.2331 5.5566 6.4889 6,016 95.6 
t62 3.0859 0.0171 724 -0.9195 0.1856 -1.2908 -0.5483 6,803 85.9 
t63 3.6224 0.019 1,148 4.9147 0.2065 4.5017 5.3277 7,930 95.1 
t64 3.7106 0.2194 89 5.8733 2.3858 1.1017 10.6449 130 85 
t65 3.4481 0.0514 408 3.019 0.5595 1.9 4.138 1,142 91.2 
 187 
 
t66 3.6246 0.0205 1,103 4.9389 0.2227 4.4936 5.3842 6,763 94.5 
t67 3.5629 0.0205 1,145 4.2675 0.2235 3.8206 4.7145 6,936 95.2 
t68 3.5553 0.0196 1,146 4.185 0.2134 3.7581 4.6119 7,077 94 
t69 3.7023 0.0212 1,082 5.7831 0.2303 5.3226 6.2436 6,372 95.6 
t70 3.5241 0.0491 389 3.8455 0.5341 2.7773 4.9138 1,159 92.7 
t71 3.7399 0.0388 574 6.1921 0.4223 5.3474 7.0368 2,360 93.7 
t72 3.6793 0.0185 1,241 5.5328 0.2013 5.1302 5.9354 8,390 95.1 
t73 3.6228 0.02 1,170 4.9192 0.2172 4.4847 5.3537 7,693 94.5 
t74 3.6215 0.025 881 4.9042 0.2719 4.3604 5.4479 4,643 93.5 
t75 3.5596 0.0458 521 4.2316 0.498 3.2356 5.2276 1,602 93.2 
t76 3.6117 0.021 1,079 4.7979 0.2286 4.3407 5.2552 6,247 94.2 
t77 2.74 0.102 154 -4.6811 1.1094 -6.9 -2.4623 270 100 
t78 3.0492 0.1661 106 -1.319 1.8066 -4.9322 2.2942 176 93.1 
t79 3.6096 0.0213 1,033 4.7757 0.2311 4.3135 5.2379 6,020 94.5 
t80 3.4916 0.0439 496 3.4919 0.4779 2.536 4.4477 1,668 92.1 
t81 3.6663 0.0219 931 5.3922 0.2386 4.915 5.8693 5,549 95.2 
t82 3.5939 0.0308 568 4.604 0.3349 3.9343 5.2738 2,479 93.5 
t83 3.6495 0.0191 1,051 5.2094 0.2081 4.7932 5.6255 6,796 95.1 
t84 2.9652 0.1815 43 -2.2329 1.9732 -6.1793 1.7136 119 80.4 
t85 2.9652 0.1815 43 -2.2329 1.9732 -6.1793 1.7136 119 80.4 
t86 3.5587 0.0211 1,022 4.2213 0.2295 3.7624 4.6803 5,909 93.7 
t87 3.5789 0.0196 1,039 4.4417 0.2129 4.016 4.8675 6,730 94.3 
t88 3.5601 0.0199 1,082 4.2373 0.2166 3.804 4.6705 6,842 94.9 
 188 
 
t89 3.4697 0.0212 1,020 3.2539 0.2301 2.7938 3.714 6,452 93.4 
t90 3.5818 0.0199 1,112 4.4726 0.2169 4.0389 4.9063 6,647 94.4 
t91 3.5182 0.0177 1,153 3.7818 0.1927 3.3963 4.1673 8,424 94.2 
t92 3.534 0.0193 1,063 3.9535 0.2094 3.5346 4.3724 6,706 95.2 
t93 3.5796 0.0188 1,066 4.4488 0.2048 4.0392 4.8583 7,291 95.7 
t94 3.6555 0.0179 1,143 5.2749 0.1942 4.8864 5.6633 7,971 95 
t95 3.6343 0.0184 1,145 5.0436 0.1997 4.6441 5.4431 7,730 95.3 
t96 3.6473 0.0187 1,145 5.1849 0.2038 4.7774 5.5924 7,506 95.1 
t97 3.644 0.0184 1,186 5.1495 0.1997 4.7501 5.549 7,789 95.5 
t98 3.288 0.0422 418 1.2778 0.4592 0.3594 2.1963 1,488 92.3 
t99 3.6451 0.0188 1,126 5.1617 0.2045 4.7528 5.5707 7,777 95.3 
t100 3.5288 0.0182 1,172 3.8967 0.1978 3.5012 4.2923 7,855 94.2 
t101 3.4933 0.0276 764 3.5106 0.3006 2.9093 4.1119 3,722 94.2 
t102 3.5969 0.0187 1,097 4.6367 0.2028 4.2311 5.0424 7,121 94.9 
t103 3.59 0.0228 856 4.5625 0.2475 4.0675 5.0575 4,667 94.5 
t104 3.6153 0.0179 1,098 4.8378 0.1951 4.4476 5.228 7,569 95.2 
t105 3.2648 0.076 217 1.0256 0.8265 -0.6275 2.6786 646 88.4 
t106 2.9238 0.0815 247 -2.683 0.8859 -4.4548 -0.9113 531 89.4 
t107 3.5297 0.0242 789 3.9063 0.2631 3.3802 4.4325 4,116 94.5 
t108 3.5477 0.0163 1,176 4.102 0.1767 3.7485 4.4555 8,809 95.4 
t109 3.5403 0.0176 1,091 4.0221 0.1918 3.6385 4.4057 7,631 95.5 
t110 3.4957 0.0233 981 3.5371 0.2532 3.0307 4.0435 5,129 94.2 
t111 3.5837 0.0177 1,141 4.494 0.1922 4.1096 4.8784 7,759 95.9 
 189 
 
t112 3.5842 0.0189 1,099 4.4994 0.2057 4.0881 4.9107 7,061 95.3 
t113 3.279 0.1168 139 1.1796 1.2707 -1.3618 3.7209 278 85.5 
t114 3.3753 0.0182 1,174 2.2274 0.1981 1.8312 2.6236 7,735 91.2 
t115 3.0568 0.2174 53 -1.2364 2.3646 -5.9655 3.4928 72 93.5 
t116 3.7773 0.2911 31 6.5987 3.1654 0.2679 12.9296 45 86.5 
t117 3.6063 0.0611 349 4.7395 0.6645 3.4104 6.0685 960 94 
t118 3.1846 0.0393 671 0.1539 0.4278 -0.7018 1.0095 2,197 91.4 
t119 3.5514 0.0193 1,170 4.1427 0.2095 3.7236 4.5617 7,393 95 
t120 3.5615 0.0191 1,170 4.2524 0.2077 3.837 4.6678 7,477 95 
t121 3.5055 0.2129 89 3.6435 2.315 -0.9865 8.2735 138 85.2 
t122 3.6667 0.0374 621 5.3964 0.4069 4.5826 6.2101 2,394 94.3 
t123 3.3966 0.0672 388 2.4585 0.7311 0.9964 3.9206 1,201 85.2 
t124 3.4595 0.0441 665 3.1424 0.4792 2.1841 4.1008 2,007 91.9 
t125 3.7542 0.0219 919 6.3475 0.2382 5.8712 6.8238 6,715 96 
t126 3.4496 0.1323 102 3.0354 1.4387 0.1581 5.9127 265 87.2 
t127 2.9658 0.09 149 -2.2256 0.9784 -4.1824 -0.2688 521 81.9 
t128 3.7477 0.0222 1,002 6.2769 0.2416 5.7938 6.76 6,632 96 
t129 3.7969 0.0206 966 6.8125 0.2241 6.3643 7.2608 7,116 95.7 
t130 3.7228 0.0184 951 6.0061 0.1997 5.6068 6.4054 8,570 94.8 
t131 3.8397 0.0233 904 7.2774 0.2529 6.7715 7.7833 5,742 95.7 
t132 3.8294 0.0235 951 7.1653 0.2555 6.6542 7.6764 5,920 94.9 
t133 3.1342 0.0338 832 -0.395 0.368 -1.1311 0.3411 3,188 91 
t134 3.1843 0.0702 375 0.1507 0.7637 -1.3767 1.6781 1,025 86.4 
 190 
 
t135 3.1647 0.0904 246 -0.0631 0.9829 -2.0288 1.9026 545 92.7 
t136 3.0894 0.2413 90 -0.8817 2.6239 -6.1295 4.3661 117 93.6 
t137 3.1289 0.042 477 -0.4521 0.4571 -1.3664 0.4621 1,342 100 
t138 3.4008 0.051 326 2.5043 0.5548 1.3947 3.6138 1,027 96.3 
t139 3.8137 0.0272 813 6.9948 0.2961 6.4027 7.5869 4,412 96.1 
t140 3.2807 0.0273 889 1.1981 0.2967 0.6047 1.7914 3,908 100 
t141 3.4364 0.0257 866 2.8922 0.2793 2.3336 3.4508 4,358 94.6 
t142 3.5599 0.0929 200 4.2349 1.0102 2.2145 6.2552 418 95.7 
t143 3.4978 0.0428 414 3.5592 0.4652 2.6288 4.4897 1,514 94.9 
t144 3.3363 0.0477 413 1.8034 0.5188 0.7659 2.841 1,424 92.7 
t145 3.081 0.0754 237 -0.9733 0.82 -2.6134 0.6667 557 87.7 
t146 3.1623 0.0409 559 -0.0895 0.4448 -0.9791 0.8002 1,919 91.4 
t147 3.4424 0.0457 474 2.957 0.4972 1.9625 3.9515 1,569 94.5 
t148 3.2393 0.0483 435 0.7478 0.5249 -0.302 1.7977 1,426 90.8 
t149 3.43 0.0282 603 2.8218 0.3068 2.2083 3.4354 2,964 91.6 
t150 2.6496 0.119 159 -5.6648 1.2942 -8.2532 -3.0764 323 79.4 
t151 4.3665 0.3363 43 13.0068 3.6569 5.693 20.3205 52 91.2 
t152 3.8993 0.0933 201 7.926 1.0141 5.8977 9.9543 400 94.6 
t153 3.4777 0.0282 668 3.341 0.3064 2.7282 3.9539 3,305 94.2 
t154 3.9534 0.0273 807 8.5145 0.2973 7.9199 9.1091 4,401 96.4 
t155 3.8135 0.0257 855 6.9927 0.2795 6.4338 7.5516 5,184 94.8 
t156 3.7501 0.0255 877 6.3036 0.2778 5.7479 6.8593 4,983 95 
t157 3.1464 0.3025 34 -0.2622 3.2898 -6.8418 6.3174 44 78.6 
 191 
 
t158 3.6776 0.0549 331 5.515 0.5969 4.3212 6.7087 948 94.1 
t159 3.2259 0.0368 616 0.6026 0.4004 -0.1982 1.4033 2,214 91.6 
t160 3.8611 0.0222 909 7.5101 0.2413 7.0275 7.9928 6,382 96.9 
t161 2.8887 0.0377 824 -3.0639 0.4096 -3.883 -2.2447 2,333 100 
t162 4.1038 0.1719 100 10.149 1.8694 6.4102 13.8878 186 88.6 
t163 3.4188 0.0182 1,288 2.7001 0.1984 2.3033 3.0968 8,418 92.9 
t164 3.6344 0.1361 135 5.0447 1.4795 2.0857 8.0038 253 88.2 
t165 4.0294 0.2198 73 9.3401 2.3898 4.5605 14.1197 122 93.1 
t166 3.5945 0.0438 431 4.6105 0.4765 3.6574 5.5636 1,536 94.7 
t167 3.816 0.0238 891 7.0196 0.2588 6.5019 7.5373 5,671 94.3 
t168 3.8954 0.0227 890 7.8834 0.2464 7.3906 8.3763 6,188 95.9 
t169 3.4274 0.2132 87 2.7938 2.3186 -1.8435 7.4311 134 95 
t170 3.7869 0.0371 608 6.7038 0.4038 5.8962 7.5115 2,359 95.2 
t171 3.4857 0.0225 910 3.4278 0.2452 2.9373 3.9182 5,210 94.1 
t172 3.195 0.0317 910 0.2662 0.3446 -0.4229 0.9553 3,524 90.6 
t173 3.5372 0.201 62 3.9883 2.1857 -0.3831 8.3596 98 86.7 
t174 3.4966 0.0323 683 3.5466 0.3513 2.8441 4.2491 2,968 92.6 
t175 3.5262 0.0265 824 3.8681 0.2887 3.2907 4.4455 4,073 94.1 
t176 3.3326 0.0756 272 1.7628 0.8224 0.1181 3.4076 621 91.1 
t177 3.2968 0.0404 536 1.3737 0.4394 0.4948 2.2526 1,978 89.8 
t178 3.4927 0.0235 911 3.5039 0.2552 2.9934 4.0144 5,110 95.4 
t179 2.8602 0.0413 591 -3.374 0.4488 -4.2716 -2.4764 3,024 83.5 
t180 2.7728 0.0507 509 -4.3246 0.5516 -5.4279 -3.2214 1,985 82.5 
 192 
 
t181 3.0778 0.0982 187 -1.0076 1.0676 -3.1427 1.1276 448 88.2 
t182 3.2406 0.0751 334 0.7621 0.8166 -0.8711 2.3953 914 84.9 
t183 3.4216 0.0396 627 2.7313 0.4302 1.8709 3.5916 2,565 90.5 
t184 3.6141 0.0381 537 4.8246 0.4146 3.9953 5.6539 2,183 95.5 
t185 3.3864 0.0227 1,086 2.3478 0.2474 1.853 2.8425 5,714 93.3 
t186 3.3349 0.0732 331 1.7884 0.7963 0.1959 3.381 906 87.2 
t187 4.0253 0.2571 48 9.2958 2.7959 3.704 14.8876 71 89.9 
t188 3.6725 0.0272 693 5.4588 0.2956 4.8675 6.05 3,979 95.9 
t189 3.3901 0.0357 492 2.3882 0.3878 1.6127 3.1638 1,952 93.8 
t190 3.4945 0.0323 620 3.5239 0.3512 2.8215 4.2264 2,640 94.9 
t191 3.5801 0.0314 786 4.455 0.3409 3.7731 5.1368 3,430 92.7 
t192 3.4721 0.0873 258 3.2803 0.9494 1.3814 5.1792 617 94.2 
t193 3.6299 0.0346 558 4.9957 0.376 4.2437 5.7477 2,713 95.7 
t194 3.097 0.1128 160 -0.7996 1.2271 -3.2538 1.6545 293 94.2 
t195 3.2889 0.2004 91 1.2875 2.1792 -3.0709 5.6459 127 98.4 
t196 3.3104 0.1423 121 1.5216 1.5469 -1.5723 4.6155 213 97.3 
t197 3.797 0.0403 441 6.8127 0.4382 5.9362 7.6891 1,845 95.6 
t198 3.3821 0.0243 894 2.3017 0.2642 1.7733 2.83 4,687 94.6 
t199 3.4969 0.0225 828 3.55 0.2451 3.0598 4.0401 5,436 95.7 
t200 3.1457 0.1382 93 -0.2696 1.5032 -3.276 2.7368 204 79.7 
t201 3.377 0.031 479 2.2457 0.3375 1.5707 2.9207 2,385 92.8 
t202 3.2405 0.0357 744 0.7618 0.3885 -0.0153 1.5388 2,843 92.8 
t203 3.723 0.0205 1,020 6.0085 0.2231 5.5623 6.4547 6,992 95.6 
 193 
 
t204 3.6772 0.0226 982 5.5098 0.2462 5.0174 6.0023 6,011 94.7 
t205 3.2968 0.0162 1,835 1.3734 0.1767 1.0201 1.7267 15,737 88.2 
t206 3.8258 0.023 911 7.1267 0.2501 6.6266 7.6269 6,273 96 
t207 3.3099 0.022 1,403 1.5156 0.2393 1.0371 1.9942 6,331 100 
t208 3.057 0.0831 244 -1.2342 0.904 -3.0421 0.5738 619 79.9 
t209 2.8596 0.0718 276 -3.3807 0.7811 -4.943 -1.8184 628 87.1 
t210 3.8876 0.0229 988 7.7987 0.2493 7.3001 8.2972 6,004 95 
t211 4.7378 0.0297 1,047 17.0439 0.3233 16.3972 17.6906 4,776 100 
t212 3.8219 0.0232 987 7.0839 0.2523 6.5794 7.5884 6,032 95.1 
t213 3.3971 0.0361 894 2.4641 0.3927 1.6787 3.2495 3,273 92.7 
t214 3.0644 0.0416 600 -1.1532 0.4526 -2.0584 -0.248 1,959 91.2 
t215 3.1139 0.1881 70 -0.615 2.0455 -4.7059 3.476 101 90.2 
t216 3.1659 0.1255 115 -0.0494 1.3646 -2.7786 2.6797 308 83 
t217 3.0027 0.1382 117 -1.8245 1.5034 -4.8313 1.1823 267 90.8 
t218 3.5603 0.1178 148 4.2388 1.2807 1.6774 6.8003 301 85.5 
t219 3.0407 0.036 763 -1.411 0.3918 -2.1945 -0.6275 2,739 89 
t220 2.9713 0.1393 91 -2.1656 1.5145 -5.1946 0.8634 261 84.2 
t221 4.1569 0.087 192 10.7271 0.9459 8.8354 12.6188 461 97.5 
t222 3.868 0.029 813 7.5853 0.3152 6.9549 8.2157 4,370 94.3 
t223 3.868 0.029 813 7.5853 0.3152 6.9549 8.2157 4,370 94.3 
t224 3.4239 0.0244 828 2.7553 0.2649 2.2254 3.2851 4,366 93.8 
t225 3.2354 0.0309 812 0.7057 0.3366 0.0325 1.3788 3,354 93.6 
t226 0.5723 0.6558 8 -28.255 7.1317 -42.518 -13.992 9 23.7 
 194 
 
t227 3.0753 0.1328 111 -1.0352 1.4439 -3.9231 1.8526 284 83.8 
t228 3.3881 0.0253 856 2.3665 0.2754 1.8157 2.9174 4,370 91.9 
t229 3.1199 0.1918 61 -0.5506 2.0862 -4.723 3.6218 93 83 
t230 3.4179 0.1246 149 2.6908 1.3548 -0.0189 5.4004 277 85.8 
t231 3.1733 0.0323 917 0.031 0.3515 -0.6721 0.7341 3,660 89.9 
t232 3.4591 0.0223 980 3.1387 0.242 2.6547 3.6226 5,551 93.6 
t233 3.4415 0.0211 1,031 2.9473 0.2295 2.4882 3.4063 5,953 94.2 
t234 2.8344 0.3023 31 -3.655 3.2872 -10.229 2.9193 51 79.7 
t235 3.3899 0.0202 1,365 2.3862 0.2194 1.9475 2.8249 6,532 100 
t236 3.5899 0.0212 915 4.5609 0.2307 4.0995 5.0222 5,970 96.2 
t237 3.5299 0.0206 971 3.9084 0.2243 3.4599 4.3569 6,403 94.6 
t238 3.4578 0.0296 1,014 3.1242 0.3216 2.481 3.7674 4,683 89.4 
t239 3.5157 0.0561 501 3.7541 0.6099 2.5343 4.9739 1,447 88.7 
t240 4.3315 0.0205 1,434 12.6261 0.2229 12.1802 13.072 8,526 100 
t241 5.3358 0.2306 68 23.5472 2.5075 18.5322 28.5622 103 100 
t242 3.6926 0.0252 778 5.6778 0.2745 5.1288 6.2268 4,439 94.3 
t243 5.478 0.0943 206 25.0934 1.0251 23.0433 27.1436 494 100 
t244 3.5272 0.0279 686 3.8788 0.3031 3.2726 4.4851 3,348 92.9 
t245 3.5509 0.02 1,051 4.1372 0.2178 3.7016 4.5727 6,377 93.3 
t246 2.9778 0.0548 361 -2.0951 0.5959 -3.2869 -0.9033 1,073 82.9 
t247 3.522 0.0201 1,009 3.8221 0.2182 3.3857 4.2585 6,090 94.7 
t248 3.5363 0.1689 113 3.9781 1.8362 0.3056 7.6505 224 89.6 
t249 3.1962 0.2731 34 0.2802 2.9701 -5.66 6.2203 65 82.3 
 195 
 
t250 3.0853 0.069 245 -0.9266 0.7507 -2.428 0.5749 611 85.5 
t251 3.2117 0.0335 829 0.4486 0.3643 -0.28 1.1773 3,352 92 
t252 3.6079 0.022 784 4.7565 0.2395 4.2775 5.2354 5,014 95.5 
t253 3.6028 0.0185 1,088 4.7009 0.2015 4.2979 5.104 7,064 95 
t254 3.5701 0.0368 571 4.3457 0.4007 3.5443 5.1472 2,145 95.9 
t255 3.4071 0.0174 1,372 2.5733 0.1895 2.1943 2.9523 7,823 100 
 
Table 13: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A) 
 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 1.8721 0.0372 98 1.0506 0.1511 0.7483 1.3528 306 74 
t2 2.0269 0.024 207 1.6802 0.0976 1.485 1.8754 492 82 
t3 1.7486 0.0071 488 0.5489 0.029 0.491 0.6068 9,868 69 
t4 2.1405 0.0063 772 2.142 0.0255 2.0909 2.1931 5,025 85 
t5 1.8613 0.018 366 1.007 0.0731 0.8609 1.1532 1,324 75 
t6 2.0589 0.0055 737 1.81 0.0224 1.7652 1.8547 7,772 82 
t7 2.1643 0.0109 421 2.2384 0.0442 2.1501 2.3268 1,717 86 
 196 
 
t8 2.2559 0.0049 900 2.6112 0.0199 2.5714 2.651 6,466 90 
t9 1.8367 0.0192 268 0.907 0.0781 0.7509 1.0632 1,214 73 
t10 2.1325 0.0229 182 2.1092 0.093 1.9231 2.2952 408 84 
t11 2.2236 0.0061 754 2.4798 0.0246 2.4305 2.529 4,573 88 
t12 2.1263 0.0127 367 2.0841 0.0516 1.9809 2.1872 1,428 84 
t13 2.019 0.0755 47 1.6478 0.3071 1.0336 2.262 57 81 
t14 2.1704 0.0169 272 2.2633 0.0687 2.1259 2.4008 785 87 
t15 2.2548 0.0173 165 2.6067 0.0703 2.4661 2.7473 462 93 
t16 2.2859 0.0098 383 2.7327 0.0397 2.6532 2.8122 1,342 92 
t17 2.2757 0.0046 856 2.6914 0.0185 2.6543 2.7285 6,929 91 
t18 2.2504 0.0044 951 2.5887 0.0179 2.553 2.6245 7,566 89 
t19 2.2267 0.0057 776 2.4923 0.023 2.4462 2.5384 5,168 89 
t20 1.834 0.0491 77 0.8961 0.1997 0.4967 1.2954 192 72 
t21 2.0673 0.0134 406 1.8444 0.0543 1.7359 1.953 1,534 82 
t22 2.0723 0.0118 495 1.8647 0.048 1.7687 1.9608 2,056 82 
t23 2.2421 0.0059 781 2.5547 0.0239 2.507 2.6024 5,000 89 
t24 2.1704 0.0169 272 2.2633 0.0687 2.1259 2.4008 785 87 
t25 2.0133 0.0323 146 1.6247 0.1313 1.3621 1.8874 307 80 
t26 2.1216 0.0132 332 2.0651 0.0537 1.9577 2.1724 1,110 86 
t27 1.7013 0.0511 85 0.3563 0.2076 -0.059 0.7714 226 65 
t28 2.1806 0.0054 915 2.305 0.0221 2.2609 2.3491 6,628 87 
 197 
 
t29 2.1656 0.0081 599 2.2439 0.0331 2.1777 2.3101 2,757 87 
t30 1.6776 0.0229 215 0.2602 0.0931 0.074 0.4464 1,130 66 
t31 2.1958 0.006 682 2.3667 0.0244 2.318 2.4155 5,158 89 
t32 1.9617 0.0205 266 1.4151 0.0833 1.2486 1.5817 818 80 
t33 1.8456 0.0624 72 0.943 0.2536 0.4358 1.4502 111 74 
t34 2.2299 0.0052 932 2.5052 0.021 2.4631 2.5472 6,337 89 
t35 2.1754 0.0187 160 2.2837 0.076 2.1316 2.4357 447 87 
t36 1.8305 0.0652 69 0.8818 0.2652 0.3514 1.4121 109 73 
t37 2.2626 0.005 867 2.6382 0.0203 2.5977 2.6787 6,391 91 
t38 2.2359 0.0105 430 2.5298 0.0427 2.4444 2.6152 1,548 90 
t39 2.0603 0.0108 618 1.8159 0.0439 1.7282 1.9036 2,479 82 
t40 2.0752 0.0102 621 1.8765 0.0414 1.7937 1.9593 2,723 82 
t41 2.2432 0.0056 869 2.5591 0.0229 2.5134 2.6048 5,466 90 
t42 1.879 0.0626 71 1.0789 0.2544 0.5701 1.5877 108 75 
t43 2.263 0.0205 135 2.6397 0.0834 2.4729 2.8065 333 92 
t44 2.1627 0.0086 855 2.2321 0.0351 2.1619 2.3023 3,440 100 
t45 2.2354 0.0068 676 2.5277 0.0276 2.4726 2.5828 3,872 91 
t46 2.1933 0.0056 844 2.3564 0.0227 2.311 2.4018 5,730 90 
t47 1.7955 0.0242 261 0.7393 0.0984 0.5424 0.9362 838 72 
t48 2.2601 0.0094 455 2.6281 0.0382 2.5516 2.7046 1,790 91 
t49 2.12 0.023 177 2.0584 0.0935 1.8713 2.2454 418 84 
 198 
 
t50 2.2537 0.0049 892 2.602 0.0199 2.5622 2.6418 6,603 90 
t51 2.0656 0.015 278 1.8372 0.0609 1.7154 1.959 1,072 83 
t52 2.1659 0.0111 428 2.2451 0.0451 2.1548 2.3354 1,540 87 
t53 2.2752 0.0053 810 2.6895 0.0215 2.6466 2.7325 5,362 91 
t54 2.2259 0.0221 137 2.4889 0.09 2.3089 2.669 304 90 
t55 2.5847 0.0035 1,359 3.9476 0.0142 3.9192 3.9761 7,056 100 
t56 2.2333 0.005 839 2.519 0.0202 2.4785 2.5595 6,816 89 
t57 2.2917 0.0046 914 2.7567 0.0186 2.7195 2.7938 7,435 91 
t58 2.773 0.0196 74 4.7131 0.0796 4.5539 4.8722 107 100 
t59 2.3073 0.0047 869 2.8201 0.019 2.782 2.8581 6,178 92 
t60 2.3038 0.0043 859 2.8057 0.0173 2.771 2.8403 7,452 92 
t61 2.2982 0.005 848 2.7831 0.0203 2.7424 2.8238 5,759 92 
t62 2.0529 0.006 585 1.7858 0.0244 1.737 1.8345 6,498 82 
t63 2.2561 0.0048 942 2.6117 0.0195 2.5726 2.6508 7,546 91 
t64 1.9738 0.0557 82 1.4643 0.2262 1.0118 1.9167 121 79 
t65 2.156 0.0144 349 2.2049 0.0586 2.0877 2.322 1,072 86 
t66 2.2604 0.0051 918 2.6293 0.0206 2.588 2.6706 6,457 90 
t67 2.2584 0.0052 923 2.6212 0.021 2.5792 2.6631 6,559 90 
t68 2.2279 0.0051 916 2.497 0.0208 2.4555 2.5385 6,713 89 
t69 2.2651 0.0053 887 2.6484 0.0214 2.6056 2.6912 6,089 91 
t70 2.2233 0.0122 350 2.4786 0.0496 2.3795 2.5777 1,107 89 
 199 
 
t71 2.1948 0.009 487 2.3626 0.0368 2.289 2.4361 2,237 89 
t72 2.2679 0.0044 1,010 2.6597 0.0177 2.6244 2.6951 8,024 91 
t73 2.2319 0.0051 964 2.5134 0.0206 2.4723 2.5545 7,345 90 
t74 2.2165 0.0065 750 2.4509 0.0262 2.3984 2.5034 4,424 89 
t75 2.1975 0.0115 448 2.3737 0.0468 2.2802 2.4673 1,514 88 
t76 2.2405 0.0054 882 2.5485 0.0219 2.5048 2.5923 5,969 90 
t77 2.2266 0.0293 131 2.4918 0.1191 2.2535 2.7301 243 90 
t78 1.9129 0.0526 80 1.2168 0.2137 0.7893 1.6443 145 77 
t79 2.2279 0.0055 838 2.4971 0.0224 2.4524 2.5419 5,724 90 
t80 2.1764 0.0116 424 2.2877 0.0471 2.1935 2.3819 1,571 87 
t81 2.2543 0.0056 767 2.6044 0.0227 2.5589 2.6499 5,286 91 
t82 2.2417 0.0081 501 2.5531 0.033 2.4871 2.6192 2,385 90 
t83 2.2754 0.0049 870 2.6901 0.02 2.6502 2.73 6,516 91 
t84 1.9014 0.0668 35 1.1698 0.2716 0.6265 1.7131 108 73 
t85 1.9014 0.0668 35 1.1698 0.2716 0.6265 1.7131 108 73 
t86 2.2381 0.0054 846 2.5387 0.0221 2.4945 2.5829 5,618 89 
t87 2.2715 0.0048 863 2.6743 0.0196 2.6352 2.7134 6,435 90 
t88 2.2663 0.0049 900 2.6532 0.0199 2.6133 2.6931 6,484 90 
t89 2.2095 0.0055 814 2.4223 0.0223 2.3777 2.4669 6,118 89 
t90 2.2543 0.005 908 2.6045 0.0202 2.564 2.645 6,335 90 
t91 2.2299 0.0046 920 2.5054 0.0189 2.4677 2.5432 8,003 90 
 200 
 
t92 2.2671 0.005 859 2.6563 0.0202 2.6159 2.6968 6,375 91 
t93 2.2624 0.0049 878 2.6373 0.02 2.5972 2.6773 6,918 91 
t94 2.2913 0.0044 954 2.755 0.0178 2.7194 2.7906 7,671 91 
t95 2.282 0.0044 941 2.7171 0.0181 2.681 2.7532 7,380 91 
t96 2.3036 0.0045 941 2.8047 0.0181 2.7684 2.841 7,209 91 
t97 2.2904 0.0044 954 2.7514 0.0177 2.7159 2.7868 7,418 91 
t98 2.2035 0.0115 366 2.3979 0.0469 2.3041 2.4916 1,411 88 
t99 2.2819 0.0044 911 2.7166 0.0179 2.6808 2.7524 7,409 91 
t100 2.2424 0.0047 941 2.5561 0.019 2.5182 2.5941 7,431 89 
t101 2.2302 0.0069 624 2.5065 0.0279 2.4506 2.5624 3,517 89 
t102 2.2867 0.0046 910 2.736 0.0186 2.6989 2.7732 6,815 91 
t103 2.293 0.0055 723 2.7616 0.0225 2.7165 2.8066 4,496 91 
t104 2.2916 0.0043 892 2.7563 0.0177 2.7209 2.7916 7,220 91 
t105 1.9872 0.0231 180 1.5188 0.0938 1.3311 1.7064 586 80 
t106 2.0226 0.0265 195 1.6627 0.1079 1.4469 1.8785 468 79 
t107 2.2445 0.0065 673 2.5647 0.0263 2.5122 2.6172 3,922 90 
t108 2.3038 0.004 950 2.8057 0.0162 2.7733 2.8381 8,430 91 
t109 2.2977 0.0044 894 2.781 0.0178 2.7454 2.8167 7,293 91 
t110 2.2378 0.0059 802 2.5374 0.0238 2.4898 2.585 4,839 89 
t111 2.2898 0.0044 929 2.7489 0.0179 2.7132 2.7847 7,406 92 
t112 2.2723 0.0047 916 2.6775 0.0193 2.639 2.7161 6,732 91 
 201 
 
t113 1.9438 0.0356 117 1.3423 0.1449 1.0526 1.6321 255 79 
t114 2.162 0.0052 894 2.2292 0.0211 2.1869 2.2715 7,297 86 
t115 2.1346 0.062 48 2.1179 0.2521 1.6138 2.622 67 87 
t116 2.102 0.0744 30 1.9854 0.3023 1.3807 2.59 44 85 
t117 2.173 0.0156 307 2.2741 0.0635 2.1471 2.4012 906 89 
t118 2.1002 0.0115 514 1.9779 0.0468 1.8844 2.0714 1,988 83 
t119 2.2273 0.0051 947 2.4949 0.0206 2.4536 2.5362 6,956 89 
t120 2.2358 0.0047 925 2.5293 0.0193 2.4907 2.5679 7,033 89 
t121 1.8835 0.0589 78 1.097 0.2394 0.6181 1.5758 123 76 
t122 2.2284 0.0085 531 2.4992 0.0347 2.4298 2.5686 2,273 90 
t123 1.8929 0.0198 302 1.1353 0.0805 0.9742 1.2963 1,077 76 
t124 2.1172 0.0116 522 2.0473 0.0472 1.9528 2.1417 1,839 84 
t125 2.2588 0.0049 771 2.6229 0.02 2.5828 2.663 6,395 91 
t126 1.9821 0.0366 88 1.4981 0.1487 1.2007 1.7955 241 79 
t127 1.8221 0.0329 112 0.8477 0.1337 0.5803 1.1152 451 71 
t128 2.2898 0.0048 857 2.7489 0.0196 2.7097 2.7882 6,382 92 
t129 2.2615 0.0045 808 2.6337 0.0184 2.5969 2.6704 6,814 92 
t130 2.2669 0.004 802 2.6557 0.0163 2.6231 2.6882 8,250 91 
t131 2.2907 0.0049 773 2.7523 0.0201 2.7121 2.7925 5,542 92 
t132 2.2514 0.0052 803 2.5926 0.0211 2.5503 2.6348 5,684 91 
t133 2.0688 0.0101 613 1.8504 0.0412 1.768 1.9327 2,850 81 
 202 
 
t134 1.9725 0.0206 304 1.4588 0.0837 1.2913 1.6263 921 78 
t135 2.0543 0.0249 197 1.7912 0.1014 1.5884 1.9941 490 83 
t136 1.759 0.0768 62 0.591 0.3121 -0.033 1.2151 87 70 
t137 2.295 0.0106 373 2.7701 0.0429 2.6843 2.8559 1,220 91 
t138 2.2636 0.0122 279 2.6423 0.0497 2.5429 2.7417 959 90 
t139 2.2887 0.0057 703 2.7442 0.0232 2.6979 2.7905 4,238 92 
t140 2.2424 0.0068 616 2.5562 0.0276 2.501 2.6115 3,490 89 
t141 2.2179 0.0065 682 2.4566 0.0265 2.4036 2.5096 4,072 88 
t142 2.1714 0.0227 169 2.2674 0.0925 2.0825 2.4523 382 87 
t143 2.2453 0.0103 365 2.5678 0.0419 2.484 2.6517 1,430 90 
t144 2.0832 0.0134 347 1.909 0.0545 1.8 2.0179 1,274 83 
t145 2.0165 0.0233 199 1.638 0.0946 1.4488 1.8272 509 80 
t146 2.1289 0.0118 444 2.0947 0.0479 1.9989 2.1905 1,764 84 
t147 2.1715 0.0116 394 2.2679 0.0473 2.1732 2.3626 1,423 86 
t148 2.0074 0.0149 378 1.6008 0.0607 1.4793 1.7223 1,267 81 
t149 2.2077 0.0075 516 2.415 0.0307 2.3537 2.4764 2,830 88 
t150 1.7817 0.0437 126 0.6834 0.1775 0.3285 1.0384 283 70 
t151 2.2105 0.0596 42 2.4265 0.2423 1.9419 2.911 51 90 
t152 2.2604 0.0184 187 2.6292 0.075 2.4792 2.7791 386 91 
t153 2.2426 0.0069 566 2.5567 0.0281 2.5006 2.6129 3,134 89 
t154 2.2987 0.0058 709 2.7851 0.0237 2.7377 2.8325 4,242 93 
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t155 2.2582 0.0055 721 2.6205 0.0225 2.5755 2.6655 4,958 91 
t156 2.2734 0.0055 743 2.6821 0.0225 2.6372 2.7271 4,764 91 
t157 1.7465 0.1068 30 0.5404 0.4341 -0.328 1.4086 40 71 
t158 2.2515 0.0126 304 2.5929 0.0511 2.4908 2.6951 910 90 
t159 2.1663 0.0103 505 2.2466 0.0418 2.1631 2.3301 2,061 85 
t160 2.3046 0.0047 774 2.8091 0.0192 2.7706 2.8475 6,138 93 
t161 2.0598 0.0119 475 1.8137 0.0486 1.7166 1.9109 1,911 82 
t162 2.0851 0.0384 88 1.9165 0.1562 1.6041 2.2289 174 83 
t163 2.2198 0.0047 993 2.4641 0.0193 2.4254 2.5027 7,964 88 
t164 2.0438 0.0352 117 1.7489 0.1431 1.4628 2.0351 234 82 
t165 2.1157 0.0514 63 2.0412 0.2089 1.6233 2.459 112 86 
t166 2.2407 0.0101 377 2.5491 0.0409 2.4673 2.6309 1,453 90 
t167 2.268 0.005 753 2.66 0.0204 2.6192 2.7008 5,439 91 
t168 2.2622 0.0052 751 2.6367 0.0212 2.5942 2.6792 5,965 93 
t169 1.9696 0.0551 66 1.4473 0.2242 0.999 1.8956 112 79 
t170 2.2687 0.0083 537 2.6629 0.0336 2.5958 2.7301 2,268 92 
t171 2.2157 0.006 738 2.4475 0.0246 2.3983 2.4966 4,933 89 
t172 2.0807 0.0094 673 1.8989 0.0381 1.8226 1.9752 3,193 82 
t173 2.0572 0.055 57 1.8032 0.2237 1.3558 2.2507 93 82 
t174 2.1706 0.0084 571 2.264 0.0341 2.1959 2.3321 2,798 87 
t175 2.2074 0.0066 665 2.4139 0.027 2.3599 2.4678 3,834 89 
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t176 2.1212 0.0212 232 2.0633 0.0861 1.8912 2.2355 574 84 
t177 2.0524 0.0119 439 1.7836 0.0483 1.6869 1.8803 1,811 82 
t178 2.228 0.006 730 2.4976 0.0242 2.4492 2.546 4,791 90 
t179 1.7527 0.0149 425 0.5655 0.0606 0.4444 0.6867 2,507 69 
t180 1.6594 0.019 360 0.1863 0.0773 0.0316 0.341 1,610 67 
t181 1.9236 0.0326 142 1.26 0.1325 0.9949 1.525 387 76 
t182 1.8518 0.0234 258 0.9682 0.0953 0.7776 1.1587 805 75 
t183 2.0948 0.0103 516 1.9562 0.042 1.8722 2.0402 2,368 84 
t184 2.2277 0.0089 457 2.4962 0.0362 2.4239 2.5686 2,057 90 
t185 2.1903 0.006 851 2.3441 0.0243 2.2956 2.3927 5,351 87 
t186 1.9034 0.0216 264 1.1779 0.0878 1.0022 1.3535 805 78 
t187 2.0711 0.0561 44 1.8597 0.2279 1.4039 2.3154 67 85 
t188 2.2604 0.006 596 2.6291 0.0244 2.5803 2.6779 3,771 91 
t189 2.2379 0.0091 423 2.5378 0.0372 2.4635 2.6122 1,852 89 
t190 2.2198 0.0083 527 2.4644 0.0338 2.3967 2.5321 2,490 90 
t191 2.1719 0.0077 638 2.2693 0.0312 2.2069 2.3317 3,217 87 
t192 2.1237 0.0207 203 2.0734 0.084 1.9053 2.2414 553 84 
t193 2.2301 0.0079 492 2.506 0.0322 2.4416 2.5705 2,502 88 
t194 2.0261 0.0331 127 1.6769 0.1346 1.4077 1.9461 253 81 
t195 1.9718 0.0532 68 1.4563 0.2162 1.0239 1.8886 103 80 
t196 2.1462 0.0341 95 2.1651 0.1388 1.8875 2.4427 186 85 
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t197 2.3002 0.0086 406 2.791 0.0351 2.7208 2.8612 1,800 93 
t198 2.2536 0.0062 721 2.6016 0.0251 2.5515 2.6517 4,436 90 
t199 2.2714 0.0053 698 2.6739 0.0217 2.6305 2.7172 5,153 91 
t200 1.8286 0.046 82 0.8738 0.1871 0.4995 1.248 189 74 
t201 2.2112 0.0086 411 2.4294 0.035 2.3594 2.4994 2,276 89 
t202 2.1322 0.0096 564 2.1083 0.0391 2.0301 2.1864 2,573 84 
t203 2.2842 0.0045 849 2.7261 0.0183 2.6894 2.7628 6,698 92 
t204 2.2692 0.005 818 2.6649 0.0204 2.6241 2.7057 5,756 91 
t205 1.9957 0.0048 1,248 1.5533 0.0197 1.514 1.5926 14,240 80 
t206 2.3102 0.0048 762 2.8318 0.0196 2.7926 2.871 5,973 91 
t207 2.2339 0.0056 878 2.5216 0.0229 2.4757 2.5674 5,616 89 
t208 1.7959 0.0297 196 0.7412 0.1209 0.4994 0.983 553 71 
t209 1.9268 0.0255 210 1.2731 0.1036 1.0659 1.4803 550 76 
t210 2.2949 0.0048 852 2.7695 0.0195 2.7306 2.8085 5,801 92 
t211 2.5644 0.0044 1,047 3.8651 0.0177 3.8297 3.9006 4,776 100 
t212 2.2685 0.005 817 2.662 0.0202 2.6216 2.7024 5,755 91 
t213 2.0968 0.0095 659 1.9643 0.0386 1.8871 2.0415 2,936 83 
t214 2.0556 0.0126 444 1.7968 0.0512 1.6943 1.8993 1,739 81 
t215 2.0239 0.0591 59 1.6678 0.2403 1.1872 2.1483 89 80 
t216 1.8248 0.0418 93 0.8586 0.17 0.5185 1.1987 267 72 
t217 1.8392 0.0461 82 0.9171 0.1875 0.5421 1.2921 212 72 
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t218 2.0074 0.0334 129 1.6008 0.1359 1.3289 1.8727 282 80 
t219 2.0188 0.0114 563 1.6473 0.0464 1.5545 1.74 2,430 79 
t220 1.7185 0.0494 69 0.4265 0.201 0.0246 0.8285 214 69 
t221 2.3246 0.0156 182 2.8904 0.0636 2.7631 3.0176 449 95 
t222 2.2449 0.006 709 2.5663 0.0245 2.5173 2.6154 4,179 90 
t223 2.2449 0.006 709 2.5663 0.0245 2.5173 2.6154 4,179 90 
t224 2.2252 0.0062 667 2.486 0.0252 2.4356 2.5364 4,142 89 
t225 2.1899 0.0083 633 2.3427 0.0338 2.2751 2.4104 3,093 86 
t226 0.2951 0.4084 4 -5.3597 1.6602 -8.68 -2.039 4 11 
t227 1.8287 0.0447 87 0.8743 0.1818 0.5107 1.238 243 72 
t228 2.1857 0.0068 685 2.3256 0.0276 2.2704 2.3808 4,132 87 
t229 1.895 0.0679 53 1.1437 0.2762 0.5913 1.696 85 76 
t230 1.9862 0.0355 128 1.5145 0.1444 1.2257 1.8033 256 79 
t231 2.0316 0.0097 683 1.699 0.0393 1.6204 1.7775 3,270 80 
t232 2.2186 0.0057 786 2.4594 0.0233 2.4129 2.5059 5,219 88 
t233 2.2213 0.0057 833 2.4702 0.0232 2.4238 2.5167 5,605 89 
t234 1.8497 0.1094 26 0.9597 0.4447 0.0703 1.8491 44 69 
t235 2.2622 0.0051 878 2.6364 0.0209 2.5947 2.6782 5,862 90 
t236 2.2982 0.0048 756 2.7827 0.0197 2.7434 2.822 5,676 91 
t237 2.2324 0.0053 785 2.5156 0.0214 2.4728 2.5584 6,046 89 
t238 2.0682 0.008 807 1.848 0.0326 1.7828 1.9131 4,322 83 
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t239 2.0087 0.0155 413 1.6061 0.063 1.48 1.7322 1,325 81 
t240 2.5902 0.0031 1,434 3.9699 0.0126 3.9448 3.995 8,526 100 
t241 2.4954 0.0346 68 3.5847 0.1407 3.3033 3.866 103 100 
t242 2.2647 0.0057 671 2.6469 0.023 2.6009 2.6929 4,254 90 
t243 2.3249 0.0106 206 2.8916 0.043 2.8056 2.9777 494 100 
t244 2.2417 0.007 585 2.5532 0.0286 2.4961 2.6103 3,209 89 
t245 2.2475 0.0051 869 2.5768 0.0207 2.5354 2.6182 6,080 89 
t246 1.9324 0.0193 301 1.296 0.0784 1.1392 1.4527 986 76 
t247 2.3054 0.0048 829 2.8122 0.0197 2.7728 2.8516 5,841 91 
t248 1.8312 0.0474 92 0.8847 0.1925 0.4996 1.2698 195 78 
t249 1.9114 0.0883 29 1.2104 0.3588 0.4927 1.9281 57 72 
t250 2.0052 0.0229 213 1.592 0.093 1.4059 1.7781 568 79 
t251 2.0884 0.0095 631 1.9299 0.0385 1.8529 2.007 3,025 83 
t252 2.2938 0.005 671 2.7652 0.0205 2.7242 2.8063 4,799 91 
t253 2.3097 0.0044 909 2.8298 0.0177 2.7944 2.8652 6,789 91 
t254 2.3093 0.0082 491 2.828 0.0334 2.7611 2.8949 2,038 91 
t255 2.312 0.0043 887 2.8389 0.0173 2.8042 2.8735 7,154 91 
 
Table 14: George W. Bush Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B) 
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Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 3.5868 0.0291 1,005 6.3208 0.2527 5.8154 6.8261 6,752 87 
t2 3.5561 0.0346 697 6.0546 0.3003 5.4539 6.6552 4,591 85 
t3 3.2515 0.0454 411 3.4134 0.3933 2.6269 4.2 2,067 84 
t4 5.3472 0.0343 1,716 21.5843 0.2976 20.989 22.18 6,993 100 
t5 3.4121 0.0679 366 4.8058 0.5887 3.6283 5.9832 1,036 88 
t6 3.3913 0.0536 474 4.6256 0.4644 3.6968 5.5543 1,936 89 
t7 3.4332 0.0544 440 4.9885 0.4718 4.0449 5.9321 1,768 88 
t8 3.3127 0.0472 662 3.9442 0.4095 3.1252 4.7632 2,431 90 
t9 2.7173 0.0332 920 -1.2182 0.2879 -1.794 
-
0.6425 3,138 98 
t10 2.5894 0.0301 1,072 -2.3275 0.2611 -2.85 
-
1.8052 3,478 100 
t11 3.1604 0.0141 1,661 2.6237 0.1224 2.379 2.8685 32,019 77 
t12 3.2874 0.0303 775 3.7251 0.2625 3.2 4.2502 5,355 87 
t13 3.4207 0.0283 909 4.8801 0.2451 4.3899 5.3704 6,650 88 
t14 3.4094 0.0503 496 4.7821 0.4361 3.9099 5.6544 2,030 86 
t15 3.2492 0.3087 49 3.3935 2.6768 -1.96 8.7471 82 77 
t16 3.7281 0.0482 610 7.5458 0.4176 6.7106 8.3809 2,651 83 
t17 3.4423 0.0407 730 5.0677 0.3531 4.3615 5.7739 3,585 81 
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t18 2.0682 0.094 108 -6.8466 0.8151 -8.477 
-
5.2163 427 66 
t19 3.3687 0.0375 801 4.4298 0.3253 3.7792 5.0805 4,182 81 
t20 2.1507 0.1458 25 -6.131 1.2641 -8.659 
-
3.6029 92 68 
t21 3.4317 0.0365 865 4.9755 0.3166 4.3424 5.6086 4,591 82 
t22 2.6589 0.0846 210 -1.7242 0.7332 -3.191 
-
0.2578 551 80 
t23 3.4926 0.0527 455 5.5042 0.4572 4.5899 6.4186 1,960 85 
t24 2.0634 0.0399 660 -6.8879 0.3458 -7.58 
-
6.1963 1,585 100 
 
Table 15: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE A) 
 
Text 
File 
Raw 
Score 
Raw 
SE 
Unique 
Scored 
Words 
Transformed 
Score 
Transformed 
SE 
Transformed                 
[95% 
Confidence 
Interval] 
Total 
Words 
Scored 
%       
Tot    
Sc'd 
t1 2.4577 0.0062 813 . . . . 6,359 82 
t2 2.4326 0.0077 591 . . . . 4,403 81 
t3 2.3973 0.0122 344 . . . . 1,961 80 
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t4 3 0 1,716 . . . . 6,993 100 
t5 2.4814 0.0151 313 . . . . 976 83 
t6 2.4779 0.0112 380 . . . . 1,794 83 
t7 2.4436 0.0124 357 . . . . 1,638 82 
t8 2.4458 0.0107 515 . . . . 2,198 82 
t9 2.4082 0.0105 543 . . . . 2,572 80 
t10 2.3548 0.0109 559 . . . . 2,730 79 
t11 2.0959 0.0044 1,219 . . . . 28,920 70 
t12 2.4147 0.0075 602 . . . . 4,942 81 
t13 2.4429 0.0064 695 . . . . 6,174 81 
t14 2.4152 0.012 406 . . . . 1,904 81 
t15 2.0467 0.0922 45 . . . . 73 68 
t16 2.3738 0.0111 524 . . . . 2,536 79 
t17 2.3059 0.0104 612 . . . . 3,395 77 
t18 1.6997 0.0512 86 . . . . 366 57 
t19 2.2889 0.0099 664 . . . . 3,940 76 
t20 1.7868 0.104 20 . . . . 81 60 
t21 2.3035 0.0093 704 . . . . 4,286 77 
t22 2.1266 0.0333 172 . . . . 487 71 
t23 2.3995 0.0125 381 . . . . 1,850 80 
t24 2.2069 0.0199 326 . . . . 1,166 74 
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Table 16: Richard B. Cheney Documents Content Analysis Results (SCALE B) 
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Descriptive Analysis of Automated Content Analysis Results 
Clinton Values (All years) - SCALE A 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -13.9543 -20.972 
   
  
5% -8.2225 -14.361 
   
  
10% -5.5175 -14.361 
  
Obs 369 
25% 0.6075 -13.954 
  
Sum of Wgt. 369 
  
     
  
50% 4.3691 
   
Mean 3.19091 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 5.82393 
75% 6.6393 18.8812 
   
  
90% 8.2914 20.2651 
  
Variance 33.9182 
95% 9.7231 25.0578 
  
Skewness -0.5119 
99% 18.8812 25.1551     Kurtosis 5.03307 
Clinton Values (All years) - SCALE B 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% 1.1837 1.0197 
   
  
5% 1.5062 1.1148 
   
  
10% 1.6697 1.1697 
  
Obs 369 
25% 2.0727 1.1837 
  
Sum of Wgt. 369 
  
     
  
50% 2.4339 
   
Mean 2.30658 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev.   
75% 2.573 3.3353 
   
  
90% 2.6684 3.3472 
  
Variance 0.16667 
95% 2.7537 3.3522 
  
Skewness -0.7887 
99% 3.3353 3.3527     Kurtosis 3.36017 
 
Table 17: Summarized Clinton Values (All years) on SCALE A and B 
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G. Bush (All years) - SCALE A 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -1.2499 -1.6371 
   
  
5% -1.052 -1.2499 
   
  
10% -0.7565 -1.2241 
  
Obs 105 
25% -0.2487 -1.1688 
  
Sum of Wgt. 105 
  
     
  
50% 0.1655 
   
Mean 0.53939 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 2.5 
75% 0.7847 2.5045 
   
  
90% 1.5596 2.6909 
  
Variance 6.25001 
95% 2.1242 5.6611 
  
Skewness 7.84457 
99% 5.6611 23.8004     Kurtosis 72.9711 
G. Bush Values (All years) - SCALE B 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -1.4076 -2.0364 
   
  
5% -0.989 -1.4076 
   
  
10% -0.533 -1.0753 
  
Obs 105 
25% 0.7898 -1.0403 
  
Sum of Wgt. 105 
  
     
  
50% 1.3747 
   
Mean 1.32232 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 1.41422 
75% 1.9062 2.7401 
   
  
90% 2.5424 2.8655 
  
Variance 2.00001 
95% 2.6902 3.2299 
  
Skewness 2.55193 
99% 3.2299 10.9029     Kurtosis 21.6168 
 
Table 18: Summarized G. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B 
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G. W. Bush (All years) - SCALE A 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -4.7658 -28.255 
   
  
5% -2.5287 -5.6648 
   
  
10% -1.1532 -4.7658 
  
Obs 255 
25% 1.1981 -4.6811 
  
Sum of Wgt. 255 
  
     
  
50% 3.7378 
   
Mean 3.49156 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 5.07092 
75% 5.1495 18.5407 
   
  
90% 7.0196 23.5472 
  
Variance 25.7143 
95% 9.2958 25.0934 
  
Skewness 1.70316 
99% 23.5472 44.1164     Kurtosis 25.7254 
G. W. Bush Values (All years) - SCALE B 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% 0.2602 -5.3597 
   
  
5% 0.8477 0.1863 
   
  
10% 1.0506 0.2602 
  
Obs 255 
25% 1.7858 0.3563 
  
Sum of Wgt. 255 
  
     
  
50% 2.4294 
   
Mean 2.14006 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 0.83666 
75% 2.6293 3.8651 
   
  
90% 2.7616 3.9476 
  
Variance 0.7 
95% 2.8122 3.9699 
  
Skewness -3.0866 
99% 3.9476 4.7191     Kurtosis 27.2638 
 
Table 19: Summarized G. W. Bush Values (All years) on SCALE A and B 
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R. Cheney (All years) - SCALE A 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -6.8879 -6.8879 
   
  
5% -6.8466 -6.8466 
   
  
10% -6.131 -6.131 
  
Obs 24 
25% 0.70275 -2.3275 
  
Sum of Wgt. 24 
  
     
  
50% 4.5277 
   
Mean 3.23039 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 5.7735 
75% 5.0281 6.0546 
   
  
90% 6.3208 6.3208 
  
Variance 33.3333 
95% 7.5458 7.5458 
  
Skewness 0.71538 
99% 21.5843 21.5843     Kurtosis 5.89957 
R. Cheney Values (All years) - SCALE B 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% 1.6997 1.6997 
   
  
5% 1.7868 1.7868 
   
  
10% 2.0467 2.0467 
  
Obs 24 
25% 2.2479 2.0959 
  
Sum of Wgt. 24 
  
     
  
50% 2.3984 
   
Mean 2.32526 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 0.25353 
75% 2.44325 2.4577 
   
  
90% 2.4779 2.4779 
  
Variance 0.06428 
95% 2.4814 2.4814 
  
Skewness -0.3218 
99% 3 3     Kurtosis 5.02296 
 
Table 20: Summarized R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A and B 
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George W. Bush and R. Cheney (All years) - SCALE A 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% -6.8466 -28.255 
   
  
5% -3.0639 -6.8879 
   
  
10% -1.319 -6.8466 
  
Obs 279 
25% 1.1981 -6.131 
  
Sum of Wgt. 279 
  
     
  
50% 3.7621 
   
Mean 3.46909 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 5.12421 
75% 5.0818 21.5843 
   
  
90% 7.0196 23.5472 
  
Variance 26.2575 
95% 9.2958 25.0934 
  
Skewness 1.58793 
99% 23.5472 44.1164     Kurtosis 23.3034 
George W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (All years) - SCALE B 
  Percentiles Smallest 
   
  
1% 0.2602 -5.3597 
   
  
5% 0.8586 0.1863 
   
  
10% 1.097 0.2602 
  
Obs 279 
25% 1.81 0.3563 
  
Sum of Wgt. 279 
  
     
  
50% 2.415 
   
Mean 2.15599 
  
 
Largest 
  
Std. Dev. 0.80473 
75% 2.6212 3.8651 
   
  
90% 2.7567 3.9476 
  
Variance 0.64759 
95% 2.8122 3.9699 
  
Skewness -3.2223 
99% 3.9476 4.7131     Kurtosis 29.3545 
 
Table 21: Summarized G.W. Bush and R. Cheney Values (All years) on SCALE A 
and B  
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Figure 11: Changing American support (Document values) for Turkey's EU membership by year 
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Figure 12: Changing level of American Support (Document Scores) for Turkey's EU membership by year 
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Figure 13: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner) 
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Figure 14: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner) 
 221 
 
 
Figure 15: Distribution of Document Values on Scale A (by owner) 
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Figure 16: Distribution of Document Values on Scale B (by owner) 
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Scale A Values (by year) 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1990 38 0.06367 0.75794 -1.2241 2.1242 
1991 55 1.00743 3.32441 -1.2499 23.8004 
1992 24 1.73775 2.48146 -1.6371 8.51545 
1993 15 1.53055 5.08437 -10.194 7.1442 
1994 26 0.9484 6.48724 -8.558 9.2146 
1995 19 2.38863 4.78332 -8.8911 7.9122 
1996 49 3.01177 5.10461 -8.7541 16.0624 
1997 45 4.1523 4.71274 -9.9161 12.1738 
1998 49 3.18544 7.19061 -13.954 25.1551 
1999 111 4.05701 6.10001 -20.972 25.0578 
2000 38 2.29972 6.18396 -14.361 7.8282 
2001 15 1.57093 2.87375 -3.2253 7.8557 
2002 53 4.57997 6.75305 -4.7658 44.1164 
2003 90 3.36401 2.90812 -5.6648 13.0068 
2004 77 2.82542 5.23413 -28.255 17.0439 
2005 23 4.78787 6.93781 -3.655 25.0934 
2006 26 3.24801 5.54377 -6.8879 21.5843 
 
Table 22: Scale A Values (by year) 
 224 
 
Scale B Values (by year) 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1990 38 0.93431 0.926035 -1.4076 2.6902 
1991 55 1.75811 1.612013 -2.0364 10.9029 
1992 24 1.4414 1.20419 -1.0403 2.6976 
1993 15 2.24685 0.374726 1.4922 2.5629 
1994 26 2.14759 0.417982 1.1148 2.7449 
1995 19 2.1865 0.401116 1.4066 2.6163 
1996 49 2.23434 0.378597 1.4312 2.7537 
1997 45 2.41494 0.306884 1.579 2.7805 
1998 49 2.27915 0.473661 1.0197 3.3522 
1999 111 2.38399 0.416219 1.1697 3.3527 
2000 38 2.24053 0.461366 1.1837 2.8762 
2001 15 1.87396 0.689247 0.5489 2.7657 
2002 53 2.19899 0.777282 0.2602 4.7131 
2003 90 2.28422 0.54432 0.591 2.8057 
2004 77 1.93893 1.102643 -5.3597 3.8651 
2005 23 2.2835 0.795734 0.8847 3.9699 
2006 26 2.36435 0.279659 1.6997 3 
 
Table 23: Scale B Values (by year) 
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